CERTA-2008-AVI-037
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-01-24 - Updated: 2008-01-24
Deux vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans des produits Cisco. La première concerne l'absence de changement de mot de passe des utilisateurs pendant la phase initiale de configuration pour les solutions Cisco AVS. La seconde concerne le traitement du champ Time-To-Live des trames IP par des solutions PIX et ASA.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans des produits Cisco :
- La première concerne l'absence de changement de mot de passe de certains utilisateurs pendant la phase initiale de configuration pour les solutions Cisco AVS. Ces utilisateurs par défaut peuvent avoir des droits d'administrateur. Si l'administrateur ne change pas ces identifiants de lui-même, ces comptes restent actifs et présents sur le système, permettant ainsi à une personne malveillante d'élever ses privilèges et de modifier les configurations.
- La seconde concerne le traitement du champ Time-To-Live des trames IP par des solutions PIX et ASA. Certaines valeurs provoqueraient le redémarrage du système. Cette vulnérabilité fonctionne dès lors que l'option decrement-ttl est fonctionnelle. Celle-ci n'est cependant pas active par défaut.
Solution
Se référer aux bulletins de sécurité de Cisco pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Les solutions Cisco PIX et ASA ayant des versions logicielles ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 7.2(3)006 ou 8.0(3) ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Les solutions Cisco Application Velocity System (AVS) 3110, 3120, 3180 et 3180A Management Station ayant des versions logicielles ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 AVS 5.1.0.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans des produits Cisco :\n\n1. La premi\u00e8re concerne l\u0027absence de changement de mot de passe de\n certains utilisateurs pendant la phase initiale de configuration\n pour les solutions Cisco AVS. Ces utilisateurs par d\u00e9faut peuvent\n avoir des droits d\u0027administrateur. Si l\u0027administrateur ne change pas\n ces identifiants de lui-m\u00eame, ces comptes restent actifs et pr\u00e9sents\n sur le syst\u00e8me, permettant ainsi \u00e0 une personne malveillante\n d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges et de modifier les configurations.\n2. La seconde concerne le traitement du champ Time-To-Live des trames\n IP par des solutions PIX et ASA. Certaines valeurs provoqueraient le\n red\u00e9marrage du syst\u00e8me. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 fonctionne d\u00e8s lors que\n l\u0027option decrement-ttl est fonctionnelle. Celle-ci n\u0027est cependant\n pas active par d\u00e9faut.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer aux bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Cisco pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2008-0029",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0029"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2008-0028",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0028"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2008-01-24T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2008-01-24T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20080123-avs du 23 janvier 2008 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-avs.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20080123-asa du 23 janvier 2008 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-037",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2008-01-24T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans des produits Cisco. La\npremi\u00e8re concerne l\u0027absence de changement de mot de passe des\nutilisateurs pendant la phase initiale de configuration pour les\nsolutions Cisco AVS. La seconde concerne le traitement du champ\nTime-To-Live des trames IP par des solutions PIX et ASA.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans des produits Cisco",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Avis de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Cisco publi\u00e9s le 23 janvier 2008",
"url": null
}
]
}
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