CERTA-2007-AVI-165
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-04-11 - Updated: 2007-06-13
Deux vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans Microsoft Content Management Server (CMS). Exploitées par une personne, celles-ci permettraient l'exécution de code arbitraire à distance sur le système vulnérable ou le contournement de la politique de sécurité (accès illégitime aux données de l'utilisateur, modification des caches de navigation, etc.).
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans Microsoft Content Management Server (CMS), un outil permettant de créer et maintenir du contenu de sites Web :
- la première serait dûe à une mauvaise manipulation d'adresses réticulaires (ou URLs) se trouvant dans les requêtes HTTP pour le CMS. Une personne malveillante pourrait construire un paquet particulier, et l'envoyer vers la machine vulnérable, afin d'en prendre le contrôle complet à distance.
- la seconde consisterait en une vérification incorrecte des entrées fournies par une requête de redirection HTML adressée au client. Une personne malveillante pourrait exploiter cette vulnérabilité pour faire une injection de code indirecte (cross site scripting), ce qui lui permettrait de contourner la politique de sécurité (accès illégitime aux données de l'utilisateur, modification des caches de navigation, etc.).
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
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{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Microsoft Content Management Server (CMS) 2002 Service Pack 2.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Content Management Server (CMS) 2001 Service Pack 1 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans Microsoft Content\nManagement Server (CMS), un outil permettant de cr\u00e9er et maintenir du\ncontenu de sites Web :\n\n1. la premi\u00e8re serait d\u00fbe \u00e0 une mauvaise manipulation d\u0027adresses\n r\u00e9ticulaires (ou URLs) se trouvant dans les requ\u00eates HTTP pour le\n CMS. Une personne malveillante pourrait construire un paquet\n particulier, et l\u0027envoyer vers la machine vuln\u00e9rable, afin d\u0027en\n prendre le contr\u00f4le complet \u00e0 distance.\n2. la seconde consisterait en une v\u00e9rification incorrecte des entr\u00e9es\n fournies par une requ\u00eate de redirection HTML adress\u00e9e au client. Une\n personne malveillante pourrait exploiter cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 pour\n faire une injection de code indirecte (cross site scripting), ce qui\n lui permettrait de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 (acc\u00e8s\n ill\u00e9gitime aux donn\u00e9es de l\u0027utilisateur, modification des caches de\n navigation, etc.).\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-0938",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0938"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-0939",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0939"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-06-13T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-165",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale;",
"revision_date": "2007-04-11T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "mise \u00e0 jour du bulletin MS07-018 le 12 juin 2007 par l\u0027\u00e9diteur.",
"revision_date": "2007-06-13T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans Microsoft Content\nManagement Server (CMS). Exploit\u00e9es par une personne, celles-ci\npermettraient l\u0027ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance sur le syst\u00e8me\nvuln\u00e9rable ou le contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 (acc\u00e8s\nill\u00e9gitime aux donn\u00e9es de l\u0027utilisateur, modification des caches de\nnavigation, etc.).\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Microsoft Content Management Server (CMS)",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS07-018 du 10 avril 2007",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-018.mspx"
}
]
}
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