CERTA-2007-AVI-298

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-07-11 - Updated: 2007-07-12

Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le système d'exploitation TOS intégré aux solutions de sécurité 3Com TippingPoint IPS. Un fragmentation de paquets particulière permettrait de contourner la politique de détection mise en place.

Description

Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le système d'exploitation TOS intégré aux solutions de sécurité 3Com TippingPoint IPS. Le service de détection ne fonctionnerait pas correctement sous certaines conditions de fragmentation des trames réseau (IP). L'exploitation de cette vulnérabilité permet ainsi à une personne malveillante distante de contourner les politiques de filtrage et de détection mises en place.

Solution

Se référer à l'alerte de sécurité l'éditeur 3Com pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

None
Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
N/A N/A les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.1.x ;
N/A N/A les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.2.x antérieure à 2.2.5 ;
N/A N/A les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.5.x antérieure à 2.5.2.

Show details on source website

{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [
    {
      "description": "les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.1.x ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "N/A",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.2.x ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 2.2.5 ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "N/A",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "les produits 3Com TippingPoint IPS ayant une version TOS 2.5.x ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 2.5.2.",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "N/A",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "affected_systems_content": null,
  "content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le syst\u00e8me d\u0027exploitation TOS\nint\u00e9gr\u00e9 aux solutions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 3Com TippingPoint IPS. Le service de\nd\u00e9tection ne fonctionnerait pas correctement sous certaines conditions\nde fragmentation des trames r\u00e9seau (IP). L\u0027exploitation de cette\nvuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet ainsi \u00e0 une personne malveillante distante de\ncontourner les politiques de filtrage et de d\u00e9tection mises en place.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 l\u0027alerte de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 l\u0027\u00e9diteur 3Com pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2007-3711",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-3711"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2007-07-11T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2007-07-12T00:00:00",
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Alerte 3Com 3COM-07-002 du 10 juillet 2007, \u00ab TippinPoint    IPS Filter Bypass Vulnerability \u00bb :",
      "url": "http://www.3com.com/securityalert/alerts/3COM-07-002.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Avis de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cybsec du 04 juillet 2007 :",
      "url": "http://www.cybsec.com/vuln/CYBSEC-Security_Pre-Advisory_3Com_TippingPoint_IPS_Detection_Bypass_2.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-298",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2007-07-11T00:00:00.000000"
    },
    {
      "description": "ajout de la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence CVE associ\u00e9e.",
      "revision_date": "2007-07-12T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le syst\u00e8me d\u0027exploitation TOS\nint\u00e9gr\u00e9 aux solutions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 3Com TippingPoint IPS. Un\nfragmentation de paquets particuli\u00e8re permettrait de contourner la\npolitique de d\u00e9tection mise en place.\n",
  "title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans 3Com TippingPoint IPS",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Alerte de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 3COM-07-002 du 10 juillet 2007",
      "url": null
    }
  ]
}



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