CERTA-2007-AVI-187
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-04-25 - Updated: 2007-04-25
Un erreur dans PostgreSQL permet à un utilisateur d'élever ses privilèges et d'exécuter du code avec les privilèges de la fonction security-definer.
Description
Une erreur dans la fonction security-definer peut être exploitée par un utilisateur malveillant non privilégié pour élever ses privilèges puis utiliser des objets temporaires. Le code de l'utilisateur malveillant est alors exécuté avec les privilèges de la fonction security-definer.
Solution
Passer à l'une des versions 8.2.4, 8.1.9, 8.0.13, 7.4.17 ou 7.3.19. Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
PostgreSQL, versions 7.x et 8.x.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003ePostgreSQL\u003c/SPAN\u003e, versions 7.x et 8.x.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne erreur dans la fonction security-definer peut \u00eatre exploit\u00e9e par un\nutilisateur malveillant non privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 pour \u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges puis\nutiliser des objets temporaires. Le code de l\u0027utilisateur malveillant\nest alors ex\u00e9cut\u00e9 avec les privil\u00e8ges de la fonction security-definer.\n\n## Solution\n\nPasser \u00e0 l\u0027une des versions 8.2.4, 8.1.9, 8.0.13, 7.4.17 ou 7.3.19. Se\nr\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-2138",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2138"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-04-25T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-04-25T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Site du projet PostgreSQL :",
"url": "http://www.postgresql.org/download/"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-187",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-04-25T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "\u00c9levation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Un erreur dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003ePostgreSQL\u003c/span\u003e permet \u00e0 un\nutilisateur d\u0027\u00e9lever ses privil\u00e8ges et d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code avec les\nprivil\u00e8ges de la fonction security-definer.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de PostgreSQL",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de version PostgreSQL",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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