CVE-2026-108982 (GCVE-0-2026-108982)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-12 02:44 – Updated: 2026-10-13 18:26
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
VeraCrypt 1.26.29 (FUSE-T build) on macOS sometimes allows unintended access to decrypted data. It does not terminate the FUSE-T auxiliary service (go-nfsv4) and its associated VeraCrypt core-service helper processes when a volume is dismounted. After VeraCrypt reports the volume as dismounted, the auxiliary mount continues to serve the decrypted volume image (volume.dmg) over a loopback SMB session, and the leaked processes retain an open handle to the underlying raw device. A local user or process can therefore remount and access the decrypted volume without the passphrase, e.g., by reopening a previously accessed path (such as through a macOS Open Recent menu) or by attaching volume.dmg from the stale auxiliary mount. (The macFUSE build of VeraCrypt is not affected.)
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-13 18:25 UTC
CWE
- CWE-459 - Incomplete Cleanup
Assigner
References
Impacted products
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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