Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-111765 (GCVE-0-2026-111765)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-20 15:10 – Updated: 2026-10-20 15:10

Title

A2A Java SDK: Android synchronous POST forwards credentials across authorities after incomplete redirect fix

Summary

A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Starting in version 1.3.0.Final and prior to version 1.3.2.Final, the AndroidA2AHttpClient synchronous POST path overrides the disabled-redirect setting in AndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection() with the PostBuilder default followRedirects value of true, leaving a residual of the earlier credential-redirect fix. JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport add interceptor-produced authentication headers and call synchronous post() without disabling redirects. AuthInterceptor permits X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, and X-Authentication headers; Android's repackaged OkHttp strips Authorization on cross-authority redirects but retains these nonstandard headers, disclosing a complete configured API key or token to another authority. The additional exposure applies when redirect or front-door behavior is compromised separately from the credential-handling component, or those components operate in different trust domains; a completely malicious initial origin already receives the credential on the first request. Autonomous clients require no human action, while user-invoked workflows can require interaction. Explicit followRedirects(false) prevents the redirected request. The demonstrated impact is credential disclosure, not subsequent credential use, integrity or availability impact, code execution, or host compromise. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.2.Final.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CWE

CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7639 records in the last 180 days details

References

7 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/pull/1141	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a3…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/3ae…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
a2aproject	a2a-java	Affected: >= 1.3.0.Final, < 1.3.2.Final	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
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      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "a2a-java",
          "vendor": "a2aproject",
          "versions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Starting in version 1.3.0.Final and prior to version 1.3.2.Final, the AndroidA2AHttpClient synchronous POST path overrides the disabled-redirect setting in AndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection() with the PostBuilder default followRedirects value of true, leaving a residual of the earlier credential-redirect fix. JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport add interceptor-produced authentication headers and call synchronous post() without disabling redirects. AuthInterceptor permits X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, and X-Authentication headers; Android\u0027s repackaged OkHttp strips Authorization on cross-authority redirects but retains these nonstandard headers, disclosing a complete configured API key or token to another authority. The additional exposure applies when redirect or front-door behavior is compromised separately from the credential-handling component, or those components operate in different trust domains; a completely malicious initial origin already receives the credential on the first request. Autonomous clients require no human action, while user-invoked workflows can require interaction. Explicit followRedirects(false) prevents the redirected request. The demonstrated impact is credential disclosure, not subsequent credential use, integrity or availability impact, code execution, or host compromise. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.2.Final."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
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        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx",
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          "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx"
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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        },
        {
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          "tags": [
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        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.2.Final",
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          "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.2.Final"
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      "source": {
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "A2A Java SDK: Android synchronous POST forwards credentials across authorities after incomplete redirect fix"
    }
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    "datePublished": "2026-10-20T15:10:51.321Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-16T17:52:09.082Z",
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          }
        ],
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                "userInteraction": "NONE",
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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-111765

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-20 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-20 19:48

Severity

7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L335-L342
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a36530d75e11bcf9b81f543464dbe193ca6478e
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/3ae82912a106a6765d7b78042b0ef96e6c2e29b5
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/pull/1141
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.2.Final
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-4fpj-g9jf-9rgg
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "a2a-java",
          "vendor": "a2aproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.3.0.Final, \u003c 1.3.2.Final"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Starting in version 1.3.0.Final and prior to version 1.3.2.Final, the AndroidA2AHttpClient synchronous POST path overrides the disabled-redirect setting in AndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection() with the PostBuilder default followRedirects value of true, leaving a residual of the earlier credential-redirect fix. JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport add interceptor-produced authentication headers and call synchronous post() without disabling redirects. AuthInterceptor permits X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, and X-Authentication headers; Android\u0027s repackaged OkHttp strips Authorization on cross-authority redirects but retains these nonstandard headers, disclosing a complete configured API key or token to another authority. The additional exposure applies when redirect or front-door behavior is compromised separately from the credential-handling component, or those components operate in different trust domains; a completely malicious initial origin already receives the credential on the first request. Autonomous clients require no human action, while user-invoked workflows can require interaction. Explicit followRedirects(false) prevents the redirected request. The demonstrated impact is credential disclosure, not subsequent credential use, integrity or availability impact, code execution, or host compromise. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.2.Final."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-111765",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-20T19:48:50.250",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
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        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
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      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L335-L342"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a36530d75e11bcf9b81f543464dbe193ca6478e"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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    },
    {
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      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/pull/1141"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.2.Final"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-4fpj-g9jf-9rgg"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx"
    }
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  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
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        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-522"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4FPJ-G9JF-9RGG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 21:08 – Updated: 2026-10-20 21:08

Summary

A2A Java SDK: Android synchronous POST forwards credentials across authorities after incomplete redirect fix

Details

The GHSA-9rhm fix added this safe setting in AndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection():

connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false);

The synchronous POST builder later overwrites it:

private boolean followRedirects = true;

public A2AHttpResponse post() throws IOException {
    HttpURLConnection connection = createConnection("POST", false);
    connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(followRedirects);
    // ...
}

The second assignment wins. JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport both add interceptor-produced headers and call synchronous post() without setting followRedirects(false).

On Android's repackaged OkHttp implementation, a cross-authority redirect strips Authorization but retains nonstandard request headers. AuthInterceptor permits four nonstandard authentication header names:

X-API-Key
API-Key
X-Auth-Token
X-Authentication

I confirmed that the exact v1.3.1.Final Maven artifact forwards complete synthetic values under all four names to a second loopback authority. I also reproduced the supported AuthInterceptor to Android POST path. Explicitly calling followRedirects(false) returns the original 302 and produces no request to the collector.

All test traffic stayed on two ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listeners. All credentials were synthetic FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-* values.

Reproduction

I have attached AndroidA2AHttpClientRedirectTest.java. Copy it to:

extras/http-client-android/src/test/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/

Run:

mvn -pl extras/http-client-android -am \
  -Dtest=AndroidA2AHttpClientRedirectTest \
  -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false test

On unpatched current main, the default test fails with:

Android synchronous POST must retain the documented no-redirect default
expected: <302> but was: <200>

The explicit followRedirects(true) control still passes.

The separate exact-artifact fixture passed three consecutive runs. Its relevant output was:

default status=200 x-api-key=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-DIRECT

authorization=null method=GET control-followRedirects-false status=302 collectorHits=0 interceptor-chain status=200 x-api-key=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-INTERCEPTOR collectorHits=1 header-matrix name=X-API-Key forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-API-Key header-matrix name=API-Key forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-API-Key header-matrix name=X-Auth-Token forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-Auth-Token header-matrix name=X-Authentication forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-Authentication

Impact and limitations

The demonstrated impact is disclosure of a complete API key or authentication token to a different authority. I am not claiming subsequent use of the credential, integrity impact, availability impact, code execution, or host compromise.

A fully malicious origin already receives the credential on the first request. The additional boundary matters most when redirect or front-door behavior is compromised separately from the component that handles request credentials, or when different parts of the origin operate in different trust domains.

The 7.5 score applies to an autonomous client where no human action is needed after the remote endpoint returns the redirect. If the Android workflow requires a person to select or invoke the remote agent, UI:R gives a 6.5 score. I have kept both vectors because that deployment detail affects severity but not the underlying behavior. These are suggested scores, consistent with the policy's statement that actual CVSS depends on the specific deployment context. The same policy labels the parent credential-redirect property as moderate.

Scope and prior art

This path appears to fall directly under the project's current security model:

extras/http-client-android and the client transports are listed as in scope.
Remote AgentCard and response data are treated as attacker-relevant inputs.
A malicious or compromised remote agent is part of the client-side adversary model.
Section 8 says automatic redirects are disabled in all JDK, Vert.x, and Android implementations to prevent credential leakage.
Section 13 defines a violation of a Section 8 property through the covered input and adversary as VALID.
Section 13a lists missed call sites and under-strength mitigations as new findings after an incomplete fix.
Section 14 records the original issue as fixed by disabling redirects across all HTTP client implementations. The Android synchronous path directly contradicts that recorded repair state.

This report does not claim that an AgentCard SecurityScheme declaration enforces authentication. The application has already configured the credential, and the shipped AuthInterceptor places it in an allowed header. The failure is the Android client's default redirect behavior after that point. It does not depend on a custom SPI, an insecure configuration flag, a test-only component, server-side authentication, or any of the recurring non-findings listed in Section 11a.

GHSA-9rhm is the direct parent finding. Its fix commit says redirects were disabled across all clients, but the Android POST-level override remains in 1.3.0.Final, 1.3.1.Final, and current main. I searched the public issues and pull requests on September 5 and found PR #1097, but no report covering this surviving synchronous Android path. The other three published advisories address server authorization defaults, push-notification SSRF, and credential logging. They do not cover this Android client path.

Suggested fix

The smallest compatible change is:

- private boolean followRedirects = true;
+ private boolean followRedirects = false;

This keeps followRedirects(true) available as an explicit opt-in. The attached regression passes three out of three times after the change. The Android module and its reactor dependencies pass 455 tests with no failures. The full repository test run passes 2,914 tests with no failures or errors. It reports 127 skips when using the project's documented -DskipDockerTests=true option inside the isolated build container.

References

Security property: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L335-L342

Triage and incomplete-fix rules: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L547-L573

Android documentation: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/docs/content/dev/security.md#L60-L74

Safe connection setting and later POST override: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/extras/http-client-android/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/AndroidA2AHttpClient.java#L95-L114 https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/extras/http-client-android/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/AndroidA2AHttpClient.java#L269-L300

AuthInterceptor allowlist and credential injection: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java#L33-L46 https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java#L85-L90

Parent advisory and fix: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a36530d75e11bcf9b81f543464dbe193ca6478e

Android redirect implementation: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/okhttp/+/05b3c271102f7e16bd772dd8a9dab5c6b1424c24/repackaged/okhttp/src/main/java/com/android/okhttp/internal/http/HttpEngine.java#900

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.3.1.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-http-client-android"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.3.0.Final"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.2.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-111765"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T21:08:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The GHSA-9rhm fix added this safe setting in\nAndroidA2AHttpClient.createConnection():\n\n    connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false);\n\nThe synchronous POST builder later overwrites it:\n\n    private boolean followRedirects = true;\n\n    public A2AHttpResponse post() throws IOException {\n        HttpURLConnection connection = createConnection(\"POST\", false);\n        connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(followRedirects);\n        // ...\n    }\n\nThe second assignment wins. JSONRPCTransport and RestTransport both\nadd interceptor-produced headers and call synchronous post() without\nsetting followRedirects(false).\n\nOn Android\u0027s repackaged OkHttp implementation, a cross-authority\nredirect strips Authorization but retains nonstandard request headers.\nAuthInterceptor permits four nonstandard authentication header names:\n\n    X-API-Key\n    API-Key\n    X-Auth-Token\n    X-Authentication\n\nI confirmed that the exact v1.3.1.Final Maven artifact forwards\ncomplete synthetic values under all four names to a second loopback\nauthority. I also reproduced the supported AuthInterceptor to Android\nPOST path. Explicitly calling followRedirects(false) returns the\noriginal 302 and produces no request to the collector.\n\nAll test traffic stayed on two ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listeners. All\ncredentials were synthetic FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-* values.\n\nReproduction\n\nI have attached AndroidA2AHttpClientRedirectTest.java. Copy it to:\n\n    extras/http-client-android/src/test/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/\n\nRun:\n\n    mvn -pl extras/http-client-android -am \\\n      -Dtest=AndroidA2AHttpClientRedirectTest \\\n      -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false test\n\nOn unpatched current main, the default test fails with:\n\n    Android synchronous POST must retain the documented no-redirect default\n    expected: \u003c302\u003e but was: \u003c200\u003e\n\nThe explicit followRedirects(true) control still passes.\n\nThe separate exact-artifact fixture passed three consecutive runs. Its\nrelevant output was:\n\n    default status=200 x-api-key=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-DIRECT\nauthorization=null method=GET\n    control-followRedirects-false status=302 collectorHits=0\n    interceptor-chain status=200\nx-api-key=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-INTERCEPTOR collectorHits=1\n    header-matrix name=X-API-Key forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-API-Key\n    header-matrix name=API-Key forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-API-Key\n    header-matrix name=X-Auth-Token forwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-Auth-Token\n    header-matrix name=X-Authentication\nforwarded=FULCRUM-SYNTHETIC-X-Authentication\n\nImpact and limitations\n\nThe demonstrated impact is disclosure of a complete API key or\nauthentication token to a different authority. I am not claiming\nsubsequent use of the credential, integrity impact, availability\nimpact, code execution, or host compromise.\n\nA fully malicious origin already receives the credential on the first\nrequest. The additional boundary matters most when redirect or\nfront-door behavior is compromised separately from the component that\nhandles request credentials, or when different parts of the origin\noperate in different trust domains.\n\nThe 7.5 score applies to an autonomous client where no human action is\nneeded after the remote endpoint returns the redirect. If the Android\nworkflow requires a person to select or invoke the remote agent, UI:R\ngives a 6.5 score. I have kept both vectors because that deployment\ndetail affects severity but not the underlying behavior. These are\nsuggested scores, consistent with the policy\u0027s statement that actual\nCVSS depends on the specific deployment context. The same policy\nlabels the parent credential-redirect property as moderate.\n\nScope and prior art\n\nThis path appears to fall directly under the project\u0027s current security model:\n\n1. extras/http-client-android and the client transports are listed as in scope.\n2. Remote AgentCard and response data are treated as attacker-relevant inputs.\n3. A malicious or compromised remote agent is part of the client-side\nadversary model.\n4. Section 8 says automatic redirects are disabled in all JDK, Vert.x,\nand Android implementations to prevent credential leakage.\n5. Section 13 defines a violation of a Section 8 property through the\ncovered input and adversary as VALID.\n6. Section 13a lists missed call sites and under-strength mitigations\nas new findings after an incomplete fix.\n7. Section 14 records the original issue as fixed by disabling\nredirects across all HTTP client implementations. The Android\nsynchronous path directly contradicts that recorded repair state.\n\nThis report does not claim that an AgentCard SecurityScheme\ndeclaration enforces authentication. The application has already\nconfigured the credential, and the shipped AuthInterceptor places it\nin an allowed header. The failure is the Android client\u0027s default\nredirect behavior after that point. It does not depend on a custom\nSPI, an insecure configuration flag, a test-only component,\nserver-side authentication, or any of the recurring non-findings\nlisted in Section 11a.\n\nGHSA-9rhm is the direct parent finding. Its fix commit says redirects\nwere disabled across all clients, but the Android POST-level override\nremains in 1.3.0.Final, 1.3.1.Final, and current main. I searched the\npublic issues and pull requests on September 5 and found PR #1097, but\nno report covering this surviving synchronous Android path. The other\nthree published advisories address server authorization defaults,\npush-notification SSRF, and credential logging. They do not cover this\nAndroid client path.\n\nSuggested fix\n\nThe smallest compatible change is:\n\n    - private boolean followRedirects = true;\n    + private boolean followRedirects = false;\n\nThis keeps followRedirects(true) available as an explicit opt-in. The\nattached regression passes three out of three times after the change.\nThe Android module and its reactor dependencies pass 455 tests with no\nfailures. The full repository test run passes 2,914 tests with no\nfailures or errors. It reports 127 skips when using the project\u0027s\ndocumented -DskipDockerTests=true option inside the isolated build\ncontainer.\n\nReferences\n\nSecurity property:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L335-L342\n\nTriage and incomplete-fix rules:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L547-L573\n\nAndroid documentation:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/docs/content/dev/security.md#L60-L74\n\nSafe connection setting and later POST override:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/extras/http-client-android/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/AndroidA2AHttpClient.java#L95-L114\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/extras/http-client-android/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/http/android/AndroidA2AHttpClient.java#L269-L300\n\nAuthInterceptor allowlist and credential injection:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java#L33-L46\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java#L85-L90\n\nParent advisory and fix:\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx\nhttps://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a36530d75e11bcf9b81f543464dbe193ca6478e\n\nAndroid redirect implementation:\nhttps://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/okhttp/+/05b3c271102f7e16bd772dd8a9dab5c6b1424c24/repackaged/okhttp/src/main/java/com/android/okhttp/internal/http/HttpEngine.java#900",
  "id": "GHSA-4fpj-g9jf-9rgg",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T21:08:06Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T21:08:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-4fpj-g9jf-9rgg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/pull/1141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/2a36530d75e11bcf9b81f543464dbe193ca6478e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/3ae82912a106a6765d7b78042b0ef96e6c2e29b5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/blob/30e31086e24bea096b5f662088661269c9119100/SECURITY.md#L335-L342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.2.Final"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "A2A Java SDK: Android synchronous POST forwards credentials across authorities after incomplete redirect fix"
}

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CVE-2026-111765 (GCVE-0-2026-111765)

FKIE_CVE-2026-111765

GHSA-4FPJ-G9JF-9RGG

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