CERTA-2011-AVI-086
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2011-02-14 - Updated: 2011-02-16
Plusieurs vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans Django. Celles-ci permettent de contourner la politique de sécurité, de réaliser une injection de code indirecte à distance et porter atteinte à la confidentialité des données.
Description
La première vulnérabilité corrigée permet de contourner la protection anti-injection de requêtes illégitimes par rebond. Une faille dans la gestion des noms de fichiers téléchargés vers le serveur permet à une personne malveillante de réaliser une injection de code indirecte à distance. Enfin, sur les systèmes Windows un attaquant capable de rejouer des connexions au serveur ou de contourner les mécanismes d'authentification peut afficher des fichiers arbitraires, à cause d'un problème dans l'utilisation des caractères de séparation du système de fichiers.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Django 1.1.x versions inf\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.1.4.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Django 1.2.x versions inf\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.2.5 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nLa premi\u00e8re vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 corrig\u00e9e permet de contourner la protection\nanti-injection de requ\u00eates ill\u00e9gitimes par rebond. Une faille dans la\ngestion des noms de fichiers t\u00e9l\u00e9charg\u00e9s vers le serveur permet \u00e0 une\npersonne malveillante de r\u00e9aliser une injection de code indirecte \u00e0\ndistance. Enfin, sur les syst\u00e8mes Windows un attaquant capable de\nrejouer des connexions au serveur ou de contourner les m\u00e9canismes\nd\u0027authentification peut afficher des fichiers arbitraires, \u00e0 cause d\u0027un\nprobl\u00e8me dans l\u0027utilisation des caract\u00e8res de s\u00e9paration du syst\u00e8me de\nfichiers.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0696",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0696"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0698",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0698"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0697",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0697"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2011-02-14T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2011-02-16T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Debian DSA-2163-1 du 14 f\u00e9vrier 2011 :",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2163"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-086",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-02-14T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "ajout de la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au bulletin Debian et des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences CVE.",
"revision_date": "2011-02-16T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Injection de code indirecte \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans Django. Celles-ci\npermettent de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, de r\u00e9aliser une\ninjection de code indirecte \u00e0 distance et porter atteinte \u00e0 la\nconfidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Django",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Django du 8 f\u00e9vrier 2011",
"url": "http://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2011/feb/08/security/"
}
]
}
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