CVE-2026-103502 (GCVE-0-2026-103502)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-12 13:15 – Updated: 2026-10-12 13:15
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
hex_core's default HTTP adapter doesn't verify TLS certificates on OTP 24 and 25
Summary
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hexpm hex_core allows an attacker who can intercept HTTPS connections to impersonate hex.pm, repo.hex.pm or any other repository or API server to programs that use hex_core's default HTTP adapter on Erlang/OTP 24, or on OTP 25 when the operating system's CA certificates can't be loaded.
hex_core:default_config/0 selects the built-in hex_http_httpc adapter. For an HTTPS request whose adapter config has no ssl option, hex_http_httpc:http_options/2 builds options that verify the server certificate against public_key:cacerts_get/0. When that call raises, the adapter prints a warning and sends the request without ssl options, so httpc uses the defaults of the ssl application, which before OTP 26 don't verify the server certificate. public_key:cacerts_get/0 doesn't exist on OTP 24, so every HTTPS request falls back there, and on OTP 25 it raises when no CA store is found. hex_core versions before 0.11.0 never set ssl options, so they don't verify the server certificate on OTP 25 and earlier whether or not a CA store is found.
The fallback was intended and documented, but the documentation didn't make clear that it meant no certificate verification. Since hex_core 0.8.2 the README has warned that the built-in httpc adapter "has insecure default settings" and recommended other HTTP clients, and the adapter prints "using default ssl options which are insecure" on every request that falls back. hex_core 0.11.0 added certificate verification with the changelog entry "Use secure SSL defaults for OTP 25+". Neither the README nor the warning says that the server certificate isn't verified, the README doesn't say which OTP versions the warning applies to, and on OTP 25 without CA certificates the warning tells users to upgrade to OTP 25 or later, which they already run. This advisory is published so that users who took those notices as general advice know their HTTPS requests weren't authenticated.
This issue affects hex_core: from 0.1.0 before 0.20.0.
Severity
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/security/adviso… | relatedvendor-advisory |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-103502.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-103502 | related |
| https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/commit/fbb6d9de… | related |
| https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/commit/b7b3a42d… | patch |
Impacted products
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"value": "Affects programs that use the `hex_http_httpc` adapter, the default in `hex_core:default_config/0`, without an `ssl` option in the adapter\u0027s `http_options`, on OTP 24, or on OTP 25 when `public_key:cacerts_get/0` fails. hex_core versions before 0.11.0 are affected on OTP 25 and earlier whether or not the CA certificates load. On OTP 26 and later the `ssl` defaults verify the server certificate. Hex and rebar3 vendor hex_core but configure their own HTTP adapters, so they aren\u0027t affected."
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"value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hexpm hex_core allows an attacker who can intercept HTTPS connections to impersonate hex.pm, repo.hex.pm or any other repository or API server to programs that use hex_core\u0027s default HTTP adapter on Erlang/OTP 24, or on OTP 25 when the operating system\u0027s CA certificates can\u0027t be loaded.\n\n`hex_core:default_config/0` selects the built-in `hex_http_httpc` adapter. For an HTTPS request whose adapter config has no `ssl` option, `hex_http_httpc:http_options/2` builds options that verify the server certificate against `public_key:cacerts_get/0`. When that call raises, the adapter prints a warning and sends the request without `ssl` options, so httpc uses the defaults of the `ssl` application, which before OTP 26 don\u0027t verify the server certificate. `public_key:cacerts_get/0` doesn\u0027t exist on OTP 24, so every HTTPS request falls back there, and on OTP 25 it raises when no CA store is found. hex_core versions before 0.11.0 never set `ssl` options, so they don\u0027t verify the server certificate on OTP 25 and earlier whether or not a CA store is found.\n\nThe fallback was intended and documented, but the documentation didn\u0027t make clear that it meant no certificate verification. Since hex_core 0.8.2 the README has warned that the built-in httpc adapter \"has insecure default settings\" and recommended other HTTP clients, and the adapter prints \"using default ssl options which are insecure\" on every request that falls back. hex_core 0.11.0 added certificate verification with the changelog entry \"Use secure SSL defaults for OTP 25+\". Neither the README nor the warning says that the server certificate isn\u0027t verified, the README doesn\u0027t say which OTP versions the warning applies to, and on OTP 25 without CA certificates the warning tells users to upgrade to OTP 25 or later, which they already run. This advisory is published so that users who took those notices as general advice know their HTTPS requests weren\u0027t authenticated.\n\nThis issue affects hex_core: from 0.1.0 before 0.20.0."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn attacker on the network path between a program using hex_core\u0027s default adapter and a Hex repository or API server completes the TLS handshake with any certificate. It receives the API keys, OAuth tokens and repository keys the program sends, and can alter API requests and responses. Registry signatures, which hex_core verifies by default, still prevent changes to registry contents. Hex and rebar3 aren\u0027t affected because they configure their own HTTP adapters.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade hex_core to 0.20.0 or later. On OTP 24, or on OTP 25 without the operating system\u0027s CA certificates, HTTPS requests through \u003ccode\u003ehex_http_httpc\u003c/code\u003e then fail with \u003ccode\u003e{error, {cacerts_unavailable, Reason}}\u003c/code\u003e unless the adapter config has \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e options.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Upgrade hex_core to 0.20.0 or later. On OTP 24, or on OTP 25 without the operating system\u0027s CA certificates, HTTPS requests through `hex_http_httpc` then fail with `{error, {cacerts_unavailable, Reason}}` unless the adapter config has `ssl` options."
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"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"title": "hex_core\u0027s default HTTP adapter doesn\u0027t verify TLS certificates on OTP 24 and 25",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003ePass \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e options that verify the server certificate in the adapter config, for example \u003ccode\u003e{hex_http_httpc, #{http_options =\u0026gt; [{ssl, SslOpts}]}}\u003c/code\u003e, use another HTTP adapter, or run on OTP 26 or later.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCompile \u003ccode\u003esrc/hex_http.erl\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003esrc/hex_http_httpc.erl\u003c/code\u003e from hex_core main 4fbc5d1 in the \u003ccode\u003eerlang:24\u003c/code\u003e Docker image and run \u003ccode\u003ehex_http_httpc:request(get, \u0026lt;\u0026lt;\"https://self-signed.badssl.com/\"\u0026gt;\u0026gt;, #{}, undefined, #{profile =\u0026gt; default})\u003c/code\u003e after starting inets and ssl.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe adapter prints \u003ccode\u003e[hex_http_httpc] using default ssl options which are insecure.\u003c/code\u003e and returns \u003ccode\u003e{ok, {200, Headers, Body}}\u003c/code\u003e from the server with the self-signed certificate.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIn the \u003ccode\u003eerlang:25\u003c/code\u003e image with an empty tmpfs mounted on \u003ccode\u003e/etc/ssl/certs\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003epublic_key:cacerts_get/0\u003c/code\u003e raises and the request also returns \u003ccode\u003e{ok, {200, ...}}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIn the \u003ccode\u003eerlang:25\u003c/code\u003e image with the CA store present (150 certificates), the same request fails with \u003ccode\u003e{error, {failed_connect, ...}}\u003c/code\u003e after a \u003ccode\u003eBad Certificate\u003c/code\u003e alert.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "1. Compile `src/hex_http.erl` and `src/hex_http_httpc.erl` from hex_core main 4fbc5d1 in the `erlang:24` Docker image and run `hex_http_httpc:request(get, \u003c\u003c\"https://self-signed.badssl.com/\"\u003e\u003e, #{}, undefined, #{profile =\u003e default})` after starting inets and ssl.\n2. The adapter prints `[hex_http_httpc] using default ssl options which are insecure.` and returns `{ok, {200, Headers, Body}}` from the server with the self-signed certificate.\n3. In the `erlang:25` image with an empty tmpfs mounted on `/etc/ssl/certs`, `public_key:cacerts_get/0` raises and the request also returns `{ok, {200, ...}}`.\n4. In the `erlang:25` image with the CA store present (150 certificates), the same request fails with `{error, {failed_connect, ...}}` after a `Bad Certificate` alert."
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"value": "* Compile src/hex_http.erl and src/hex_http_httpc.erl from hex_core main 4fbc5d1 in the erlang:24 Docker image and run hex_http_httpc:request(get, \u003c\u003c\"https://self-signed.badssl.com/\"\u003e\u003e, #{}, undefined, #{profile =\u003e default}) after starting inets and ssl.\n* The adapter prints [hex_http_httpc] using default ssl options which are insecure. and returns {ok, {200, Headers, Body}} from the server with the self-signed certificate.\n* In the erlang:25 image with an empty tmpfs mounted on /etc/ssl/certs, public_key:cacerts_get/0 raises and the request also returns {ok, {200, ...}}.\n* In the erlang:25 image with the CA store present (150 certificates), the same request fails with {error, {failed_connect, ...}} after a Bad Certificate alert."
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003ehex_core:default_config/0\u003c/code\u003e sets \u003ccode\u003ehttp_adapter\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003e{hex_http_httpc, #{profile =\u0026gt; default}}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003ehex_http_httpc:request/5\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003ehex_http_httpc:request_to_file/6\u003c/code\u003e build their httpc options with \u003ccode\u003ehttp_options/2\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFor an \u003ccode\u003ehttps\u003c/code\u003e URI whose adapter config has no \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e entry in \u003ccode\u003ehttp_options\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ehttp_options/2\u003c/code\u003e adds \u003ccode\u003e{ssl, [{verify, verify_peer}, {cacerts, public_key:cacerts_get()}, ...]}\u003c/code\u003e inside a \u003ccode\u003etry\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWhen \u003ccode\u003epublic_key:cacerts_get/0\u003c/code\u003e raises (\u003ccode\u003eundef\u003c/code\u003e on OTP 24; an error on OTP 25 when no CA store is found), the \u003ccode\u003ecatch\u003c/code\u003e prints a warning with \u003ccode\u003eio:format/1\u003c/code\u003e and returns the options without \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ehttpc then uses the \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e application\u0027s defaults, which are \u003ccode\u003everify_none\u003c/code\u003e before OTP 26, and completes the handshake with any certificate.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ehex_core before 0.11.0 (e57b4fb) had no step 3: it never passed \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e options, so step 5 applied on every OTP version before 26.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. `hex_core:default_config/0` sets `http_adapter` to `{hex_http_httpc, #{profile =\u003e default}}`.\n2. `hex_http_httpc:request/5` and `hex_http_httpc:request_to_file/6` build their httpc options with `http_options/2`.\n3. For an `https` URI whose adapter config has no `ssl` entry in `http_options`, `http_options/2` adds `{ssl, [{verify, verify_peer}, {cacerts, public_key:cacerts_get()}, ...]}` inside a `try`.\n4. When `public_key:cacerts_get/0` raises (`undef` on OTP 24; an error on OTP 25 when no CA store is found), the `catch` prints a warning with `io:format/1` and returns the options without `ssl`.\n5. httpc then uses the `ssl` application\u0027s defaults, which are `verify_none` before OTP 26, and completes the handshake with any certificate.\n6. hex_core before 0.11.0 (e57b4fb) had no step 3: it never passed `ssl` options, so step 5 applied on every OTP version before 26."
}
],
"value": "* hex_core:default_config/0 sets http_adapter to {hex_http_httpc, #{profile =\u003e default}}.\n* hex_http_httpc:request/5 and hex_http_httpc:request_to_file/6 build their httpc options with http_options/2.\n* For an https URI whose adapter config has no ssl entry in http_options, http_options/2 adds {ssl, [{verify, verify_peer}, {cacerts, public_key:cacerts_get()}, ...]} inside a try.\n* When public_key:cacerts_get/0 raises (undef on OTP 24; an error on OTP 25 when no CA store is found), the catch prints a warning with io:format/1 and returns the options without ssl.\n* httpc then uses the ssl application\u0027s defaults, which are verify_none before OTP 26, and completes the handshake with any certificate.\n* hex_core before 0.11.0 (e57b4fb) had no step 3: it never passed ssl options, so step 5 applied on every OTP version before 26."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-103502",
"datePublished": "2026-10-12T13:15:29.040Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-09T16:45:02.344Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-12T13:15:29.040Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-103502",
"date": "2026-10-13",
"epss": "0.00245",
"percentile": "0.14631"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:hexpm:hex_core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hex_http_httpc"
],
"packageName": "hex_core",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/hex_core",
"product": "hex_core",
"programFiles": [
"src/hex_http_httpc.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hex_http_httpc:request/5"
},
{
"name": "hex_http_httpc:request_to_file/6"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core",
"vendor": "hexpm",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.20.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:hexpm:hex_core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hex_http_httpc"
],
"packageName": "hexpm/hex_core",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/hexpm/hex_core",
"product": "hex_core",
"programFiles": [
"src/hex_http_httpc.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hex_http_httpc:request/5"
},
{
"name": "hex_http_httpc:request_to_file/6"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core",
"vendor": "hexpm",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b7b3a42defb4ed8e20a5c68a4412ce68a95b7938",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fbb6d9de472e5edb8d6fb6b32a91cb266137892e",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hexpm hex_core allows an attacker who can intercept HTTPS connections to impersonate hex.pm, repo.hex.pm or any other repository or API server to programs that use hex_core\u0027s default HTTP adapter on Erlang/OTP 24, or on OTP 25 when the operating system\u0027s CA certificates can\u0027t be loaded.\n\nhex_core:default_config/0 selects the built-in hex_http_httpc adapter. For an HTTPS request whose adapter config has no ssl option, hex_http_httpc:http_options/2 builds options that verify the server certificate against public_key:cacerts_get/0. When that call raises, the adapter prints a warning and sends the request without ssl options, so httpc uses the defaults of the ssl application, which before OTP 26 don\u0027t verify the server certificate. public_key:cacerts_get/0 doesn\u0027t exist on OTP 24, so every HTTPS request falls back there, and on OTP 25 it raises when no CA store is found. hex_core versions before 0.11.0 never set ssl options, so they don\u0027t verify the server certificate on OTP 25 and earlier whether or not a CA store is found.\n\nThe fallback was intended and documented, but the documentation didn\u0027t make clear that it meant no certificate verification. Since hex_core 0.8.2 the README has warned that the built-in httpc adapter \"has insecure default settings\" and recommended other HTTP clients, and the adapter prints \"using default ssl options which are insecure\" on every request that falls back. hex_core 0.11.0 added certificate verification with the changelog entry \"Use secure SSL defaults for OTP 25+\". Neither the README nor the warning says that the server certificate isn\u0027t verified, the README doesn\u0027t say which OTP versions the warning applies to, and on OTP 25 without CA certificates the warning tells users to upgrade to OTP 25 or later, which they already run. This advisory is published so that users who took those notices as general advice know their HTTPS requests weren\u0027t authenticated.\n\nThis issue affects hex_core: from 0.1.0 before 0.20.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-103502",
"lastModified": "2026-10-13T14:31:20.750",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-12T14:17:08.610",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-103502.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/commit/b7b3a42defb4ed8e20a5c68a4412ce68a95b7938"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/commit/fbb6d9de472e5edb8d6fb6b32a91cb266137892e"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/security/advisories/GHSA-p26c-h8c2-rwqj"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-103502"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-636"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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