CERTA-2008-AVI-390
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-08-05 - Updated: 2008-08-05
Plusieurs vulnérabilités découvertes dans Ingres permettent à une personne malintentionnée d'exécuter du code arbitraire et d'élever ses privilèges.
Description
Trois vulnérabilités ont été découvertes et permettent à une personne malveillante d'élever ses privilèges et d'exécuter du code arbitraire :
- une personne non authentifiée peut attribuer à un utilisateur ou un groupe propriétaire d'un journal d'événements verifydb des droits en lecture et en écriture ;
- une personne non authentifiée exploitant une vulnérabilité de type écrasement de pointeur peut exécuter du code arbitraire sur le serveur de base de données ;
- une personne non authentifiée peut obtenir les privilèges d'un utilisateur Ingres, cette vulnérabilité combinée avec la précédente peut permettre d'obtenir les droits root.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
- Ingres 2006 release 2 (9.1.0) ;
- Ingres 2006 release 1 (9.0.4) ;
- Ingres 2.6.
Certains produits CA utilisent ce système de gestion de base de données.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eIngres 2006 release 2 (9.1.0) ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eIngres 2006 release 1 (9.0.4) ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eIngres 2.6.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e \u003cP\u003eCertains produits \u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCA\u003c/SPAN\u003e utilisent ce syst\u00e8me de gestion de base de donn\u00e9es.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nTrois vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes et permettent \u00e0 une personne\nmalveillante d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges et d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire :\n\n- une personne non authentifi\u00e9e peut attribuer \u00e0 un utilisateur ou un\n groupe propri\u00e9taire d\u0027un journal d\u0027\u00e9v\u00e9nements verifydb des droits en\n lecture et en \u00e9criture ;\n- une personne non authentifi\u00e9e exploitant une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de type\n \u00e9crasement de pointeur peut ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire sur le\n serveur de base de donn\u00e9es ;\n- une personne non authentifi\u00e9e peut obtenir les privil\u00e8ges d\u0027un\n utilisateur Ingres, cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 combin\u00e9e avec la pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente\n peut permettre d\u0027obtenir les droits root.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2008-3356",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3356"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2008-3357",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3357"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2008-3389",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3389"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2008-08-05T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2008-08-05T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Ingres du 01 ao\u00fbt 2008 :",
"url": "http://www.ingres.com/support/security-alert-080108.php"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-390",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2008-08-05T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire"
},
{
"description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s d\u00e9couvertes dans \u003cspan\nclass=\"textit\"\u003eIngres\u003c/span\u003e permettent \u00e0 une personne malintentionn\u00e9e\nd\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire et d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Ingres",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Ingres du 01 aout 2008",
"url": null
}
]
}
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