CVE-2025-59734 (GCVE-0-2025-59734)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-10-06 08:09 – Updated: 2026-02-26 17:48
VLAI
Title
Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch
Summary
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.  This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-10-08 03:55 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Google CNA under the Google root
CNA scorecard B 78/100 over 38 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
FFmpeg FFmpeg Affected: 4d7c609be37dc57d31527c8c9e5945dc9491a7cd , < 8.0 (custom)
Affected: 7.1.1 , < 8.0 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2025-08-20 22:00
Credits
Google Big Sleep
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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            "lang": "es",
            "value": "Es posible causar una escritura de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n en la decodificaci\u00f3n SANM con una animaci\u00f3n cuidadosamente dise\u00f1ada usando subversi\u00f3n \u003c2.\n\nCuando un chunk STOR est\u00e1 presente, un chunk FOBJ subsiguiente se guardar\u00e1 en ctx -\u003e stored_frame. Los frames almacenados pueden ser referenciados m\u00e1s tarde por chunks FTCH. Para archivos que usan subversi\u00f3n \u003c 2, el frame sin decodificar se almacena y se decodifica de nuevo cuando se analizan los chunks FTCH. Sin embargo, en process_frame_obj, si el frame tiene un tama\u00f1o inv\u00e1lido, hay un retorno anticipado, con un valor de 0.\n\nEsto provoca que el c\u00f3digo en decode_frame siga almacenando el b\u00fafer de frame en bruto en ctx -\u003e stored_frame. Dejando ctx -\u003e has_dimensions establecido en falso.\n\nUn chunk subsiguiente de tipo FTCH llamar\u00eda a process_ftch y decodificar\u00eda ese objeto de frame de nuevo, a\u00f1adiendo a los valores superior/izquierdo y llamando a process_frame_obj de nuevo.\nDado que nunca establecimos ctx -\u003e have_dimensions antes, esta vez establecemos las dimensiones, llamando a init_buffers, lo que puede reasignar el b\u00fafer en ctx -\u003e stored_frame, liberando el anterior. Sin embargo, el objeto GetByteContext gb todav\u00eda mantiene una referencia al b\u00fafer antiguo.\n\nFinalmente, cuando el c\u00f3digo intenta decodificar el frame, los c\u00f3decs que aceptan un GetByteContext como par\u00e1metro activar\u00e1n una lectura de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n al usar gb.\n\nGetByteContext solo se usa para leer bytes, por lo que, como m\u00e1ximo, se podr\u00edan leer datos inv\u00e1lidos. No hay asignaciones de heap entre la liberaci\u00f3n y el momento en que se accede al objeto. Sin embargo, al regresar a process_ftch, el c\u00f3digo restaura los valores originales para superior/izquierdo en stored_frame, escribiendo 4 bytes en los datos liberados en el desplazamiento 6, potencialmente corrompiendo los metadatos del asignador.\n\nEste problema puede ser activado simplemente al sondear si un archivo tiene el formato sanm.\n\nRecomendamos actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 8.0 o posterior."
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      "product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "FFmpeg: FFmpeg: Use-after-free vulnerability in SANM decoding",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-59734.json",
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        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://git.ffmpeg.org/ffmpeg.git",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "SANM",
              "product": "FFmpeg",
              "repo": "https://git.ffmpeg.org/ffmpeg.git",
              "vendor": "FFmpeg",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "8.0",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "4d7c609be37dc57d31527c8c9e5945dc9491a7cd",
                  "versionType": "custom"
                },
                {
                  "lessThan": "8.0",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "7.1.1",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "Google Big Sleep"
            }
          ],
          "datePublic": "2025-08-20T22:00:00.000Z",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion \u0026lt;2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen a \u003ccode\u003eSTOR\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;chunk is present, a subsequent \u003ccode\u003eFOBJ\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;chunk will be saved in \u003ccode\u003ectx-\u0026gt;stored_frame\u003c/code\u003e. Stored frames can later be referenced by \u003ccode\u003eFTCH\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;chunks. For files using subversion \u0026lt; 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the \u003ccode\u003eFTCH\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;chunks are parsed.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eHowever, in \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eprocess_frame_obj\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;if the frame has an invalid size, there\u2019s an early return, with a value of 0.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis causes the code in \u003ccode\u003edecode_frame\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;to still store the raw frame buffer into \u003ccode\u003ectx-\u0026gt;stored_frame\u003c/code\u003e. Leaving \u003ccode\u003ectx-\u0026gt;has_dimensions\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;set to \u003ccode\u003efalse\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA subsequent chunk with type \u003ccode\u003eFTCH\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;would call \u003ccode\u003eprocess_ftch\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling \u003ccode\u003eprocess_frame_obj\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;again.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eGiven that we never set \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ectx-\u0026gt;have_dimensions\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;before, this time we set the dimensions, calling \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003einit_buffers\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e, which can reallocate the buffer in \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ectx-\u0026gt;stored_frame\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e, freeing the previous one. However, the \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eGetByteContext\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;object \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003egb\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;still holds a reference to the old buffer.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a \u003ccode\u003eGetByteContext\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using \u003ccode\u003egb\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eGetByteContext\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the \u003ccode\u003efree\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to \u003ccode\u003eprocess_ftch\u003c/code\u003e, the code \u003cem\u003erestores\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;the original values for top/left in \u003ccode\u003estored_frame\u003c/code\u003e, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator\u2019s metadata.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003eWe recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion \u003c2.\n\nWhen a STOR\u00a0chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ\u00a0chunk will be saved in ctx-\u003estored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH\u00a0chunks. For files using subversion \u003c 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH\u00a0chunks are parsed.\u00a0However, in process_frame_obj\u00a0if the frame has an invalid size, there\u2019s an early return, with a value of 0.\u00a0\n\nThis causes the code in decode_frame\u00a0to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx-\u003estored_frame. Leaving ctx-\u003ehas_dimensions\u00a0set to false.\n\nA subsequent chunk with type FTCH\u00a0would call process_ftch\u00a0and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj\u00a0again.\nGiven that we never set ctx-\u003ehave_dimensions\u00a0before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx-\u003estored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext\u00a0object gb\u00a0still holds a reference to the old buffer.\n\n\n\n\nFinally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext\u00a0as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.\n\nGetByteContext\u00a0is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free\u00a0and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores\u00a0the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator\u2019s metadata.\n\nThis issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWe recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond."
            }
          ],
          "impacts": [
            {
              "capecId": "CAPEC-100",
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CAPEC-100 Overflow Buffers"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV4_0": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "ADJACENT",
                "baseScore": 8.7,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "format": "CVSS",
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "GENERAL"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-416",
                  "description": "CWE-416 Use After Free",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2025-10-19T14:51:43.143Z",
            "orgId": "14ed7db2-1595-443d-9d34-6215bf890778",
            "shortName": "Google"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "url": "https://issuetracker.google.com/440183164"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "14ed7db2-1595-443d-9d34-6215bf890778",
        "assignerShortName": "Google",
        "cveId": "CVE-2025-59734",
        "datePublished": "2025-10-06T08:09:44.280Z",
        "dateReserved": "2025-09-19T08:11:37.550Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-02-26T17:48:16.522Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



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