CERTA-2007-AVI-436
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-10-12 - Updated: 2007-10-12
Une vulnérabilité découverte dans EMC RepliStor permettrait une exécution de code arbitraire à distance par un individu malveillant.
Description
une vulnérabilité a été découverte dans EMC RepliStor, logiciel de récupération et de protection des données sous Microsoft Windows. Cette vulnérabilité permet un dépassement de mémoire tampon au niveau du service Server (port 7144/tcp). Cette vulnérabilité permettrait à un individu malveillant d'exécuter du code arbitraire avec des privilèges élevés grâce à des requêtes malformées.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité KB emc168869 d'EMC pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
EMC RepliStor versions 6.1.3 et précédentes.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eEMC RepliStor versions 6.1.3 et pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes.\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nune vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans EMC RepliStor, logiciel de\nr\u00e9cup\u00e9ration et de protection des donn\u00e9es sous Microsoft Windows. Cette\nvuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet un d\u00e9passement de m\u00e9moire tampon au niveau du\nservice Server (port 7144/tcp). Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permettrait \u00e0 un\nindividu malveillant d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire avec des privil\u00e8ges\n\u00e9lev\u00e9s gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des requ\u00eates malform\u00e9es.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 KB emc168869 d\u0027EMC pour l\u0027obtention\ndes correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-5323",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5323"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-10-12T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-10-12T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Avis de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 TippingPoint DVLabs du 10 octobre 2007 :",
"url": "http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-07-18"
},
{
"title": "Site officiel d\u0027EMC :",
"url": "http://powerlink.emc.com"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-436",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-10-12T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans EMC RepliStor permettrait une\nex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance par un individu malveillant.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans EMC RepliStor",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 TippingPoint DVLabs du 10 octobre 2007",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
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