CVE-2026-114611 (GCVE-0-2026-114611)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-22 17:33 – Updated: 2026-10-22 17:33
VLAI
Title
OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack
Summary
OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CWE
  • CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7674 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
schorschii OCO-Server Affected: < 1.2.3
guessed Create a notification for this product.
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{
  "containers": {
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      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "OCO-Server",
          "vendor": "schorschii",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.2.3"
            }
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          "value": "OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device\u0027s serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device\u0027s freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=\u003cserial\u003e` issued by the server\u0027s internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim\u0027s `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device\u0027s MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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      "providerMetadata": {
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        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
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          "name": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639"
        },
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          "name": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404"
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          "tags": [
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        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
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    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-114611",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-21T20:34:25.599Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
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  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
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                "vendor": "schorschii",
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                  {
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                    "version": "\u003c 1.2.3"
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            "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
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        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device\u0027s serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device\u0027s freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=\u003cserial\u003e` issued by the server\u0027s internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim\u0027s `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device\u0027s MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-114611",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-22T18:17:28.377",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
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              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
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                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
                "version": "3.1"
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        "weaknesses": [
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            "description": [
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            ],
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          }
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    }
  }
}



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