CERTA-2007-AVI-217
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-05-11 - Updated: 2007-05-11
De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans certains produits de la société CA. Ces vulnérabilités permettent à une utilisateur malintentionné de conduire des attaques par déni de service ou d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans certains produits de la société CA :
- La première vulnérabilité résulte d'un débordement de tampon au niveau du traitement des identifiants. L'exploitation de cette vulnérabilité permet d'exécuter des commandes arbitraires à distance via le port 12168/TCP.
- La seconde faille est due à un débordement de tampon présent au niveau de la bibliothèque InoCore.dll. Cette vulnérabilité peut être exploitée localement afin d'élever ses privilèges.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | CA Anti-Spyware (eTrust PestPatrol) version r8 et versions antérieures. | ||
| N/A | N/A | CA Threat Manager (eTrust Integrated Threat Management) version r8 et versions antérieures ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | CA Anti-Virus for the Enterprise (eTrust Antivirus) version r8 et versions antérieures ; |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "CA Anti-Spyware (eTrust PestPatrol) version r8 et versions ant\u00e9rieures.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "CA Threat Manager (eTrust Integrated Threat Management) version r8 et versions ant\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "CA Anti-Virus for the Enterprise (eTrust Antivirus) version r8 et versions ant\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans certains produits de la\nsoci\u00e9t\u00e9 CA :\n\n- La premi\u00e8re vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9sulte d\u0027un d\u00e9bordement de tampon au\n niveau du traitement des identifiants. L\u0027exploitation de cette\n vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permet d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter des commandes arbitraires \u00e0 distance\n via le port 12168/TCP.\n- La seconde faille est due \u00e0 un d\u00e9bordement de tampon pr\u00e9sent au\n niveau de la biblioth\u00e8que InoCore.dll. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre\n exploit\u00e9e localement afin d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-2523",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2523"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-2522",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2522"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-05-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-05-11T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de CA du 10 mai 2007 :",
"url": "http://supportconnectw.ca.com/public/antivirus/infodocs/caav-secnotice050807.asp"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-217",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-05-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "De multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans certains produits\nde la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 CA. Ces vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s permettent \u00e0 une utilisateur\nmalintentionn\u00e9 de conduire des attaques par d\u00e9ni de service ou\nd\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Multiples Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s des produits CA",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 CA du 10 mai 2007",
"url": null
}
]
}
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