Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from cleanstart

Published

2026-07-30 07:10

Modified

2026-07-30 09:36

Summary

Security fixes in argo-rollouts 1.9.0-r0

Details

Package argo-rollouts version 1.9.0-r0 fixes 13 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mh63-6h87-95cp, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3, ghsa-93mq-9ffx-83m2, ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2, ghsa-cfpf-hrx2-8rv6...

References

URL

Type

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-rollouts

WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpine",
        "name": "argo-rollouts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.9.0-r0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Package argo-rollouts version 1.9.0-r0 fixes 13 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mh63-6h87-95cp, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3, ghsa-93mq-9ffx-83m2, ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2, ghsa-cfpf-hrx2-8rv6...",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-IL70948",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T09:36:13Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-rollouts"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fixes in argo-rollouts 1.9.0-r0",
  "upstream": [
    "ghsa-mh63-6h87-95cp",
    "ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
    "ghsa-93mq-9ffx-83m2",
    "ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2",
    "ghsa-cfpf-hrx2-8rv6",
    "ghsa-r6j8-c6r2-37rr",
    "ghsa-gxhx-2686-5h9g",
    "CVE-2025-29786",
    "CVE-2025-68156",
    "CVE-2025-30204",
    "CVE-2026-35469",
    "CVE-2026-33186",
    "CVE-2025-13281"
  ]
}

GHSA-P77J-4MVH-X3M3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:10 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:12

Summary

gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path

Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.

The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.

Who is impacted? This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria: 1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx). 2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).

The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.

Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer): * v1.79.3 * The latest master branch.

It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:

func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
    if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
    }   
    return handler(ctx, req)
}

// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.

3. Policy Hardening

Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "google.golang.org/grpc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.79.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33186"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T23:16:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nIt is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.\n\nThe gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, \"deny\" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback \"allow\" rule was present.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\nThis affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:\n1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.\n2. Their security policy contains specific \"deny\" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback \"allow\" rule).\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nYes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.\n\nUsers should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):\n* **v1.79.3**\n* The latest **master** branch.\n\nIt is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nWhile upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:\n\n#### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)\nAdd an \"outermost\" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:\n\n```go\nfunc pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {\n    if info.FullMethod == \"\" || info.FullMethod[0] != \u0027/\u0027 {\n        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, \"malformed method name\")\n    }   \n    return handler(ctx, req)\n}\n\n// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain\ns := grpc.NewServer(\n    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),\n)\n```\n\n#### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization\nIf your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a leading slash.\n\n#### 3. Policy Hardening\nSwitch to a \"default deny\" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.",
  "id": "GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:12:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path"
}

GHSA-PC3F-X583-G7J2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 20:44 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:36

Summary

SpdyStream: DOS on CRI

Details

The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash. Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected: 1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload, triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read. 2. Header count -- parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bit numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an http.Header map of that size with no upper bound. 3. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with no validation. Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is enough to exhaust process memory.

Impact

Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.

Affected versions

github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0

Fix

v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related hardening: Core fixes: - SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating. - Header count limit -- parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximum number of headers per frame (default: 1000). - Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB) before allocation. - Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the same connection. Additional hardening: - Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the library from producing invalid frames. Configurable limits: - Callers can adjust the defaults using NewConnectionWithOptions or the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options: WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and WithMaxHeaderCount.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/moby/spdystream"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35469"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T20:44:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T22:16:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate\nattacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A\nremote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can\ncause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of\nmalformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.\n\u00a0\nThree allocation paths in the receive side are affected:\n1. **SETTINGS entry count** -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit\n`numSettings` from the payload and allocates a slice of that size\nwithout checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker\ncan set `numSettings` to a value far exceeding the actual payload,\ntriggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.\n\u00a0\n2. **Header count** -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` reads a 32-bit\n`numHeaders` from the decompressed header block and allocates an\n`http.Header` map of that size with no upper bound.\n\u00a0\n3. **Header field size** -- Individual header name and value lengths are\nread as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with\nno validation.\n\u00a0\nBecause SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire\npayload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser\ninterprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is\nenough to exhaust process memory.\n## Impact\n\u00a0Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly\nor through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can\nsend SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single\ncrafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.\n## Affected versions\n\u00a0`github.com/moby/spdystream` \u003c= v0.5.0\n## Fix\n\u00a0v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related\nhardening:\n\u00a0\n**Core fixes:**\n\u00a0\n- **SETTINGS entry-count validation** -- The SETTINGS frame reader now\nchecks that `numSettings` is consistent with the declared frame\nlength (`numSettings \u003c= (length-4)/8`) before allocating.\n\u00a0\n- **Header count limit** -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` enforces a maximum\nnumber of headers per frame (default: 1000).\n\u00a0\n- **Header field size limit** -- Individual header name and value\nlengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)\nbefore allocation.\n\u00a0\n- **Connection closure on protocol error** -- The connection read loop\nnow closes the underlying `net.Conn` when it encounters an\n`InvalidControlFrame` error, preventing further exploitation on the\nsame connection.\n\u00a0\n**Additional hardening:**\n\u00a0\n- **Write-side bounds checks** -- All frame write methods now verify\nthat payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the\nlibrary from producing invalid frames.\n\u00a0\n**Configurable limits:**\n\u00a0\n- Callers can adjust the defaults using `NewConnectionWithOptions` or\nthe lower-level `spdy.NewFramerWithOptions` with functional options:\n`WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize`, `WithMaxHeaderFieldSize`, and\n`WithMaxHeaderCount`.\n\u00a0",
  "id": "GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:36:28Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T20:44:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/security/advisories/GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/commit/ef6121f62c730110bf5ae604a865a8613bfb787f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/releases/tag/v0.5.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SpdyStream: DOS on CRI"
}

GHSA-R6J8-C6R2-37RR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-15 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-20 03:27

Summary

kube-controller-manager is vulnerable to half-blind Server Side Request Forgery through in-tree Portworx StorageClass

Details

A half-blind Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in kube-controller-manager when using the in-tree Portworx StorageClass. This vulnerability allows authorized users to leak arbitrary information from unprotected endpoints in the control plane’s host network (including link-local or loopback services).

Severity

5.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.32.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.33.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.33.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.34.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13281"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-16T00:48:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-14T22:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A half-blind Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in kube-controller-manager when using the in-tree Portworx StorageClass. This vulnerability allows authorized users to leak arbitrary information from unprotected endpoints in the control plane\u2019s host network (including link-local or loopback services).",
  "id": "GHSA-r6j8-c6r2-37rr",
  "modified": "2025-12-20T03:27:50Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T00:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/135525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/7506ce804c20696ba32cdb72126270ceaed06e24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/97650c1c4fe15cbb7756ba95b3edc8a8665063ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/dbe17dfe7773563eac95534040f413ada6d2b421"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6j8-c6r2-37rr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/kubernetes-security-announce/c/EORqZg0k1l4/m/TtD-q0v7AgAJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/12/01/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kube-controller-manager is vulnerable to half-blind Server Side Request Forgery through in-tree Portworx StorageClass"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

Vulnerability from cleanstart

GHSA-P77J-4MVH-X3M3

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

3. Policy Hardening

GHSA-PC3F-X583-G7J2

Impact

Affected versions

Fix

GHSA-R6J8-C6R2-37RR

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature