CERTA-2011-AVI-198
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2011-04-11 - Updated: 2011-04-11
Deux vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans RoundCube. La première permet l'injection de requêtes illégitimes par rebond, et la seconde de contourner la politique de sécurité ce qui permet à un utilisateur malveillant d'utiliser RoundCube comme relai de messagerie.
Description
Une vulnérabilité permettant l'injection de requêtes illégitimes par rebond lors de la connexion a été corrigée dans RoundCube. Également, une vulnérabilité qui, lorsqu'elle est exploitée, permet à un utilisateur malveillant de contourner la politique de sécurité afin de passer des commandes illégitimes, a été corrigée.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Roundcube versions 0.5 et inférieures.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eRoundcube versions 0.5 et inf\u00e9rieures.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permettant l\u0027injection de requ\u00eates ill\u00e9gitimes par\nrebond lors de la connexion a \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9e dans RoundCube. \u00c9galement,\nune vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 qui, lorsqu\u0027elle est exploit\u00e9e, permet \u00e0 un\nutilisateur malveillant de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 afin de\npasser des commandes ill\u00e9gitimes, a \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9e.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-1492",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-1492"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2011-04-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2011-04-11T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Ensemble de modification 4490 du 03 f\u00e9vrier 2011 :",
"url": "http://trac.roundcube.net/changeset/4490"
},
{
"title": "Ensemble de modification 4488 du 03 f\u00e9vrier 2011 :",
"url": "http://trac.roundcube.net/changeset/4488"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-198",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-04-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Injection de requ\u00eates ill\u00e9gitimes par rebond (CSRF)"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans RoundCube. La premi\u00e8re permet\nl\u0027injection de requ\u00eates ill\u00e9gitimes par rebond, et la seconde de\ncontourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ce qui permet \u00e0 un utilisateur\nmalveillant d\u0027utiliser RoundCube comme relai de messagerie.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans RoundCube",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Liste des modifications apport\u00e9es \u00e0 RoundCube 0.5.1",
"url": "http://trac.roundcube.net/wiki/Changelog"
}
]
}
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