CERTA-2013-AVI-055
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2013-01-22 - Updated: 2013-01-22
Deux vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans EMC AlphaStor. La première concerne une injection de commande à distance via le DCP « run command ». La seconde concerne une interprétation des chaînes de caractères (format string) pouvant mener un utilisateur malintentionné à exécuter du code arbitraire à distance.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Versions antérieures à EMC AlphaStor 4.0 mise à jour 800
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eVersions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 EMC AlphaStor 4.0 mise \u00e0 jour 800\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2013-0928",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-0928"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2013-0929",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2013-0929"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2013-01-22T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2013-01-22T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2013-AVI-055",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2013-01-22T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eEMC\nAlphaStor\u003c/span\u003e. La premi\u00e8re concerne une injection de commande \u00e0\ndistance via le DCP \u00ab run command \u00bb. La seconde concerne une\ninterpr\u00e9tation des cha\u00eenes de caract\u00e8res (format string) pouvant mener\nun utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 \u00e0 ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans EMC AlphaStor",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ESA-2013-008 du 18 janvier 2013",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2013-01/att-0078/ESA-2012-008.txt"
}
]
}
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