CERTA-2008-AVI-006
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2008-01-08 - Updated: 2008-01-08
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans Asterisk. Elle pourrait être exploitée à distance par le biais de trames spécialement construites, afin de perturber le service.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans Asterisk. L'application ne manipulerait pas correctement les trames signalant la fermeture d'une session d'appel SIP (BYE) et un transfert (en-tête "Also"). Celui-ci n'est normalement plus utilisé, et a été remplacé par la méthode Refer.
Cette vulnérabilité pourrait être exploitée à distance par le biais de trames spécialement construites afin de perturber le service Asterisk.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asterisk | Asterisk | Asterisk Open Source, pour les versions de la branche 1.4.x antérieures à 1.4.17 ; | ||
| Asterisk | N/A | AsteriskNOW pour les versions antérieures à beta7 ; | ||
| Asterisk | Asterisk | Asterisk Business Edition, pour les versions de la branche C.x.x antérieures à C.1.0-beta8 ; | ||
| Asterisk | Asterisk | s800i (Asterisk Appliance) pour les versions de la branche 1.0.x antérieures à 1.0.3.4. | ||
| Asterisk | Asterisk | Asterisk Appliance Developer Kit pour les versions antérieures à Asterisk 1.4 revision 95946 ; |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Asterisk Open Source, pour les versions de la branche 1.4.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.4.17 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"vendor": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "AsteriskNOW pour les versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 beta7 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Asterisk Business Edition, pour les versions de la branche C.x.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 C.1.0-beta8 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"vendor": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "s800i (Asterisk Appliance) pour les versions de la branche 1.0.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.0.3.4.",
"product": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"vendor": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Asterisk Appliance Developer Kit pour les versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 Asterisk 1.4 revision 95946 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"vendor": {
"name": "Asterisk",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans Asterisk. L\u0027application ne\nmanipulerait pas correctement les trames signalant la fermeture d\u0027une\nsession d\u0027appel SIP (BYE) et un transfert (en-t\u00eate \"Also\"). Celui-ci\nn\u0027est normalement plus utilis\u00e9, et a \u00e9t\u00e9 remplac\u00e9 par la m\u00e9thode Refer.\n\nCette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 pourrait \u00eatre exploit\u00e9e \u00e0 distance par le biais de\ntrames sp\u00e9cialement construites afin de perturber le service Asterisk.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2008-0095",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0095"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2008-01-08T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2008-01-08T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "RFC 3515, \"The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer Method\" :",
"url": "http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3115.txt"
},
{
"title": "Annonce de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du projet Asterisk AST-2008-001 du 02 janvier 2008 :",
"url": "http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/AST-2008-001.html"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2008-AVI-006",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2008-01-08T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans Asterisk. Elle pourrait \u00eatre\nexploit\u00e9e \u00e0 distance par le biais de trames sp\u00e9cialement construites,\nafin de perturber le service.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Asterisk",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du projet Asterisk AST-2008-001 du 02 janvier 2008",
"url": null
}
]
}
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