CERTA-2007-AVI-170
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-04-11 - Updated: 2007-04-11
Une vulnérabilité présente dans ColdFusion MX 7.x permet à une personne malintentionnée locale de contourner la politique de sécurité et d'exécuter du code arbitraire.
Description
Une vulnérabilité dans ColdFusion MX 7.x permet à un utilisateur local de changer certains fichiers du programme. Ceci permet l'exécution de code arbitraire avec les droits administrateur après redémarrage de ColdFusion.
Solution
Appliquer la procédure de mise à jour disponible sur le site de l'éditeur (cf. section Documentation).
ColdFusion MX 7.x sur Linux et Solaris.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eColdFusion MX 7.x sur Linux et Solaris.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans ColdFusion MX 7.x permet \u00e0 un utilisateur local\nde changer certains fichiers du programme. Ceci permet l\u0027ex\u00e9cution de\ncode arbitraire avec les droits administrateur apr\u00e8s red\u00e9marrage de\nColdFusion.\n\n## Solution\n\nAppliquer la proc\u00e9dure de mise \u00e0 jour disponible sur le site de\nl\u0027\u00e9diteur (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-1874",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-1874"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-170",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 pr\u00e9sente dans ColdFusion MX 7.x permet \u00e0 une personne\nmalintentionn\u00e9e locale de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et\nd\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Adobe ColdFusion MX 7",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Adobe APSB07-08 du 10 avril 2007",
"url": "http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb07-08.html"
}
]
}
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