CVE-2026-115700 (GCVE-0-2026-115700)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 13:49 – Updated: 2026-10-26 13:49
VLAI
Title
SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney
Summary
Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed. The IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected. This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.
CWE
  • CWE-436 - Interpretation Conflict
  • CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
EEF CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard A 97/100 over 341 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
benoitc hackney Affected: 4.0.1 , < 4.9.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
benoitc hackney Affected: 452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f , < f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee (git)
    cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-25 00:00
Show details on NVD website

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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eInterpretation Conflict vulnerability in \u003ccode\u003ehackney_url\u003c/code\u003e in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as \u003ccode\u003e%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D\u003c/code\u003e (decoding to \u003ccode\u003e[::ffff:127.0.0.1]\u003c/code\u003e) or \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1.\u003c/code\u003e is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s allowlist built on \u003ccode\u003euri_string:parse/1\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003einet:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a \u003ccode\u003eLocation\u003c/code\u003e target when redirects are followed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe IP-literal gate that \u003ccode\u003ehackney_url:normalize/2\u003c/code\u003e applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to \u003ccode\u003einet_parse:address/1\u003c/code\u003e as is. The connect path in \u003ccode\u003ehackney_happy:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eRun the allowlist on the host that \u003ccode\u003ehackney_url:normalize/1\u003c/code\u003e returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. The gate.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_url:normalize/2\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_url.erl\u003c/code\u003e percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises \u003ccode\u003einvalid_url_host\u003c/code\u003e when \u003ccode\u003einet_parse:address/1\u003c/code\u003e accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. What the connect path accepts.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_happy:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e removes a surrounding \u003ccode\u003e[...]\u003c/code\u003e pair before calling \u003ccode\u003einet:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by \u003ccode\u003einet_parse:address/1\u003c/code\u003e, so \u003ccode\u003e[::ffff:127.0.0.1]\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1.\u003c/code\u003e pass the gate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Result.\u003c/strong\u003e A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as \u003ccode\u003e%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D\u003c/code\u003e, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on \u003ccode\u003euri_string:parse/1\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003einet:parse_address/1\u003c/code\u003e, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a \u003ccode\u003eLocation\u003c/code\u003e target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in \u003ccode\u003eip_candidate/1\u003c/code\u003e before the gate.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "**1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n**2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate.\n\n**3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate."
            }
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          "value": "1. The gate. hackney_url:normalize/2 in src/hackney_url.erl percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises invalid_url_host when inet_parse:address/1 accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n2. What the connect path accepts. hackney_happy:parse_address/1 removes a surrounding [...] pair before calling inet:parse_address/1, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by inet_parse:address/1, so [::ffff:127.0.0.1] and 127.0.0.1. pass the gate.\n\n3. Result. A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s check based on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in ip_candidate/1 before the gate."
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            "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller\u0027s allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-115700",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-26T16:59:16.113",
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                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-10-26T14:16:32.080",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115700"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-436"
              },
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-918"
              }
            ],
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



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