CERTA-2010-AVI-230
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2010-05-27 - Updated: 2010-05-27
Une vulnérabilité dans l'ouverture de certains fichiers par Adobe Photoshop CS4 permet à un utilisateur malveillant d'exécuter du code arbitraire.
Description
Adobe Photoshop CS4 présente une vulnérabilité lors de l'ouverture de fichiers malformés aux formats Photoshop ASL (style d'image), ABR (configuration pour les outils) ou GRD (gradient ou texture). L'exploitation de cette vulnérabilité permet à l'attaquant de prendre le contrôle complet du système vulnérable.
La version Adobe Photoshop CS5 ne présente pas ces vulnérabilité.
Solution
La version CS4 11.0.2 remédie à ces problèmes.
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Adobe Photoshop CS4 11.x pour Windows et pour MacOS X.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eAdobe Photoshop CS4 11.x pour Windows et pour MacOS X.\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nAdobe Photoshop CS4 pr\u00e9sente une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 lors de l\u0027ouverture de\nfichiers malform\u00e9s aux formats Photoshop ASL (style d\u0027image), ABR\n(configuration pour les outils) ou GRD (gradient ou texture).\nL\u0027exploitation de cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet \u00e0 l\u0027attaquant de prendre le\ncontr\u00f4le complet du syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n\nLa version Adobe Photoshop CS5 ne pr\u00e9sente pas ces vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9.\n\n## Solution\n\nLa version CS4 11.0.2 rem\u00e9die \u00e0 ces probl\u00e8mes.\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2010-1296",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1296"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2010-05-27T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2010-05-27T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2010-AVI-230",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2010-05-27T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans l\u0027ouverture de certains fichiers par Adobe\nPhotoshop CS4 permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malveillant d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code\narbitraire.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Adobe Photoshop",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Adobe apsb10-13 du 26 mai 2010",
"url": "http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-13.html"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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