CNVD-2017-18628

Vulnerability from cnvd - Published: 2017-08-03
VLAI
Title
Continental TCU堆栈缓冲区溢出漏洞
Description
TCU 是Continental AG(大陆集团)生产的现代汽车常用的,用于传输数据的2G调制解调器,可以实现汽车与远程管理工具(如 Web 面板和移动应用程序)之间的通信。 Continental TCU存在堆栈缓冲区溢出漏洞,影响使用 S-Gold 2(PMB 8876)蜂窝基带芯片的TCU,攻击者可利用AT指令访问易受攻击的车辆系统,并在 TCU 基带无线电处理器上执行任意代码。
Severity
高
Formal description

厂商尚未提供漏洞修补方案,请关注厂商主页及时更新: https://www.continental-corporation.com/zh-cn

Reference
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/61587/hacking/tcus-car-hacking.html https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20presentations/DEFCON-25-Jesse-Michael-and-Mickey-Shkatov-Driving-Down-the-Rabbit-Hole.pdf https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9647 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-208-01
Impacted products
Name
['Nissan Nissan 2011-2015 Leaf', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2013 JX3', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX60', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX60 Hybrid', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2015 QX50', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2015 QX50 Hybrid', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2013 M37/M56', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 Q70', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 Q70L', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2015-2016 Q70 Hybrid', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2013 QX56', 'Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX 80', 'BMW BMW produced between 2009-2010', 'Ford P-HEV']
Show details on source website

{
  "cves": {
    "cve": {
      "cveNumber": "CVE-2017-9647"
    }
  },
  "description": "TCU \u662fContinental AG\uff08\u5927\u9646\u96c6\u56e2\uff09\u751f\u4ea7\u7684\u73b0\u4ee3\u6c7d\u8f66\u5e38\u7528\u7684\uff0c\u7528\u4e8e\u4f20\u8f93\u6570\u636e\u76842G\u8c03\u5236\u89e3\u8c03\u5668\uff0c\u53ef\u4ee5\u5b9e\u73b0\u6c7d\u8f66\u4e0e\u8fdc\u7a0b\u7ba1\u7406\u5de5\u5177\uff08\u5982 Web \u9762\u677f\u548c\u79fb\u52a8\u5e94\u7528\u7a0b\u5e8f\uff09\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u901a\u4fe1\u3002\r\n\r\nContinental TCU\u5b58\u5728\u5806\u6808\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u5f71\u54cd\u4f7f\u7528 S-Gold 2\uff08PMB 8876\uff09\u8702\u7a9d\u57fa\u5e26\u82af\u7247\u7684TCU\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u5229\u7528AT\u6307\u4ee4\u8bbf\u95ee\u6613\u53d7\u653b\u51fb\u7684\u8f66\u8f86\u7cfb\u7edf\uff0c\u5e76\u5728 TCU \u57fa\u5e26\u65e0\u7ebf\u7535\u5904\u7406\u5668\u4e0a\u6267\u884c\u4efb\u610f\u4ee3\u7801\u3002",
  "discovererName": "Mickey Shkatov, Jesse Michael, and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk (@jessemichael, @HackingThings, @ABazhaniuk) from the Advanced Threat Research Team at McAfee",
  "formalWay": "\u5382\u5546\u5c1a\u672a\u63d0\u4f9b\u6f0f\u6d1e\u4fee\u8865\u65b9\u6848\uff0c\u8bf7\u5173\u6ce8\u5382\u5546\u4e3b\u9875\u53ca\u65f6\u66f4\u65b0\uff1a\r\nhttps://www.continental-corporation.com/zh-cn",
  "isEvent": "\u901a\u7528\u8f6f\u786c\u4ef6\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "number": "CNVD-2017-18628",
  "openTime": "2017-08-03",
  "products": {
    "product": [
      "Nissan Nissan 2011-2015 Leaf",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2013 JX3",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX60",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX60 Hybrid",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2015 QX50",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2015 QX50 Hybrid",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2013 M37/M56",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 Q70",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 Q70L",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2015-2016 Q70 Hybrid",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2013 QX56",
      "Infiniti Infiniti 2014-2016 QX 80",
      "BMW BMW produced between 2009-2010",
      "Ford P-HEV"
    ]
  },
  "referenceLink": "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/61587/hacking/tcus-car-hacking.html\r\nhttps://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20presentations/DEFCON-25-Jesse-Michael-and-Mickey-Shkatov-Driving-Down-the-Rabbit-Hole.pdf\r\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9647\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-208-01",
  "serverity": "\u9ad8",
  "submitTime": "2017-08-03",
  "title": "Continental TCU\u5806\u6808\u7f13\u51b2\u533a\u6ea2\u51fa\u6f0f\u6d1e"
}



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