CERTA-2007-AVI-050
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2007-01-24 - Updated: 2007-01-25None
Description
Plusieurs vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans le système d'exploitation Cisco IOS. Elles touchent les couches protocolaires TCP, IPv4 et IPv6 :
- la couche TCP ne manipulerait pas correctement les numéros de séquence et les valeurs acquittées ; une personne malveillante pourrait envoyer plusieurs paquets exploitant cette vulnérabilité, afin de provoquer un déni de service ;
- la couche IPv4 ne manipulerait pas correctement le champ IP option. Une personne malveillante pourrait ainsi envoyer un paquet avec une en-tête IP contenant un champ mal conçu et une autre en-tête particulière ICMP, PIMv2, PGM ou URD afin d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance ;
- la couche IPv6 ne manipulerait pas correctement des options de routage par la source (Type 0 Routing Headers), pouvant conduire à un dysfonctionnement du système vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer aux bulletins de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Toutes les versions de CISCO IOS Software (9.x, 10.x, 11.x et 12.x).",
"product": {
"name": "IOS",
"vendor": {
"name": "Cisco",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans le syst\u00e8me\nd\u0027exploitation Cisco IOS. Elles touchent les couches protocolaires TCP,\nIPv4 et IPv6 :\n\n- la couche TCP ne manipulerait pas correctement les num\u00e9ros de\n s\u00e9quence et les valeurs acquitt\u00e9es ; une personne malveillante\n pourrait envoyer plusieurs paquets exploitant cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9,\n afin de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service ;\n- la couche IPv4 ne manipulerait pas correctement le champ IP option.\n Une personne malveillante pourrait ainsi envoyer un paquet avec une\n en-t\u00eate IP contenant un champ mal con\u00e7u et une autre en-t\u00eate\n particuli\u00e8re ICMP, PIMv2, PGM ou URD afin d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code\n arbitraire \u00e0 distance ;\n- la couche IPv6 ne manipulerait pas correctement des options de\n routage par la source (Type 0 Routing Headers), pouvant conduire \u00e0\n un dysfonctionnement du syst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer aux bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2007-0481",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0481"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-0480",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0480"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2007-0479",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0479"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2007-01-24T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2007-01-25T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 72372 du 24 janvier 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070124-IOS-IPv6.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 81734 du 24 janvier 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070124-crafted-ip-option.shtml"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco ID 72318 du 24 janvier 2007 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070124-crafted-tcp.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2007-AVI-050",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2007-01-24T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "ajout des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences CVE et modification des risques.",
"revision_date": "2007-01-25T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s de certaines couches protocolaires dans Cisco IOS",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco du 24 janvier 2007",
"url": null
}
]
}
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