CERTA-2007-AVI-166
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-04-11 - Updated: 2007-04-11
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le service Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) de Microsoft Windows. Une personne malveillante pourrait l'exploiter en envoyant un paquet spécialement construit vers le système vulnérable, et ainsi prendre le contrôle total de celui-ci.
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le service Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) de Microsoft Windows. Ce service a pour but de faciliter la communication entre périphériques, et s'appuie fréquemment sur les protocoles IP, TCP/UDP et HTTP. Outre une phase de découverte des services disponibles dans le réseau, il offre aussi la possibilité d'envoyer des actions et des notifications d'événements (mises à jour du service par exemple). Ce service est largement mise en œuvre, et se trouve bien souvent activé automatiquement dans les configurations par défaut des appareils. Il fait partie des exceptions autorisées par le pare-feu Windows dans son installation native.
Le système ne manipulerait pas correctement certaines requêtes HTTP. Une personne malveillante pourrait donc envoyer à distance un paquet spécialement construit vers le système vulnérable, et ainsi prendre le contrôle total de celui-ci.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows XP Professional x64 Edition (Service Pack 2 compris).",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le service Universal Plug and\nPlay (UPnP) de Microsoft Windows. Ce service a pour but de faciliter la\ncommunication entre p\u00e9riph\u00e9riques, et s\u0027appuie fr\u00e9quemment sur les\nprotocoles IP, TCP/UDP et HTTP. Outre une phase de d\u00e9couverte des\nservices disponibles dans le r\u00e9seau, il offre aussi la possibilit\u00e9\nd\u0027envoyer des actions et des notifications d\u0027\u00e9v\u00e9nements (mises \u00e0 jour du\nservice par exemple). Ce service est largement mise en \u0153uvre, et se\ntrouve bien souvent activ\u00e9 automatiquement dans les configurations par\nd\u00e9faut des appareils. Il fait partie des exceptions autoris\u00e9es par le\npare-feu Windows dans son installation native.\n\nLe syst\u00e8me ne manipulerait pas correctement certaines requ\u00eates HTTP. Une\npersonne malveillante pourrait donc envoyer \u00e0 distance un paquet\nsp\u00e9cialement construit vers le syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable, et ainsi prendre le\ncontr\u00f4le total de celui-ci.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-1204",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-1204"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Informations sur le service UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) :",
"url": "http://www.upnp.org"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 iDefense du 10 avril 2007 :",
"url": "http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=509"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-166",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le service \u003cspan\nclass=\"textit\"\u003eUniversal Plug and Play\u003c/span\u003e (UPnP) de Microsoft\nWindows. Une personne malveillante pourrait l\u0027exploiter en envoyant un\npaquet sp\u00e9cialement construit vers le syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable, et ainsi\nprendre le contr\u00f4le total de celui-ci.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans le service UPnP de Microsoft Windows",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS07-019 du 10 avril 2007",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-019.mspx"
}
]
}
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