{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jackc/pgx/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.18.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jackc/pgx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:46:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T17:16:31Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nSQL Injection can occur when:\n\n1. The non-default simple protocol is used.\n2. A dollar quoted string literal is used in the SQL query.\n3. That string literal contains text that would be would be interpreted as a placeholder outside of a string literal.\n4. The value of that placeholder is controllable by the attacker.\n\ne.g.\n\n```go\nattackValue := `$tag$; drop table canary; --`\n_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `select $tag$ $1 $tag$, $1`, pgx.QueryExecModeSimpleProtocol, attackValue)\n```\n\nThis is unlikely to occur outside of a contrived scenario.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem is resolved in v5.9.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use the simple protocol to execute queries matching all the above conditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-j88v-2chj-qfwx",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:30:26Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:46:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx/security/advisories/GHSA-j88v-2chj-qfwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx/commit/60644f84918a8af66d14a4b0d865d4edafd955da"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx/releases/tag/v5.9.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pgx: SQL Injection via placeholder confusion with dollar quoted string literals"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.40.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.41.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29181"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T21:17:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "multi-value `baggage:` header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many `baggage:` header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit.\n\n## severity\n\nHIGH (availability / remote request amplification)\n\n## relevant links\n\n- repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go\n- pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58\n\n## vulnerability details\n\n**pins:** open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a\n**as-of:** 2026-02-04\n**policy:** direct (no program scope provided)\n\n**callsite:** propagation/baggage.go:58 (`extractMultiBaggage`)\n**attacker control:** inbound HTTP request headers (many `baggage` field-values) \u2192 `propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values(\"baggage\")` \u2192 repeated `baggage.Parse` + member aggregation\n\n### root cause\n\n`extractMultiBaggage` iterates over all `baggage` header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit).\n\n### impact\n\nin a default `net/http` configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many `baggage:` header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency.\n\nexample from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests):\n\n- canonical: `per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458` and `p95_ms=7`\n- control: `per_req_alloc_bytes=133429` and `p95_ms=0`\n\n## proof of concept\n\ncanonical:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p poc\nunzip poc.zip -d poc\ncd poc\nmake test\n```\n\noutput (excerpt):\n\n```\n[CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage\n[PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165\n```\n\ncontrol:\n\n```bash\ncd poc\nmake control\n```\n\ncontrol output (excerpt):\n\n```\n[NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480\n```\n\n**expected:** multiple `baggage` header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined `baggage` value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget.\n**actual:** multiple `baggage` header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes.\n\n## fix recommendation\n\navoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total).\n\n**fix accepted when:** under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for `per_req_alloc_bytes` and `per_req_allocs`, and `p95_ms` stays below 2ms.\n\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079945/poc.zip)\n[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079946/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)",
  "id": "GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:04:24Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29181"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/7880"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/aa1894e09e3fe66860c7885cb40f98901b35277f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.41.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenTelemetry-Go: multi-value `baggage` header extraction causes excessive allocations (remote dos amplification)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "google.golang.org/grpc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.79.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33186"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T23:16:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nIt is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.\n\nThe gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, \"deny\" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback \"allow\" rule was present.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\nThis affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:\n1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.\n2. Their security policy contains specific \"deny\" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback \"allow\" rule).\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nYes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.\n\nUsers should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):\n* **v1.79.3**\n* The latest **master** branch.\n\nIt is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nWhile upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:\n\n#### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)\nAdd an \"outermost\" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:\n\n```go\nfunc pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {\n    if info.FullMethod == \"\" || info.FullMethod[0] != \u0027/\u0027 {\n        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, \"malformed method name\")\n    }   \n    return handler(ctx, req)\n}\n\n// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain\ns := grpc.NewServer(\n    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),\n)\n```\n\n#### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization\nIf your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a leading slash.\n\n#### 3. Policy Hardening\nSwitch to a \"default deny\" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.",
  "id": "GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:12:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path"
}