CVE-2026-116472 (GCVE-0-2026-116472)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-05 18:13 – Updated: 2026-11-05 22:05
VLAI
Title
ingress-nginx mirror-target self-DOS
Summary
A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where a user with permission to create an Ingress may be able to cause denial of service of the ingress-nginx data plane, or possibly redirect traffic from other Ingresses. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using ingress-nginx. Due to a missing check, the mirror-target Ingress annotation can be used to target an unauthenticated configuration API within the ingress-nginx controller, allowing write commands to be submitted. Corrupting the data within that configuration API results in all traffic through ingress-nginx being dropped until an Ingress configuration change or a controller restart causes the data to be recreated correctly. In principle, this write access could also be used to redirect traffic from other Ingresses controlled by the same ingress-nginx instance. In practice, there is negligible additional risk: such redirection would require privileged information about internal ingress-nginx state, and users can already redirect traffic from other Ingresses controlled by the same ingress-nginx anyway.
Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CWE
  • CWE-20 - Improper input validation
Assigner
kubernetes CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard – unranked: 5 records in the last 180 days, 10 needed details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Kubernetes ingress-nginx Affected: 0 , < * (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
SUSE Rancher Prime RKE2 ingress-nginx Affected: 0 , < 1.15.2-prime1 (custom)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-11-05 17:49
Credits
Victor Pereira
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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