CERTA-2008-AVI-479

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-09-30 - Updated: 2008-10-08

Plusieurs vulnérabilités dans Lighttpd peuvent être exploitées par une personne malveillante afin de provoquer un déni de service, de contourner la politique de sécurité ou d'accéder à des informations sensibles.

Description

Plusieurs vulnérabilités affectant Lighttpd ont été découvertes :

  • une faiblesse dans la gestion de la mémoire par la fonction http_request_parse() permet à une personne malintentionnée d'obtenir un accès total à la mémoire ;
  • une erreur dans la gestion des noms de fichier permet à une personne malintentionnée de poter atteinte à la confidentialité des données ;
  • une erreur due au non décodage des requêtes avant le contrôle avec les règles de réécriture et de redirection permet à une personne malveillante de contourner ces dernières.

Solution

Se référer aux bulletins de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

Toutes les versions de Lighttpd antérieures à la version 1.4.20.

Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
References

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{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [],
  "affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eToutes les versions de \u003cTT\u003eLighttpd\u003c/TT\u003e ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 la  version 1.4.20.\u003c/P\u003e",
  "content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s affectant Lighttpd ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes :\n\n-   une faiblesse dans la gestion de la m\u00e9moire par la fonction\n    http_request_parse() permet \u00e0 une personne malintentionn\u00e9e d\u0027obtenir\n    un acc\u00e8s total \u00e0 la m\u00e9moire ;\n-   une erreur dans la gestion des noms de fichier permet \u00e0 une personne\n    malintentionn\u00e9e de poter atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es ;\n-   une erreur due au non d\u00e9codage des requ\u00eates avant le contr\u00f4le avec\n    les r\u00e8gles de r\u00e9\u00e9criture et de redirection permet \u00e0 une personne\n    malveillante de contourner ces derni\u00e8res.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer aux bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2008-4359",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4359"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2008-4360",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4360"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2008-4298",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4298"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2008-09-30T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2008-10-08T00:00:00",
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Lighttpd :",
      "url": "http://trac.lighttpd.net/security/lighttpd_sa_2008_07.txt"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Lighttpd :",
      "url": "http://trac.lighttpd.net/security/lighttpd_sa_2008_06.txt"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Lighttpd :",
      "url": "http://trac.lighttpd.net/security/lighttpd_sa_2008_05.txt"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-479",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2008-09-30T00:00:00.000000"
    },
    {
      "description": "ajout de vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s et des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences CVE.",
      "revision_date": "2008-10-08T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "D\u00e9ni de service"
    },
    {
      "description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
    },
    {
      "description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Lighttpd peuvent \u00eatre exploit\u00e9es par une\npersonne malveillante afin de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service, de\ncontourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ou d\u0027acc\u00e9der \u00e0 des informations\nsensibles.\n",
  "title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Lighttpd",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Lighttpd 04, 05, 06 et 07",
      "url": null
    }
  ]
}



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