CISCO-SA-FINESSE-PROXY-DOS-VY5DQHRV
Vulnerability from csaf_cisco - Published: 2023-03-01 16:00 - Updated: 2023-03-02 20:35| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Cisco Finesse
Cisco
|
— |
Vendor Fix
fix
Workaround
|
|
|
Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise
Cisco
|
— |
Vendor Fix
fix
Workaround
|
|
|
Cisco Unified Contact Center Express
Cisco
|
— |
Vendor Fix
fix
Workaround
|
|
|
Cisco Packaged Contact Center Enterprise
Cisco
|
— |
Vendor Fix
fix
Workaround
|
| URL | Category |
|---|---|
| https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/c… | self |
| https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/r… | external |
| https://www.cisco.com/go/tac/ | external |
| https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/r… | external |
| https://www.cisco.com/go/psirt | external |
| https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/voice_ip_co… | external |
| http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/sec… | external |
{
"document": {
"acknowledgments": [
{
"summary": "This vulnerability was found during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support case."
}
],
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "A vulnerability in the nginx configurations that are provided as part of the VPN-less reverse proxy for Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to create a denial of service (DoS) condition for new and existing users who are connected through a load balancer.\r\n\r\nThis vulnerability is due to improper IP address filtering by the reverse proxy. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of unauthenticated requests to the reverse proxy. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause all current traffic and subsequent requests to the reverse proxy through a load balancer to be dropped, resulting in a DoS condition.\r\n\r\nCisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are workarounds that address this vulnerability.\r\n\r\n",
"title": "Summary"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "At the time of publication, this vulnerability affected Cisco Finesse only if the reverse proxy was installed and requests to the reverse proxy were routed through the load balancer.\r\n\r\nThe following Cisco products, which may be bundled with Cisco Finesse, were also affected by this vulnerability:\r\n\r\nPackaged Contact Center Enterprise (PCCE)\r\nUnified Contact Center Enterprise (UCCE)\r\nUnified Contact Center Express (UCCX)\r\n\r\nFor information about which Cisco software releases were vulnerable at the time of publication, see the Fixed Software [\"#fs\"] section of this advisory. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.",
"title": "Vulnerable Products"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products [\"#vp\"] section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability.",
"title": "Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "A workaround for this vulnerability is available for customers who cannot upgrade to a fixed release. To coordinate implementation of the workaround, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) [\"https://www.cisco.com/go/tac/\"].\r\n\r\nWhile this workaround has been deployed and was proven successful in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such environment.",
"title": "Workarounds"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "When considering software upgrades [\"https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html#fixes\"], customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories page [\"https://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\"], to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.\r\n\r\nIn all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.\r\n\r\nAt the time of publication, the release information in the following table was accurate. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.\r\n\r\nThe left column lists Cisco software releases, and the right column indicates whether a release was affected by the vulnerability that is described in this advisory and which release included the fix for this vulnerability.\r\n Cisco Finesse Release First Fixed Release Earlier than 12.6(1) ES7 12.6(1) ES7\r\nIn addition to installing the fixed release, the following configurations must be applied to the reverse proxy and on any intermediary devices such as load balancers:\r\n\r\nIntermediary network devices that are front-ending the reverse proxy, such as load balancers, should be exempted from configurations that are meant for rate limiting and blocking unauthorized access to avoid blocking the reverse proxy IP address instead of the unauthorized user IP addresses. To configure these devices correctly, follow Step 1 in the Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise Features Guide, Release 12.6(1) - Reverse-Proxy Configuration [\"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/voice_ip_comm/cust_contact/contact_center/icm_enterprise/icm_enterprise_12_6_1/configuration/guide/ucce_b_features-guide-1261/appendix.html\"].\r\nIntermediary network devices that are front-ending the reverse proxy, such as load balancers, should be enabled with the capability to allow requests to contain the user IP addresses instead of the IP addresses of the intermediary devices. To configure these devices correctly, follow Steps 2 and 3 in the Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise Features Guide, Release 12.6(1) - Reverse-Proxy Configuration [\"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/voice_ip_comm/cust_contact/contact_center/icm_enterprise/icm_enterprise_12_6_1/configuration/guide/ucce_b_features-guide-1261/appendix.html\"].\r\n\r\nThe Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) validates only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in this advisory.",
"title": "Fixed Software"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy [\"http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html\"]. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.",
"title": "Vulnerability Policy"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.",
"title": "Exploitation and Public Announcements"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "This vulnerability was found during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support case.",
"title": "Source"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.\r\n\r\nA standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL is an uncontrolled copy and may lack important information or contain factual errors. The information in this document is intended for end users of Cisco products.",
"title": "Legal Disclaimer"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "vendor",
"contact_details": "psirt@cisco.com",
"issuing_authority": "Cisco PSIRT",
"name": "Cisco",
"namespace": "https://wwww.cisco.com"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "Cisco Finesse Reverse Proxy VPN-less Access to Finesse Desktop Denial of Service Vulnerability",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-finesse-proxy-dos-vY5dQhrV"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC)",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/go/tac/"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "considering software upgrades",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html#fixes"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Cisco Security Advisories page",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/go/psirt"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise Features Guide, Release 12.6(1) - Reverse-Proxy Configuration",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/voice_ip_comm/cust_contact/contact_center/icm_enterprise/icm_enterprise_12_6_1/configuration/guide/ucce_b_features-guide-1261/appendix.html"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Security Vulnerability Policy",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html"
}
],
"title": "Cisco Finesse Reverse Proxy VPN-less Access to Finesse Desktop Denial of Service Vulnerability",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2023-03-02T20:35:00+00:00",
"generator": {
"date": "2024-10-31T18:43:43+00:00",
"engine": {
"name": "TVCE"
}
},
"id": "cisco-sa-finesse-proxy-dos-vY5dQhrV",
"initial_release_date": "2023-03-01T16:00:00+00:00",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2023-03-01T15:51:29+00:00",
"number": "1.0.0",
"summary": "Initial public release."
},
{
"date": "2023-03-02T20:35:00+00:00",
"number": "1.1.0",
"summary": "Clarified which releases are vulnerable."
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1.1.0"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_family",
"name": "Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise",
"product": {
"name": "Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise ",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-7500"
}
},
{
"category": "product_family",
"name": "Cisco Unified Contact Center Express",
"product": {
"name": "Cisco Unified Contact Center Express ",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-92631"
}
},
{
"category": "product_family",
"name": "Cisco Finesse",
"product": {
"name": "Cisco Finesse ",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-193469"
}
},
{
"category": "product_family",
"name": "Cisco Packaged Contact Center Enterprise",
"product": {
"name": "Cisco Packaged Contact Center Enterprise ",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-244955"
}
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Cisco"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2023-20088",
"ids": [
{
"system_name": "Cisco Bug ID",
"text": "CSCwd67008"
}
],
"notes": [
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Complete.",
"title": "Affected Product Comprehensiveness"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"CSAFPID-193469",
"CSAFPID-7500",
"CSAFPID-92631",
"CSAFPID-244955"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability.",
"product_ids": [
"CSAFPID-7500",
"CSAFPID-244955",
"CSAFPID-193469",
"CSAFPID-92631"
],
"url": "https://software.cisco.com"
},
{
"category": "workaround",
"details": "A workaround for this vulnerability is available for customers who cannot upgrade to a fixed release. To coordinate implementation of the workaround, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) [\"https://www.cisco.com/go/tac/\"].\r\n\r\nWhile this workaround has been deployed and was proven successful in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such environment.",
"product_ids": [
"CSAFPID-193469",
"CSAFPID-7500",
"CSAFPID-92631",
"CSAFPID-244955"
]
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"CSAFPID-193469",
"CSAFPID-7500",
"CSAFPID-92631",
"CSAFPID-244955"
]
}
],
"title": "Cisco Finesse Reverse Proxy Denial of Service Vulnerability"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.