CERTA-2014-AVI-020

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2014-01-15 - Updated: 2014-01-15

De multiples vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans Google Chrome. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer une exécution de code arbitraire à distance et un contournement de la politique de sécurité.

Solution

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

Google Chrome version antérieures à 32.0.1700.76

Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
References

Show details on source website
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{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [],
  "affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eGoogle Chrome version ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 32.0.1700.76\u003c/P\u003e",
  "content": "## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6641",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6641"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6644",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6644"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6643",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6643"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6642",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6642"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6646",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6646"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2013-6645",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-6645"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2014-01-15T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2014-01-15T00:00:00",
  "links": [],
  "reference": "CERTA-2014-AVI-020",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2014-01-15T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
    },
    {
      "description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "De multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans \u003cspan\nclass=\"textit\"\u003eGoogle Chrome\u003c/span\u003e. Elles permettent \u00e0 un attaquant de\nprovoquer une ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance et un\ncontournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9.\n",
  "title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Google Chrome",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Google du 14 janvier 2014",
      "url": "http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.fr/2014/01/stable-channel-update.html"
    }
  ]
}



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