CERTA-2009-AVI-108
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2009-03-19 - Updated: 2009-03-19
Une vulnérabilité dans Symantec pcAnywhere permet à un utilisateur authentifié d'élever ses privilèges.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été découverte dans Symantec pcAnywhere. L'exploitation de cette vulnérabilité permet à un utilisateur authentifié d'élever ses privilèges.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Symantec pcAnywhere versions 12.0, 12.1 et 12.5.
Les versions antérieures peuvent être affectées mais ne sont plus maintenues.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eSymantec pcAnywhere\u003c/SPAN\u003e versions 12.0, 12.1 et 12.5.\u003c/P\u003e \u003cP\u003eLes versions ant\u00e9rieures peuvent \u00eatre affect\u00e9es mais ne sont plus maintenues.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans Symantec pcAnywhere.\nL\u0027exploitation de cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet \u00e0 un utilisateur\nauthentifi\u00e9 d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2009-0538",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-0538"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2009-03-19T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2009-03-19T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2009-AVI-108",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2009-03-19T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eSymantec pcAnywhere\u003c/span\u003e\npermet \u00e0 un utilisateur authentifi\u00e9 d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Symantec pcAnywhere",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Symantec SYM09-003 du 17 mars 2009",
"url": "http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/security/Content/2009.03.17.html"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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