CERTA-2010-AVI-194
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2010-04-22 - Updated: 2010-04-22
Une vulnérabilité dans Cisco Small Business Video Surveillance Cameras et dans Cisco RVS4000 4-port Gigabit Security Router permet à un utilisateur authentifié d'élever ses privilèges.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été découverte dans Cisco Small Business Video Surveillance Cameras et dans Cisco RVS4000 4-port Gigabit Security Router. Un utilisateur authentifié peut accéder au mot de passe des autres utilisateurs et ainsi élever ses privilèges.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
- Cisco Small Business Video Surveillance Cameras ;
- Cisco RVS4000 4-port Gigabit Security Router.
Les caméras suivantes sont concernées :
- Cisco PVC2300 Business Internet Video Camera - Audio/PoE ;
- Cisco WVC200 Wireless-G PTZ Internet Video Camera - Audio ;
- Cisco WVC210 Wireless-G PTZ Internet Video Camera - 2-way Audio ;
- Cisco WVC2300 Wireless-G Business Internet Video Camera - Audio.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco Small Business Video Surveillance Cameras\u003c/SPAN\u003e ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco RVS4000 4-port Gigabit Security Router\u003c/SPAN\u003e.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e \u003cP\u003eLes cam\u00e9ras suivantes sont concern\u00e9es :\u003c/P\u003e \u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco PVC2300 Business Internet Video Camera - Audio/PoE\u003c/SPAN\u003e ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco WVC200 Wireless-G PTZ Internet Video Camera - Audio\u003c/SPAN\u003e ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco WVC210 Wireless-G PTZ Internet Video Camera - 2-way Audio\u003c/SPAN\u003e ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco WVC2300 Wireless-G Business Internet Video Camera - Audio\u003c/SPAN\u003e.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans Cisco Small Business Video\nSurveillance Cameras et dans Cisco RVS4000 4-port Gigabit Security\nRouter. Un utilisateur authentifi\u00e9 peut acc\u00e9der au mot de passe des\nautres utilisateurs et ainsi \u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2010-0593",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0593"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2010-04-22T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2010-04-22T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cisco-sa-20100421-vsc du 21 avril 2010 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100421-vsc.html"
},
{
"title": "R\u00e9f\u00e9rence CVE CVE-2010-0593 :",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0593"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2010-AVI-194",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2010-04-22T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
},
{
"description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco Small Business Video\nSurveillance Cameras\u003c/span\u003e et dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco RVS4000\n4-port Gigabit Security Router\u003c/span\u003e permet \u00e0 un utilisateur\nauthentifi\u00e9 d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Cisco Small Business Video Surveillance Cameras",
"vendor_advisories": []
}
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