CERTA-2008-AVI-210
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-04-17 - Updated: 2008-04-17
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans Cisco NAC (Network Admission Control) Appliance. Elle permettrait à une personne malveillante distante de récupérer des informations pour contourner la politique de sécurité et de prendre le contrôle de certains éléments servant à la mettre en place.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans Cisco NAC (Network Admission Control) Appliance. Elle permettrait à une personne malveillante distante de récupérer via les journaux d'erreurs transmis dans le réseau un secret partagé entre les éléments de type CAS (Cisco Clean Access Server) et CAM (Cisco Clean Access Manager).
Cette exploitation peut donc conduire non seulement au contournement de la politique de sécurité appliquée, mais également au contrôle complet du CAS.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de Cisco pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cisco | N/A | Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 3.5.x ; | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 3.6.x antérieures à 3.6.4.4 ; | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 4.0.x antérieures à 4.0.6 ; | ||
| Cisco | N/A | Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 4.1.x antérieures à 4.1.2. |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 3.5.x ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 3.6.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 3.6.4.4 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 4.0.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 4.0.6 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Cisco NAC Appliance pour les versions de la branche 4.1.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 4.1.2.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans Cisco NAC (Network Admission\nControl) Appliance. Elle permettrait \u00e0 une personne malveillante\ndistante de r\u00e9cup\u00e9rer via les journaux d\u0027erreurs transmis dans le r\u00e9seau\nun secret partag\u00e9 entre les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de type CAS (Cisco Clean Access\nServer) et CAM (Cisco Clean Access Manager).\n\nCette exploitation peut donc conduire non seulement au contournement de\nla politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 appliqu\u00e9e, mais \u00e9galement au contr\u00f4le complet\ndu CAS.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Cisco pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2008-1155",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1155"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2008-04-17T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2008-04-17T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20080416-nac du 16 avril 2008 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080416-nac.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-210",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2008-04-17T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans Cisco NAC (\u003cspan\nclass=\"textit\"\u003eNetwork Admission Control\u003c/span\u003e) Appliance. Elle\npermettrait \u00e0 une personne malveillante distante de r\u00e9cup\u00e9rer des\ninformations pour contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de prendre le\ncontr\u00f4le de certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments servant \u00e0 la mettre en place.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Cisco NAC Appliance",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 100782 publi\u00e9 le 16 avril 2008",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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