CVE-2025-15573 (GCVE-0-2025-15573)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-12 10:39 – Updated: 2026-02-12 14:48
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Missing Certificate Validation for Solax Power Pocket WiFi models MQTT Cloud Connection
Summary
The affected devices do not validate the server certificate when connecting to the SolaX Cloud MQTTS server hosted in the Alibaba Cloud (mqtt001.solaxcloud.com, TCP 8883). This allows attackers in a man-in-the-middle position to act as the legitimate MQTT server and issue arbitrary commands to devices.
Severity
9.4 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-12 14:47 UTC
CWE
- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://r.sec-consult.com/solax |
Impacted products
5 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi 3.0 |
Affected:
<3.022.03
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+LAN |
Affected:
<1.009.02
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+4GM |
Affected:
<1.005.05
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 |
Affected:
<006.06
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi 4.0 |
Affected:
<003.03
|
guessed |
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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