CVE-2021-21405 (GCVE-0-2021-21405)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-04-15 21:35 – Updated: 2024-08-03 18:09- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/securit… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/pull/5393 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://gist.github.com/wadeAlexC/2490d522e81a796… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| filecoin-project | lotus |
Affected:
< 1.5.0
|
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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