CNVD-2020-36734

Vulnerability from cnvd - Published: 2020-07-07
VLAI
Title
多款Huawei产品缓冲区溢出漏洞(CNVD-2020-36734)
Description
Huawei AP2000等都是中国华为(Huawei)公司的产品。Huawei AP2000是一款无线接入点设备。Huawei IPS Module是一款入侵防御系统(IPS)模块。NGFW Module是一款下一代防火墙(NGFW)模块。 多款Huawei产品中存在缓冲区溢出漏洞。攻击者可通过从内部网口发送伪造的消息或篡改进程间消息利用该漏洞导致资源耗尽。
Severity
低
Patch Name
多款Huawei产品缓冲区溢出漏洞(CNVD-2020-36734)的补丁
Patch Description
Huawei AP2000等都是中国华为(Huawei)公司的产品。Huawei AP2000是一款无线接入点设备。Huawei IPS Module是一款入侵防御系统(IPS)模块。NGFW Module是一款下一代防火墙(NGFW)模块。 多款Huawei产品中存在缓冲区溢出漏洞。攻击者可通过从内部网口发送伪造的消息或篡改进程间消息利用该漏洞导致资源耗尽。目前,供应商发布了安全公告及相关补丁信息,修复了此漏洞。
Formal description

目前厂商已发布升级补丁以修复漏洞,补丁获取链接: https://www.huawei.com/cn/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20191211-01-ssp-cn

Reference
https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20191211-01-ssp-en
Impacted products
Name
['Huawei IPS Module V500R001C00SPC300', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R005C30', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R006C10', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R006C20', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R007C10', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R007C20', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R008C00', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R008C10', 'Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R009C00']
Show details on source website

{
  "cves": {
    "cve": {
      "cveNumber": "CVE-2019-5257",
      "cveUrl": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5257"
    }
  },
  "description": "Huawei AP2000\u7b49\u90fd\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u534e\u4e3a\uff08Huawei\uff09\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u4ea7\u54c1\u3002Huawei AP2000\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u65e0\u7ebf\u63a5\u5165\u70b9\u8bbe\u5907\u3002Huawei IPS Module\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u5165\u4fb5\u9632\u5fa1\u7cfb\u7edf\uff08IPS\uff09\u6a21\u5757\u3002NGFW Module\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u4e0b\u4e00\u4ee3\u9632\u706b\u5899\uff08NGFW\uff09\u6a21\u5757\u3002\n\n\u591a\u6b3eHuawei\u4ea7\u54c1\u4e2d\u5b58\u5728\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u901a\u8fc7\u4ece\u5185\u90e8\u7f51\u53e3\u53d1\u9001\u4f2a\u9020\u7684\u6d88\u606f\u6216\u7be1\u6539\u8fdb\u7a0b\u95f4\u6d88\u606f\u5229\u7528\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u5bfc\u81f4\u8d44\u6e90\u8017\u5c3d\u3002",
  "formalWay": "\u76ee\u524d\u5382\u5546\u5df2\u53d1\u5e03\u5347\u7ea7\u8865\u4e01\u4ee5\u4fee\u590d\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u8865\u4e01\u83b7\u53d6\u94fe\u63a5\uff1a\r\nhttps://www.huawei.com/cn/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20191211-01-ssp-cn",
  "isEvent": "\u901a\u7528\u8f6f\u786c\u4ef6\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "number": "CNVD-2020-36734",
  "openTime": "2020-07-07",
  "patchDescription": "Huawei AP2000\u7b49\u90fd\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u534e\u4e3a\uff08Huawei\uff09\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u4ea7\u54c1\u3002Huawei AP2000\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u65e0\u7ebf\u63a5\u5165\u70b9\u8bbe\u5907\u3002Huawei IPS Module\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u5165\u4fb5\u9632\u5fa1\u7cfb\u7edf\uff08IPS\uff09\u6a21\u5757\u3002NGFW Module\u662f\u4e00\u6b3e\u4e0b\u4e00\u4ee3\u9632\u706b\u5899\uff08NGFW\uff09\u6a21\u5757\u3002\r\n\r\n\u591a\u6b3eHuawei\u4ea7\u54c1\u4e2d\u5b58\u5728\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u901a\u8fc7\u4ece\u5185\u90e8\u7f51\u53e3\u53d1\u9001\u4f2a\u9020\u7684\u6d88\u606f\u6216\u7be1\u6539\u8fdb\u7a0b\u95f4\u6d88\u606f\u5229\u7528\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u5bfc\u81f4\u8d44\u6e90\u8017\u5c3d\u3002\u76ee\u524d\uff0c\u4f9b\u5e94\u5546\u53d1\u5e03\u4e86\u5b89\u5168\u516c\u544a\u53ca\u76f8\u5173\u8865\u4e01\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u4fee\u590d\u4e86\u6b64\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002",
  "patchName": "\u591a\u6b3eHuawei\u4ea7\u54c1\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff08CNVD-2020-36734\uff09\u7684\u8865\u4e01",
  "products": {
    "product": [
      "Huawei IPS Module V500R001C00SPC300",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R005C30",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R006C10",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R006C20",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R007C10",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R007C20",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R008C00",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R008C10",
      "Huawei Huawei AP2000 V200R009C00"
    ]
  },
  "referenceLink": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20191211-01-ssp-en",
  "serverity": "\u4f4e",
  "submitTime": "2019-12-18",
  "title": "\u591a\u6b3eHuawei\u4ea7\u54c1\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff08CNVD-2020-36734\uff09"
}



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