CNVD-2025-27904

Vulnerability from cnvd - Published: 2025-11-14
VLAI
Title
Tenda AC23 formSetIPv6status函数栈缓冲区溢出漏洞
Description
Tenda AC23是腾达推出的家用双频无线路由器,主打大户型覆盖和高速传输,支持802.11acWave2技术,双频并发速率最高达2033Mbps。 Tenda AC23存在栈缓冲区溢出漏洞,该漏洞源于formSetIPv6status和formGetWanParameter函数没有对用户输入的参数进行验证,攻击者利用该漏洞通过注入精心设计的有效载荷执行任意Web脚本或HTML。
Severity
高
Formal description

目前厂商尚未发布升级程序修复该安全问题,详情见厂商官网: https://www.tenda.com.cn/

Reference
https://github.com/lst-oss/Vulnerability/tree/main/Tenda/AC23/formSetIPv6status-formGetWanParameter
Impacted products
Name
Tenda AC23 16.03.07.45_cn
Show details on source website

{
  "cves": {
    "cve": {
      "cveNumber": "CVE-2023-40798",
      "cveUrl": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40798"
    }
  },
  "description": "Tenda AC23\u662f\u817e\u8fbe\u63a8\u51fa\u7684\u5bb6\u7528\u53cc\u9891\u65e0\u7ebf\u8def\u7531\u5668\uff0c\u4e3b\u6253\u5927\u6237\u578b\u8986\u76d6\u548c\u9ad8\u901f\u4f20\u8f93\uff0c\u652f\u6301802.11acWave2\u6280\u672f\uff0c\u53cc\u9891\u5e76\u53d1\u901f\u7387\u6700\u9ad8\u8fbe2033Mbps\u3002\n\nTenda AC23\u5b58\u5728\u6808\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u6e90\u4e8eformSetIPv6status\u548cformGetWanParameter\u51fd\u6570\u6ca1\u6709\u5bf9\u7528\u6237\u8f93\u5165\u7684\u53c2\u6570\u8fdb\u884c\u9a8c\u8bc1\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5229\u7528\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u901a\u8fc7\u6ce8\u5165\u7cbe\u5fc3\u8bbe\u8ba1\u7684\u6709\u6548\u8f7d\u8377\u6267\u884c\u4efb\u610fWeb\u811a\u672c\u6216HTML\u3002",
  "formalWay": "\u76ee\u524d\u5382\u5546\u5c1a\u672a\u53d1\u5e03\u5347\u7ea7\u7a0b\u5e8f\u4fee\u590d\u8be5\u5b89\u5168\u95ee\u9898\uff0c\u8be6\u60c5\u89c1\u5382\u5546\u5b98\u7f51\uff1a\r\nhttps://www.tenda.com.cn/",
  "isEvent": "\u901a\u7528\u8f6f\u786c\u4ef6\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "number": "CNVD-2025-27904",
  "openTime": "2025-11-14",
  "products": {
    "product": "Tenda AC23 16.03.07.45_cn"
  },
  "referenceLink": "https://github.com/lst-oss/Vulnerability/tree/main/Tenda/AC23/formSetIPv6status-formGetWanParameter",
  "serverity": "\u9ad8",
  "submitTime": "2023-08-29",
  "title": "Tenda AC23 formSetIPv6status\u51fd\u6570\u6808\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e"
}



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