CERTA-2010-AVI-496
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2010-10-13 - Updated: 2010-10-13
Une vulnérabilité dans le partage de cluster de disques, sous Windows Server 2008 R2, peut être utilisée par un utilisateur malintentionné pour porter atteinte à l'intégrité et à la confidentialité des données.
Description
Une vulnérabilité existe dans la gestion des clusters de disques partagés sous Windows Server 2008 R2. Cette vulnérabilité s'applique uniquement au cluster de disques de basculement. Lors de l'ajout d'un disque, le gestionnaire du cluster de basculement met des autorisations par défauts pouvant permettre, à un utilisateur malintentionné, de porter atteinte à l'intégrité et à la confidentialité des données.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation). La mise à jour proposée par Microsoft corrige la façon dont sont définies les permissions par défaut, mais pas les permissions existantes sur les clusters de disques partagés. Les administrateurs devront donc vérifier les permissions sur les clusters de disques existants une fois la mise à jour appliquée.
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
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{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Windows Server 2008 R2 64 bits ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Windows Server 2008 R2 pour syst\u00e8mes Itanium.",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 existe dans la gestion des clusters de disques\npartag\u00e9s sous Windows Server 2008 R2. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 s\u0027applique\nuniquement au cluster de disques de basculement. Lors de l\u0027ajout d\u0027un\ndisque, le gestionnaire du cluster de basculement met des autorisations\npar d\u00e9fauts pouvant permettre, \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9, de\nporter atteinte \u00e0 l\u0027int\u00e9grit\u00e9 et \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation). La mise \u00e0 jour propos\u00e9e par\nMicrosoft corrige la fa\u00e7on dont sont d\u00e9finies les permissions par\nd\u00e9faut, mais pas les permissions existantes sur les clusters de disques\npartag\u00e9s. Les administrateurs devront donc v\u00e9rifier les permissions sur\nles clusters de disques existants une fois la mise \u00e0 jour appliqu\u00e9e.\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2010-3223",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-3223"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2010-10-13T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2010-10-13T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2010-AVI-496",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2010-10-13T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 l\u0027int\u00e9grit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans le partage de \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003ecluster\u003c/span\u003e\nde disques, sous Windows Server 2008 R2, peut \u00eatre utilis\u00e9e par un\nutilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 pour porter atteinte \u00e0 l\u0027int\u00e9grit\u00e9 et \u00e0 la\nconfidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans le partage de cluster de disques sous Windows Server",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS10-086 du 12 octobre 2010",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-086.mspx"
}
]
}
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