CERTFR-2020-AVI-404
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2020-07-02 - Updated: 2020-07-03
Une vulnérabilité a été découverte dans les commutateurs Cisco. Elle permet à un attaquant de provoquer un contournement de la politique de sécurité.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cisco | Small Business | Commutateurs gérés empilables Cisco série 500 Small Business (produit en fin de vie) | ||
| Cisco | Small Business | Commutateurs intelligents Cisco série 200 Small Business (produit en fin de vie) | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Commutateurs gérés empilables Cisco série 350X versions antérieures à 2.5.5.47 | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Commutateurs intelligents Cisco série 250 versions antérieures à 2.5.5.47 | ||
| Cisco | Small Business | Commutateurs gérés Cisco série 300 Small Business (produit en fin de vie) | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Commutateurs gérés empilables Cisco série 550X versions antérieures à 2.5.5.47 | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Commutateurs gérés Cisco série 350 versions antérieures à 2.5.5.47 |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Commutateurs g\u00e9r\u00e9s empilables Cisco s\u00e9rie 500 Small Business (produit en fin de vie)",
"product": {
"name": "Small Business",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs intelligents Cisco s\u00e9rie 200 Small Business (produit en fin de vie)",
"product": {
"name": "Small Business",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs g\u00e9r\u00e9s empilables Cisco s\u00e9rie 350X versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.5.5.47",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs intelligents Cisco s\u00e9rie 250 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.5.5.47",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs g\u00e9r\u00e9s Cisco s\u00e9rie 300 Small Business (produit en fin de vie)",
"product": {
"name": "Small Business",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs g\u00e9r\u00e9s empilables Cisco s\u00e9rie 550X versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.5.5.47",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Commutateurs g\u00e9r\u00e9s Cisco s\u00e9rie 350 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.5.5.47",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2020-3297",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3297"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2020-07-02T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2020-07-03T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTFR-2020-AVI-404",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "Version initiale",
"revision_date": "2020-07-02T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "Modification du titre car une seule vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 fait l\u0027objet de cet avis.",
"revision_date": "2020-07-03T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans les commutateurs Cisco. Elle\npermet \u00e0 un attaquant de provoquer un contournement de la politique de\ns\u00e9curit\u00e9.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans les commutateurs Cisco",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco cisco-sa-sbswitch-session-JZAS5jnY du 01 juillet 2020",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sbswitch-session-JZAS5jnY"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.