CERTA-2007-AVI-447
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-10-19 - Updated: 2007-10-19
Plusieurs correctifs pour de multiples vulnérabilités touchant des produits Cisco ont été mis en ligne.
Description
Plusieurs vulnérabilités permettant entre autre des dénis de service et le contournement des politiques de sécurité sont corrigés dans les correctifs mis en ligne par Cisco.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
- Les logiciels suivants nécessitent l'application du correctif ICM7.1(5)_ES46 :
- Cisco Unified Intelligent Contact Management Enterprise ;
- Cisco Unified ICM Hosted ;
- Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise ;
- Cisco Unified Contact center Hosted ;
- Cisco Unified CallManager ;
- Cisco System Unified Contact Enterprise.
- Les boitiers Cisco PIX et ASA, avec les versions logicielles 7.0, 7.1, 7.2 et 8.0 sont vulnérables et nécéssitent l'installation du correctif ;
- Les logiciels Cisco Unified CallManager 5.0 and Communications Manager 5.1 sont vulnérables, et nécessitent l'installation de la version 6.0 ;
- Le module Cisco Firewall Services (version antérieure à la 3.2) est vulnérable et nécessite l'installation de la mise à jour.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eLes logiciels suivants n\u00e9cessitent l\u0027application du correctif ICM7.1(5)_ES46 : \u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco Unified Intelligent Contact Management Enterprise ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco Unified ICM Hosted ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco Unified Contact center Hosted ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco Unified CallManager ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eCisco System Unified Contact Enterprise.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e \u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eLes boitiers Cisco PIX et ASA, avec les versions logicielles 7.0, 7.1, 7.2 et 8.0 sont vuln\u00e9rables et n\u00e9c\u00e9ssitent l\u0027installation du correctif ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eLes logiciels Cisco Unified CallManager 5.0 and Communications Manager 5.1 sont vuln\u00e9rables, et n\u00e9cessitent l\u0027installation de la version 6.0 ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eLe module Cisco Firewall Services (version ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la 3.2) est vuln\u00e9rable et n\u00e9cessite l\u0027installation de la mise \u00e0 jour.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s permettant entre autre des d\u00e9nis de service et\nle contournement des politiques de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sont corrig\u00e9s dans les\ncorrectifs mis en ligne par Cisco.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-5539",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5539"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-5537",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5537"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-5538",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5538"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-10-19T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-10-19T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 98833 du 17 octobre 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-cucm.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 98711 du 17 octobre 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-asa.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 98612 du 17 octobre 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-fwsm.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 97836 du 17 octobre 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-447",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-10-19T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Plusieurs correctifs pour de multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s touchant des\nproduits Cisco ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mis en ligne.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans des produits Cisco",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Cisco 97836, 98612, 98711 et 98833 du 17 octobre 2007",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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