CERTA-2007-AVI-429
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-10-10 - Updated: 2007-10-10
Une vulnérabilié pourrait permettre à un utilisateur malveillant d'effectuer une élévation de privilèges dans SharePoint.
Description
Cette vulnérabilité permet, via l'exécution de code arbitraire, une élévation de privilèges dans SharePoint. Cette vulnérabilité peut également permettre à un attaquant de modifier le cache d'un utilisateur en exécutant du code arbitraire et entrainer ainsi une fuite d'informations au niveau du poste de travail.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité MS07-059 de Microsoft pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Windows SharePoint Services 3.0 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Office SharePoint Server 2007.",
"product": {
"name": "Office",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nCette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet, via l\u0027ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire, une\n\u00e9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges dans SharePoint. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 peut\n\u00e9galement permettre \u00e0 un attaquant de modifier le cache d\u0027un utilisateur\nen ex\u00e9cutant du code arbitraire et entrainer ainsi une fuite\nd\u0027informations au niveau du poste de travail.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 MS07-059 de Microsoft pour\nl\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-2581",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2581"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-429",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-10-10T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 de certaines donn\u00e9es"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabili\u00e9 pourrait permettre \u00e0 un utilisateur malveillant\nd\u0027effectuer une \u00e9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges dans SharePoint.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Windows SharePoint Services 3.0 et Office SharePoint Server 2007",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS07-059",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-059.mspx"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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