CVE-2019-15027 (GCVE-0-2019-15027)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2019-08-14 12:03 – Updated: 2024-08-05 00:34
VLAI
Summary
The MediaTek Embedded Multimedia Card (eMMC) subsystem for Android on MT65xx, MT66xx, and MT8163 SoC devices allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root via shell metacharacters in a filename under /data, because clear_emmc_nomedia_entry in platform/mt6577/external/meta/emmc/meta_clr_emmc.c invokes 'system("/system/bin/rm -r /data/' followed by this filename upon an eMMC clearance from a Meta Mode boot. NOTE: compromise of Fire OS on the Amazon Echo Dot would require a second hypothetical vulnerability that allows creation of the required file under /data.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
  • n/a
Assigner
References
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.