CERTA-2008-AVI-268
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-05-22 - Updated: 2008-05-22
Plusieurs vulnérabilités présentes dans le serveur SSH des IOS Cisco permettent à un utilisateur distant de provoquer un déni de service.
Description
De multiples vulnérabilités non détaillées sont présentes dans les systèmes d'exploitation IOS utilisé dans de nombreux équipements Cisco. Ces failles sont toutes relatives au serveur SSH mis en œuvre dans cet IOS. Elles permettent de provoquer un déni de service à distance en faisant redémarrer l'équipement vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Cisco IOS 12.x ;",
"product": {
"name": "IOS",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Cisco IOS R12.x.",
"product": {
"name": "IOS",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDe multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s non d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sont pr\u00e9sentes dans les\nsyst\u00e8mes d\u0027exploitation IOS utilis\u00e9 dans de nombreux \u00e9quipements Cisco.\nCes failles sont toutes relatives au serveur SSH mis en \u0153uvre dans cet\nIOS. Elles permettent de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance en\nfaisant red\u00e9marrer l\u0027\u00e9quipement vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2008-1159",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1159"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2008-05-22T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2008-05-22T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 99725 du 21 mai 2008 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-268",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2008-05-22T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s pr\u00e9sentes dans le serveur SSH des IOS Cisco\npermettent \u00e0 un utilisateur distant de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s du serveur SSH des \u00e9quipements Cisco",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco n\u00b099725 du 21 mai 2008",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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