CERTA-2007-AVI-431
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-10-10 - Updated: 2007-10-10
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans les clients de messagerie Microsoft Outlook Express et Windows Mail. Elle concerne l'interprétation de trames du protocole NNTP. L'exploitation de cette dernière, à distance et par le biais de paquets spécialement construits, peut provoquer l'exécution de code arbitraire sur le système vulnérable.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans les clients de messagerie Microsoft Outlook Express et Windows Mail. Elle concerne l'interprétation de trames du protocole NNTP (pour Network News Transfer Protocol). Ce dernier est utilisé pour échanger des informations de type news. Il a été initialement présenté dans le standard RFC 977 (1986), lui-même remplacé par le plus récent RFC 3977 (2006). Les ports TCP couramment utilisés pour les échanges de données sont 119/TCP et 563/TCP (NNTPS).
L'exploitation de cette vulnérabilité, à distance et par le biais de paquets spécialement construits, peut provoquer l'exécution de code arbitraire sur le système vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité MS07-056 de Microsoft pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
- Microsoft Outlook Express 6 ;
- Microsoft Outlook Express 6 Service Pack 1 ;
- Microsoft Outlook Express 5.5 Service Pack 2 ;
- Windows Mail (Vista).
Cela concerne donc les versions Outlook Express 6 (Service Pack 1 inclus).
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Outlook Express 6 ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Outlook Express 6 Service Pack 1 ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Outlook Express 5.5 Service Pack 2 ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eWindows Mail (Vista).\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e \u003cP\u003eCela concerne donc les versions Outlook Express 6 (Service Pack 1 inclus).\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans les clients de messagerie\nMicrosoft Outlook Express et Windows Mail. Elle concerne\nl\u0027interpr\u00e9tation de trames du protocole NNTP (pour Network News Transfer\nProtocol). Ce dernier est utilis\u00e9 pour \u00e9changer des informations de type\nnews. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 initialement pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans le standard RFC 977 (1986),\nlui-m\u00eame remplac\u00e9 par le plus r\u00e9cent RFC 3977 (2006). Les ports TCP\ncouramment utilis\u00e9s pour les \u00e9changes de donn\u00e9es sont 119/TCP et 563/TCP\n(NNTPS).\n\nL\u0027exploitation de cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9, \u00e0 distance et par le biais de\npaquets sp\u00e9cialement construits, peut provoquer l\u0027ex\u00e9cution de code\narbitraire sur le syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 MS07-056 de Microsoft pour\nl\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-3897",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-3897"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "RFC 3977, \"Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)\", October 2006 :",
"url": "http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3977.txt"
},
{
"title": "RFC 977, \"Network News Transfer Protocol, A Proposed Standard for the Stream-Based Transmission of News\", February 2006 :",
"url": "http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc977.txt"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-431",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans les clients de messagerie\nMicrosoft Outlook Express et Windows Mail. Elle concerne\nl\u0027interpr\u00e9tation de trames du protocole NNTP. L\u0027exploitation de cette\nderni\u00e8re, \u00e0 distance et par le biais de paquets sp\u00e9cialement construits,\npeut provoquer l\u0027ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire sur le syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n",
"title": "VUln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Microsoft Outlook Express et Windows Mail",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS07-056 du 09 octobre 2007",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-056.mspx"
}
]
}
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