CERTA-2007-AVI-293
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-07-11 - Updated: 2007-07-11
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le comportement du pare-feu de Microsoft Vista lié à l'interface Teredo. L'exploitation de celle-ci permettrait à une personne distante d'activer l'interface et de récupérer les informations nécessaires pour initier de nouvelles connexions avec le système vulnérable.
Description
Teredo est un protocole d'encapsulation permettant à une machine isolée de communiquer en IPv6 dans un environnement IPv4. Ce dernier est détaillé dans la note d'information CERTA-2006-INF-004.
Le pare-feu de Microsoft Vista ne filtre pas correctement le trafic à l'intention de l'interface dédiée à Teredo. Cette vulnérabilité s'applique pour toute machine dans un réseau, même exploitant des techniques de translation d'adresses (NAT).
Une personne distante peut ainsi activer cette interface et récupérer les informations nécessaires pour initier de nouvelles connexions avec le système vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité MS07-038 de Microsoft pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows Vista ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows Vista x64 Edition.",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nTeredo est un protocole d\u0027encapsulation permettant \u00e0 une machine isol\u00e9e\nde communiquer en IPv6 dans un environnement IPv4. Ce dernier est\nd\u00e9taill\u00e9 dans la note d\u0027information CERTA-2006-INF-004.\n\nLe pare-feu de Microsoft Vista ne filtre pas correctement le trafic \u00e0\nl\u0027intention de l\u0027interface d\u00e9di\u00e9e \u00e0 Teredo. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9\ns\u0027applique pour toute machine dans un r\u00e9seau, m\u00eame exploitant des\ntechniques de translation d\u0027adresses (NAT).\n\nUne personne distante peut ainsi activer cette interface et r\u00e9cup\u00e9rer\nles informations n\u00e9cessaires pour initier de nouvelles connexions avec\nle syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 MS07-038 de Microsoft pour\nl\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-3038",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-3038"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-07-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-07-11T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Note d\u0027information CERTA-2006-INF-004, \u00ab Migration IPv6 : enjeux de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00bb :",
"url": "http://www.certa.ssi.gouv.fr/site/CERTA-2006-INF-004/"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-293",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-07-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le comportement du pare-feu de\nMicrosoft Vista li\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u0027interface Teredo. L\u0027exploitation de celle-ci\npermettrait \u00e0 une personne distante d\u0027activer l\u0027interface et de\nr\u00e9cup\u00e9rer les informations n\u00e9cessaires pour initier de nouvelles\nconnexions avec le syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du pare-feu Microsoft Vista",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS07-038 du 10 juillet 2007",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-038.mspx"
}
]
}
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